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ABSTRACT 
 
Mabel Denzin Gergan: Precarity and Possibility at the Margins: Hazards, Infrastructure, and 
Indigenous Politics in Sikkim, India. 
(Under the direction of: Dr. Sara Smith) 
 
 
This research aims to understand the intimate linkages between hazards, infrastructure, 
and indigenous politics in the context of anti-dam activism and a 6.9 magnitude earthquake in the 
Eastern Himalayan state of Sikkim, India. The Indian Himalayan Region, a climate change 
hotspot, is witnessing a massive surge in large scale infrastructural development alongside an 
increase in the frequency and intensity of natural hazard events. Earthquakes and landslides near 
hydropower project sites, along with incidents of shamanic possession by angered mountain 
deities, raised serious doubts about the viability of hydropower projects for both local 
communities and regional technocrats. I take a materialist and postcolonial approach to examine 
how state apathy combined with the visceral quality of ecological precarity, has prompted 
solidarity between disparate groups and demands for policies and projects sensitive to the 
region’s cultural and geo-physical particularities. I also foreground the experiences of indigenous 
youth to demonstrate how environmental vulnerability has a direct bearing on young people’s 
lives, labor, and politics. Young people are at the center of this research as it interrogates how 
these myriad transformations are shaping their political subjectivities, which are ultimately tied 
to the political, cultural, and ecological future of this region. Employing qualitative and 
participatory research methodologies I present a fine-grained analysis of the geo-physical
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cultural, and political processes that interrupt the centralization of state authority and 
environmental governance in the Himalayan region. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: NEGOTIATING SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MARGINS 
1.1. Introduction  
 
But what will be saved for coming generations? What is Sikkim’s future? 
Certainly it is overshadowed by the Red China-India struggle; Mr. Nehru calls 
this “a drama of which only the beginnings have been seen and no one knows 
what the end will be.” Sikkim’s tranquility could be swept away overnight. (Doig, 
National Geographic 1963:429) 
If we bring a small country like Sikkim within our fold by using force, it would be 
like killing a fly with a bullet. (Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, The Statesman, 
3 June 1960 in Datta-Ray 1984) 
I have no words when [the] Indian army was sent today in a surprise attack on 
Sikkim Guards who are less than 300 strong and were trained, equipped and 
officered by [the] Indian army who looked upon each other as comrades…This is 
a most treacherous and black day in the history of democratic India in solving the 
survival of our little country by use of arms. (The 12th Chogyal [Monarch] to 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, 9 April 1975 in Datta-Ray 1984) 
These three quotes, briefly and dramatically, encapsulate how the “little country” of 
Sikkim, an independent Buddhist monarchy bordering Nepal, China, and Bhutan, became the 
22nd state of India in 1975. While this hostile breach of trust by the Indian State took the 12th 
monarch of Sikkim, Palden Thondup Namgyal by surprise, similar events had already been 
unfolding elsewhere in the world. The massive wave of decolonization spurred by World War II 
saw many newly independent Asian, African, and Latin American countries, frantically 
attempting to consolidate their territorial integrity. As Krishna (1996) points out this 
“cartographic anxiety” (509) was especially heightened at the territorial margins and encounters 
between the state and its frontiers can be seen as indicative of “the contested and tortured 
production of sovereign identity” (508).
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What then becomes of places like Sikkim that find their nascent aspirations for sovereignty 
crushed, replaced instead by a regional identity that must now exist as a margin to an imagined 
core? Moreover what becomes of the many people who inhabit these places, who already existed 
at the margins of these kingdoms and princely states, even before they were incorporated into 
larger nation-states?  
This dissertation tells the story of one such margin and its people, from a snapshot in 
time, as they resist and desire continual attempts by both a physical and epistemic core, to secure 
these sites of “cartographic anxiety” (Krishna 1996). In present day Sikkim, remnants of the 
former kingdom and its symbols of sovereignty are still on display, the Sikkimese national flag 
on taxis being the most evident of these. This kingdom nostalgia, notwithstanding, since its 
merger with India almost forty years ago, Sikkim has proven to be a model, disciplined state. 
Unlike the tragic state-sponsored violence unfolding in border areas like Kashmir and Manipur 
through draconian laws like AFSPA (Armed Forces Special Powers Act), Sikkim is lauded for 
being one of the most peaceful states in India. But for the younger generation of voters, the 
resentment felt by their parent’s generation towards the Indian state is slowly giving way to 
resentment closer to home. Despite winning numerous accolades for tourism, public works, and 
agriculture, for many years now Sikkim has had one of the highest rates of unemployment in the 
country (Labor Bureau 2015). More recently, the state has also held the unfortunate distinction of 
having the highest rate of suicide in India (National Crime Records Bureau 2012). Growing 
economic precarity especially among young people threatens to destabilize, what on the surface 
appears to be a tranquil state.  
Along with questions of income inequality and a shrinking public sector, ecological 
precarity has recently taken center stage in Sikkim. Concerns around infrastructure and hazards, 
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occupy a huge place in the Sikkimese imaginary and its relationship to ‘mainland’ India. My 
mother belongs to Sikkim and every year we would travel there during our summer vacations. 
These summer trips unfortunately almost always coincided with the early onset of monsoon 
rains. My most vivid memories of these trips are of the hours stuck in traffic jams caused by 
heavy rains and landslides. Indian army trucks filled with nauseated jawans (soldiers), buses and 
shared taxis bustling with locals and large contingents of Bengali tourists, would form a snake-
like procession on the narrow, circuitous NH-1 highway, the only road connecting Sikkim to the 
rest of India. In between complaints about the loud madisey (people from the plains) tourists, the 
incessant monsoon rains and the numerous landslides, my uncle would brush us up on Sikkimese 
history and his fear of a Chinese invasion. Just hours ago when we crossed into Sikkim through 
the Siliguri corridor [See Fig 5, page 107] in West Bengal, my uncle had remarked, “This is 
where India ends and Sikkim begins.” Despite this emotional disassociation from India most 
Sikkimese people like my uncle, believed that the Indian state had a responsibility to its margins, 
a responsibility that had not yet been fulfilled. On the other side of the border, China had 
successfully built wide open highways, large enough to accommodate tanks and on the Indian 
side not only was the road infrastructure questionable, army jawans were notorious among locals 
for their inability to navigate mountainous roads. After all, as my uncle pointed out, “How can a 
madisey drive in the mountains?” In 2011, when a 6.9 magnitude earthquake shook Sikkim, 
similar concerns would be echoed by many others. The NH-1 highway had been blocked due to 
massive landslides triggered by the earthquake, severely hampering rescue operations. Within 
Sikkim, it took several weeks to reach far-flung areas especially in the North District where the 
epicenter had been located. People’s fears this time around were not directed across the border 
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but at the massive hydropower infrastructure which promised roads and greater connectivity and 
instead, as investigations would later reveal, had rendered the region even more vulnerable.   
Geo-political, cultural, and geophysical anxieties have heavily shaped regional 
imaginaries and the relationship between the Himalayan margins and mainland India. This 
dissertation presents a fine-grained analysis of the geo-physical, cultural, and political processes 
that interrupt the Indian state’s attempt to secure this strategic frontier region. I was introduced to 
these questions and concerns while examining inter-generational relations during my M.A. 
research in the indigenous Lepcha reserve of Dzongu in North Sikkim in 2007. Like many other 
academics and scholars, I had been drawn to Dzongu because of the rarity of indigenous reserves 
in India and the many challenges that threatened their existence. My mother also belongs to the 
Lepcha tribe (though not from the reserve) and this was also an attempt to connect with her 
culture and history. In retrospect (and after an embarrassing perusal of my M.A. thesis) I realized 
how I had been driven by a near orientalist fascination of the ‘untouched’ indigenous culture of 
the Dzongu Lepchas, a tendency that is evident in much of the early scholarship on the reserve 
and its inhabitants (Subba and Po’dar 1991). During the end of my M.A. research in 2007, 
Dzongu started garnering attention because of a hunger strike launched by its youth against 
hydropower projects planned within the reserve. Hopefully older and wiser now, this dissertation 
though still focused on Dzongu and the Lepcha tribe, I will tell a far more complex and nuanced 
story, that sheds light on the many ways marginalized groups especially their youth, faced with 
ecological and economic precarity, negotiate their relationship with the nation-state. At the 
center of this research then is the question: what are the material, cultural, and political processes 
that are reorienting the relationship of the physical and epistemic margins to the core? 
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Drawing on literature from political ecology, post-humanist and materialist geography, 
post-colonial and decolonial theory, indigenous politics, and geographies of young people, I 
demonstrate how environmental risk and vulnerability is reorienting the relationship between the 
state and marginalized groups like the Lepchas. I conducted ethnographic and participatory 
research over two predissertation surveys (2011, 2012) and ten months of fieldwork (2013-2014) 
in Gangtok, the capital town of Sikkim and Dzongu reserve in North Sikkim. My fieldwork in 
2014, took place during India’s national and Sikkim’s state elections. Since 2011, earthquakes 
and landslides near hydropower project sites, along with incidents of shamanic possession by 
angered mountain deities had raised serious doubts about the viability of hydropower projects for 
both locals and state technocrats. Along with interviews with indigenous activists, panchayat 
(village governance officials) members, civil society members, geologists and disaster 
management officials, I was able to witness how questions of economic and ecological precarity, 
e.g. youth unemployment and earthquakes, were often conflated and took central place in 
electoral debates and political rhetoric. My research highlights how indigenous knowledge 
systems and young people’s political subjectivities are being shaped by the contentious politics 
of hydropower development in the Himalayas. I also draw on interviews with regional 
technocrats and scientists, to demonstrate how state technocracy in its critique of hydropower 
project developers specifically their construction practices, is implicated in the production of a 
Sikkimese regional identity. In the sections that follow, I first outline literature on South Asian 
borders and margins that provide an important framework to the dissertation, I then provide a 
brief historical background of Sikkim, following which I detail my research methodology and 
then conclude with an explanation of the dissertation format.  
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1.2 Becoming a borderland  
 
The Indian Himalayan Region is projected to experience the most severe climate change 
outside the poles but despite its geo-political and ecological significance many scholars have 
noted that like many frontier spaces, this region has existed at the conceptual peripheries of 
knowledge production. Schendel (2002:652) critiques the Euro-centric impulse behind area 
studies which subsumes peripheries of regional heartlands, “under the scholarly rubric of an 
‘area’ only to be ignored, othered, made illegible.” He argues that the institutional structure of 
Area Studies has been predicated on the marginalization of certain regions and types of 
knowledges. Schendel (2013) has noted elsewhere that in the case of South Asia, borderlands 
studies have been slow to develop because of a “methodological nationalism” prevalent among 
social scientists as well as state restrictions that made ‘sensitive’ areas out of bounds for 
research. This “methodological nationalism”, implies a reading of the margins through the lens 
of the Indian nation state, a process wherein the nation-state is assumed to be “the natural context 
and container for all social and political processes” (Gellner 2013:2). The Indian Himalayan 
region then exists at the physical margins of India and the cognitive margins of South Asian and 
South East Asian studies
1
.  
However for the many scholars who have chosen to study the Himalayan region, 
especially as it exists as marginal to state power, an influential framework has been the ‘Zomia’ 
concept originally conceptualized by historian Willem Van Schendel (2002) and later 
popularized by James Scott (2009). Schendel (2002:653) demarcates Zomia as a contiguous area 
that covers parts of South Asia, Central Asia and East Asia and derives the name from zomi, “a 
                                                 
1
 However this scholarly oversight is gradually being rectified with groups like the Asian Borderlands Research 
Network which focuses particularly on Northeastern India and the upland areas adjacent to it.  
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term for highlander in a number of Chin-Mizo-Kuki languages spoken in Burma, India and 
Bangladesh.” Despite having many of the required criterions, such as language affinities, 
spiritual traditions, ancient trade networks, this geographic area failed to qualify as a region 
within traditional area studies. One of the main reasons for this failure according to Schendel is 
that Zomia includes politically marginal areas that actively resisted projects of nation-building 
and state-making. Highlander communities were often excluded  from “discourses of citizenship, 
and cast in the roles of non-nationals, alien elements, or poachers of the state’s forestry resources 
who could be redeemed only by assimilating to the lowland ‘mainstream” (Schendel 2002: 655). 
James Scott took up the Zomia concept with great enthusiasm in his 2009 book on peasant and 
subaltern forms of resistance in The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland 
Southeast Asia. Extending Schendel’s conceptualization, Scott argues that Zomia comprises of 
Fig 1: The Indian Himalayan Region (IHR): The IHR consists of ten states and shares borders 
with six countries (Map created by Timothy Stallman) 
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state-evading societies and cultures that in their attempt to keep the state at bay create a “non-
state space” or “zones of refuge”. While both Schendel and Scott do not extend the Zomia region 
to include the Central and Northern Himalayan region, scholars like Shneiderman (2010: 290) 
believe that the concept has great analytical value for those interested in the entire Himalayan 
massif and provides “a new framework within which the historically strong focus of Himalayan 
studies on highland peripheries may be productively united with a more contemporary concern 
for the political histories of national formations and their ‘state effects’.”  
Scholars working in the Indian Himalayan region while acknowledging the importance of 
the Zomia conceptualization have also critiqued it in the light of both contemporary and 
historical political realities. Karlsson (2014) writing in the context of North-East India notes that 
physiography specificities and inter-ethnic relations have had a stronger influence on highlander 
political and cultural life than “state-evading” impulses. He also argues that the Zomia 
theorization cannot explain contemporary movements in this region that are demanding state 
recognition, wherein we observe people of this region, “straddle[ing] between a kind of longing 
for the state and the opposite, that is, a rejection of it.” (Karlsson 2014: 329). Wouters (2012) 
takes a more historical approach to Scott’s theorization that hills population are marked by a 
centrifugal movement away from the state while a more centripetal process characterizes life in 
the valley state. However Wotuers (2012) argues that studying the history of pre-modern states 
that existed in the Brahamaputra valley, an opposite flow, i.e., people deliberately moving from 
hills into the ‘state-ridden’ plains, can also be observed. Arguing against Scott, Wouters 
(2012:61) claims that “the history of those dwelling in the hills can equally be read as the history 
of their deliberate attempts to access state resources.”  Both Wouters (2012) and Karlsson (2014) 
while offering a critique of the Zomia theorization also demonstrate how Himalayan scholars 
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(including North East India) interested in studying contemporary political and economic realities 
of the region are also tasked with developing the theoretical scaffolding that will anchor future 
debates and interventions.    
The Zomia debate illustrates how the processes that shaped and are shaping this region 
are inherently geographical questions that closely intersect with recent debates within the 
discipline including but not limited to questions of citizenship, sovereignty, state-making 
practices, trans-boundary relations, climate change, and the Anthropocene. Within geography, 
while there has been a long tradition of borderland studies, the focus has primarily been on North 
America and Europe, partly due to disciplinary Euro-centricism and partly due to the relatively 
newer borders of post-colonial regions (Gellner 2013). A recent corrective to this disciplinary 
oversight can be found in Cons and Sanyal’s (2013:2) special issue in Political Geography, 
which engages South Asian borders as “margins of the state and nation, places at once removed 
from and central to debates about identity, security, risk, and survival.” Identifying South Asian 
borderlands as a productive site of inquiry, they argue for a conceptual linking of geographies of 
borders and margins since, “Theoretical debates over borders and margins, [thus,] appear at 
opposite ends….the former arguably overspecified and empirical, the latter, again arguably, 
under-specified and vague.” (Cons and Sanyal 2013:5). I contribute to these recent discussions 
within the discipline by drawing attention to the Eastern Himalayan borderlands, its multiple 
margins and the myriad ways in which these margins are contested and enrolled in political and 
cultural projects. I do this by linking hazards, large infrastructural projects, and indigenous 
politics to examine their interactions at the local, regional and national level. Sikkim is an 
important site of analysis because of its recent inclusion within the Indian state, and is instructive 
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of the ways in which ethnic minorities from marginal spaces negotiate claims over resources, 
space, and political power.  
1.3 Historical Background of Sikkim and Dzongu 
 
In the postcolonial context, the case of Sikkim elucidates how kingdoms and princely 
states each with their own dynamic histories were incorporated into a larger hegemonic state and 
suddenly found themselves at the peripheries of political and economic affairs. Sikkim’s early 
history was shaped by its relations with Tibet, Nepal, and Bhutan, with Tibet emerging as an ally 
that heavily influenced its military, political, and religious life. The Sikkimese state is said to 
have been formed in 1642, with the coronation of the first Chogyal Phuntsog Namgyal, a prince 
of the Minyak house in Kham, Tibet. According to Sikkimese religious mythology, this 
coronation had been foretold by Guru Padmasambhava in the 8
th
 century, who is said to have 
first introduced Buddhism to Sikkim (Balicki 2008). It is also believed that in the 13
th
 century a 
blood brotherhood treaty was agreed upon by three
2
 groups, the Tibetan king, Khe-Bhumsa, the 
Lepcha ruler, Thinkung Tek and the Limbu community, at Kabi village in North Sikkim that 
assured native populations of the noble and upright intentions of the new Tibetan rulers (Subba 
2010). Even today, the altar where this treaty was made by placing stones as witnesses, known as 
Kabi Longchok, is still well preserved. Several years later in 1642, Phuntsog Namgyal, a 
descendant of Khe-Bhumsa, was crowned by three revered monks at Yuksam, West Sikkim, 
which then became the first capital of the newly established Sikkimese kingdom.  
                                                 
2
 While it was believed that the treaty was signed only between the Tibetan and Lepcha rulers (Arora 2007), scholars 
like Subba (2010) have argued that the Limbu groups, who are also indigenous to the region, were also present at the 
signing of the treaty as a third party. While these debates are difficult to prove because of the paucity of historical 
records, they signal the growing demands and recognition for indigeneity especially by groups like the Limbus who 
have received much less scholarly and political attention than the Lepcha and Bhutia communities.   
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Sikkim was a historical crossroads with a geographic location that from early on had been 
highly desirable (Balicki 2008). While much of this historical cum religious narrative assumes a 
smooth transition and acceptance of Tibetan monarchy, Mullard (2011) has argued that the first 
Chogyal did not as much found the Sikkimese state as he convinced several proto-states 
inhabited by different people groups ( including the Lepchas), to consolidate their territory in 
exchange for protection. Similar historical processes were also at work in neighboring 
Himalayan valleys like Nepal for example, where small settlements existed at the outer fringes of 
state control with significant degree of local autonomy until the intensification of state 
consolidation (Lim 2004). Sikkim’s strategic location led to continual warfare with both Nepal 
and Bhutan, resulting in significant loss of territory and provided the initial impetus for this 
territorial consolidation. Foning (1987) in Lepcha, My Vanishing Tribe details the historical and 
contemporary processes of cultural erasure and argues that Lepchas never resisted the Tibetan 
invasion, pointing instead at systematic efforts of cultural suppression of native groups. However 
Mullard (2010) believes the reality of these proto-states was far more complex than one of 
assimilation and subjugation. While the Lepchas and Limbus formed a subject population that 
did indeed lose much of their cultural heritage in the wake of religious conversions, their 
acceptance of the monarchy was far from uniform. There is at least one recorded instance of a 
joint Lepcha and Limbu rebellion against Phuntsog Namgyal in the 1650s however beyond this 
there is little evidence that can prove whether later on, these groups allied willingly or by force 
(Mullard 2010: 56).  
While the early history of Sikkim was heavily shaped by its Tibetan rulers who 
introduced Buddhism alongside political and feudal relations that mirrored Tibetan society, the 
proto-states turned feudal aristocracy were semi-autonomous and their hold over tax revenues 
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allowed them to exert significant control over the Chogyal. It was these ethnic and political 
fractures that the British discovered centuries later when they entered the scene around 1814. In 
the early 19
th
 century Sikkim was a politically fragmented state with a weakened monarch and 
the British exploited the competing interests of the feudal aristocracy to their advantage (Mullard 
2011). However it was the growing antagonism with the British that laid the foundation for a 
Sikkimese nationalist narrative to develop that drew on the spiritual and religious legitimacy of 
the monarch (Hiltz 2008). This narrative was further entrenched in the context of decolonization 
when Sikkim became a protectorate of the Indian state.  
If Sikkim’s early history is obscured by both political history and religion, Dzongu’s 
history is far more elusive. Dzongu was accorded special protection under the Chogyal and the 
British, wherein non-reserve residents were not allowed to permanently settle (the exception 
being marriage) or purchase reserve land. This special status continues even till today under 
article 371 (f) of the Indian constitution that upholds the old laws and traditions of Sikkim. 
According to Gorer (1937) a British anthropologist who conducted ethnographic work in the 
Lingthem village of Dzongu, the reserve was part of the Chogyal’s private estate and was 
administered by one of the hereditary landlords or kazis. Foning (1987: 260) however believes 
that the reserve was set up by the British who were sympathetic to the Lepchas and after 
observing their abject condition under the Chogyal, decided to set up the reserve in the first half 
of the 19
th
 century in order to safeguard the tribe’s culture. But it is Gorer’s version that is widely 
accepted and corroborated through historical records of a royal proclamation in 1956 by Tashi 
Namgyal (Bhutia 2012:36).  While there is not much clarity about the political impetus behind 
demarcating this particular geographic area as a Lepcha reserve or why so many members of the 
tribe chose to settle in this location, there is a plethora of cultural and spiritual explanations 
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behind the importance of this landscape to Lepchas. All the important mythologies and origin 
stories of the Lepchas can be traced back to Dzongu (Tamsang 1983; Foning 1987). The Sangha 
of Dzongu, a group comprising of monks in Dzongu, have highlighted that many of the important 
sacred places in Dzongu such as the Tholung monastery and Kishung lake have been explicitly 
mentioned in the Nesol a Buddhist ritual text (Arora 2007). The idea of Dzongu as a sacred 
landscape of the ‘vanishing’ Lepchas gained further traction during the anti-dam protests where 
spiritual and cultural narratives were woven into concerns around environmental protection. 
This brief historical context of Sikkim and Dzongu provides three important insights into 
the political and ethnic politics of present day Sikkim that speak directly to this dissertation 
research. First, Sikkim’s dynamic political history now exists as fragmented knowledge diluted 
with popular mythology. To date there is a dearth of research on Sikkim’s history that does not 
merely revert to its Buddhist origin story (an important exception being Mullard 2011). 
Furthermore, histories of areas like Dzongu and its inhabitants that can provide important 
insights into the marginalization and political claims of groups like the Lepcha are even more 
difficult to excavate. Second, despite its transition to democracy in 1975, Sikkimese polity still 
retains a strong feudal nature characterized by deep inequality which exists even within the same 
ethnic groups. For example we find Lepcha families that at the time of the monarchy were feudal 
aristocrats, have retained considerable material wealth and access to political patronage (Bentley 
forthcoming). Third, we find that oral or written histories and mythologies of these proto-states 
were completely subsumed under Buddhist Sikkimese nationalism, which in turn finds itself 
subsumed under Indian nationalism. These multiple erasures of histories have led to deep-seated 
cultural anxieties among several groups including the Lepchas that today manifest in a variety of 
political and cultural demands on the state.   
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The anti-dam struggle of the Lepcha youth therefore is not just a reaction to 
contemporary political and ecological transformations but must be understood as ancient 
histories that are being driven to the surface by earthquakes and angry deities, among other 
things. Examining the political and cultural demands arising from social movements such as the 
Lepchas anti-dam movement can provide insights, however fractured and incomplete, into some 
of these questions and concerns. However these histories cannot be examined in isolation and 
must be brought into conversation with the histories of the dominant nation-states like India in 
this case and other ethnic-groups. Shneiderman (2013) writing in the context of the border-
crossing Thangmi community of Nepal, argues that processes of migration and mixture in the 
region remain severely under-theorized. Most scholarship that attempts to understand the process 
of state-formation in this region focuses either on “the Indic” or “the Tibetan”, placing them in 
opposition to each other when what is required is “an astute examination of the contingencies of 
political history and nationally-specific trajectories in the Himalayan region, as well as the 
recognition of the cultural, linguistic and religious fluidity that defines the lived experience of 
many border citizens.” (29) Young people are at the center of this study because of their unique 
position as interlocutors who traverse myriad worlds (virtual and physical; the village and the 
city; state and community; international and local and so on) sometimes with ease, sometimes 
with unease. This dissertation foregrounds the experiences of indigenous youth to demonstrate 
how environmental vulnerability has a direct bearing on marginalized young people’s lives, 
labor, and politics. I began this research with the following three research questions and the 
chapters that follow seek to answer these questions:  
1. What socio-material spaces of public engagement have opened/closed at the intersection of 
hydropower development and indigenous youth activism?  
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2. How are technocratic and indigenous worldviews being co-constituted as they encounter each 
other? And what specific technologies are mediating this co-constitution?   
3. In what ways are young Lepcha activists asserting new political subjectivities in the face of 
racialized and exclusionary state development practices? 
1.4 Methodology  
 
A central argument of my research is that, indigenous articulations shift our 
understanding of social movements from simply a politics of identity to a politics of knowledge. 
This entails questioning pre-given epistemological and ontological underpinnings. Critical 
feminist and performance theory have pushed for a deeper engagement with questions of 
methodology. If we acknowledge that the production of knowledge is a deeply political process 
then how is this understanding reflected in our own research methodologies? The researcher’s 
positionality is an important starting point. My mother belongs to the Lepcha tribe and Sikkim is 
like a second home to me. Doing ethnographic research in such a setting comes with an 
additional sense of expectation and responsibility. The Lepcha activists welcomed me into their 
homes and their lives as a comrade and a confidant. However, I was never considered a complete 
insider. Two or three generations ago, my mother’s family converted to Christianity which has 
given them significant upward social mobility. Several of my relatives hold important 
government positions and have voiced concerns about my research and how it might affect their 
standing with the ruling party. I am not fluent in Lepcha and have lived and studied outside 
Sikkim. Questions of authenticity and allegiance are important in any indigenous social 
movement. In this context a participatory and collaborative methodology is not an option but a 
political necessity. 
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 My research questions and methods were developed in close collaboration with 
community members over two years of pre-dissertation fieldwork while my association with the 
community has been since my M.A research (2007). I conducted 11 months of multi-sited 
fieldwork, dividing my time between Sikkim’s capital Gangtok and Dzongu in North Sikkim. 
Dzongu is divided into seven Gram Panchayat Units (GPU’s are village-level governance units) 
where I interviewed young people and panchayat members. In total, I conducted 13 interviews 
with panchayat members, 54 interviews with young people, 25 of whom had either supported or 
been involved in anti-dam protests. I conducted semi-structured interviews and questions were 
directed at understanding what it meant to be young in Dzongu. Since many young people had 
returned to the reserve after living in more urban parts of Sikkim, my questions were aimed at 
understanding what challenges they faced in adjusting to life in the reserve and what 
opportunities were available to them. I also asked questions related to the social, cultural and 
political life of the reserve and their level of involvement in each of these spheres. Since this was 
also the lead up the state elections, I attended campaign rallies of the two main political parties 
and attended cultural functions within the village. Following is the break-down of my research 
methodology for each research question: 
1. What socio-material spaces of public engagement have opened/closed at the intersection of 
hydropower technology and indigenous youth activism? 
Since hydropower is still a fairly divisive issue within the reserve, my questions were 
framed more around cultural and ecological concerns. In-depth questions related to hydropower 
projects were mostly directed to anti-dam activists or those who showed a willingness to engage 
in these questions. I conducted semi-structured interviews in Nepali, where I asked questions 
ranging from recent earthquakes; spiritual beliefs about the reserve; reasons for 
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supporting/opposing hydropower, involvement in village and state level politics before and after 
entry of hydropower, nature and level of political involvement and desire to join official politics. 
During interviews, eco-tourism was mentioned so often and due to tensions around eco-tourism 
projects within the reserve, I adapted my questionnaire to include specific questions related to 
the design, infrastructure, and aesthetics of eco-tourism. This was an unanticipated “socio-
material” realm of engagement, which provided rich ethnographic insights into the formation of 
indigenous political subjectivities. Then, to understand how official political processes might be 
influenced by young people’s activism, I used unstructured interviews and participant 
observation to observe events leading up to the state and national elections. I attended village 
level meetings; participated in informal household discussions, and observed election canvassing 
within the village.   
2. How are technocratic and indigenous worldviews being co-constituted in the process? And 
what specific technologies are mediating this co-constitution?  
To answer this question, I conducted semi-structured interviews with state technocrats, 
supplemented with state reports on landslides, disaster management, and post-earthquake 
recovery. To understand state perceptions on hydropower technology, materiality, and expertise 
semi-structured interviews scientists in the Mines, Minerals, and Geology Department, Disaster 
Management Department and the Department of Science and Technology. Questions ranged 
from road connectivity and infrastructure in Sikkim, benefits of hydropower energy, perceptions 
on diversion dam technology, problems posed by seismicity and landslides to hydropower 
development. Then, to understand official discourse these interviews were supplemented by two 
kinds of texts a) Official reports: such as Detailed Project Reports (DPR) of commissioned dams 
and annual reports of each department b) Political discourse: newspaper articles and political 
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speeches which made mention of similar themes. In addition to this I attended two workshops 
one on Disaster Management and the other a youth consultation on Sikkim’s Human 
Development Report. I also had the opportunity to attend a regional level conference, the 
Sustainable Mountain Development Summit, organized by the Integrated Mountain Initiative 
(former Indian Mountain Initiative). This conference brought together stakeholders from various 
states of the Indian Himalayan Region to discuss selected themes around sustainable 
development in mountainous regions with the focus that year being on natural hazards. This 
conference provided important insights into both grassroots and policy level conversations that 
were taking shape in relation to growing ecological precarity and infrastructural development in 
the regional Himalayan context. 
3. In what ways are young Lepcha activists asserting new political subjectivities in the face of 
racialized and exclusionary state development practices? 
To answer this question, I interviewed those young people who had been directly 
involved in the anti-dam protests. I interviewed 25 anti-dam activists using semi-structured 
interviews where questions ranged from perception of Dzongu and Lepcha youth by State, 
Tourists, Non-Lepcha communities and Lepchas from outside the reserve and to what extent they 
agree or disagree with these perceptions, level of involvement in state elections and specific 
plans and projects for Dzongu. My initial plans had involved making a collaborative film with 
Dawa Lepcha, who spearheaded the anti-dam hunger strike and was a trained filmmaker. 
However his involvement in the state elections, where he decided to run for the Member of 
Legislative Assembly from the Dzongu constituency, required sidelining my ambitious plans. 
Instead, I accompanied, Dawa and his entourage of supporters, as they campaigned from village 
to village in Dzongu.  
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1.4 Explanation of the Dissertation Format  
 
This dissertation draws on two published articles, one under-review article, and two unpublished 
articles, the last chapter is the conclusion that summarizes the findings of these chapters and 
presents my future research directions. Below, I include the abstract of each article/chapter and 
their publication status.  
Chapter 2: Animating the Sacred, Sentient and Supernatural 
Materialist and post-humanist scholarship within the discipline has opened up exciting 
philosophical and theoretical possibilities with which to understand both human and nonhuman 
worlds. Yet, recent scholarship has been critical of the modern secular tendencies within this 
approach especially in its lack of engagement with sacred, sentient, and spiritual accounts and 
experiences.  The aim of this review is twofold. First it provides an overview of the concerns that 
drive the most recent work in materialist and post-humanist approaches in geography. Second, it 
presents perspectives from the subfields of indigenous and religious geographies and disciplines 
like anthropology, religious studies, literary fiction, and post-colonial studies that speak directly 
to these concerns. The review is divided into three sections. The first section provides a cursory 
overview of recent materialist and post-humanist work in geography. Surveying recent reviews 
from prominent geography journals, three categories relevant for the present discussion have 
been identified: resource geographies, urban materialities, and the Anthropocene. The second 
section examines three approaches which grapple with similar concerns but offer quite a 
different approach: indigenous ontologies, imaginative geographies, and geographies of religion 
and western spiritual epistemes. The conclusion draws linkages between the first and the second 
sections to argue for a more robust theoretical engagement with the sacred, sentient, and spiritual 
in materialist and post-humanist scholarship within geography. 
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Chapter 3: Precarity and Possibility: On Being Young and Indigenous in Sikkim, India 
In the last decade the Indian Power Ministry began an aggressive campaign for 
hydropower development in its ten Himalayan states. Twenty-nine of these dams were 
commissioned for construction in the small Eastern Himalayan state of Sikkim. In June 2007 
Dzongu a protected reserve of the indigenous Lepchas in North Sikkim became the center of 
controversy when reserve youth went on a hunger strike against seven dams planned within the 
reserve. Their protests garnered enough national and international attention to cancel four of the 
seven dams. However within the reserve there was very little support for the activists who were 
seen as educated, upper class youth, most of whom had studied and lived outside the reserve. In 
this article I narrow the focus on the Dzongu youth and demonstrate how contestations between 
State and indigenous groups often pry open profound contestations within these groups. In 
tracing the trajectory of the Dzongu activists after the protests I examine how they are redefining 
indigeneity, beyond and sometimes in conflict with former connotations. I argue that the anti-
dam protests became a way for Dzongu youth to question state-led development agendas as well 
as elders and urban elite who spoke on behalf of the community. Building on literature in 
indigeneity and geographies of young people, this research draws on the authors M.A. research 
(2007-10), two pre-dissertation surveys (2011, 2012) and ongoing fieldwork. The Indian 
Himalayan region is home to several indigenous groups and is the site of intense geo-political 
anxiety given its proximity to China and Pakistan. I argue that an attention to young people’s 
political articulations can provide a valuable lens in analyzing the politics of nation building, the 
politics of difference and the shifting political subjectivities of marginalized groups. 
Chapter 4 Living with Earthquakes and Angry Deities at the Himalayan Borderlands 
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The Indian Himalayan Region, a climate change hotspot, is witnessing a massive surge in 
hydropower development alongside an increase in natural hazard events. The focus of this paper 
is on indigenous people’s response to ecological precarity, beyond more legible instances of 
social movements or resistance. Through an ethnographic case study of a 6.9 magnitude 
earthquake in the eastern Himalayan state of Sikkim, the site of controversial hydropower 
projects and an indigenous anti-dam protest, I show how marginalized people’s relationship with 
a sacred, animate landscape exceed both scholarly and activist notions of politics. Many in 
Sikkim believe the earthquake was caused by mountain deities, angered by the desecration of its 
sacred physiography. While activists point to these events as a sign of the moral and political 
failure of the state, for non-activist tribe members they raise deeper cosmological concerns. 
While not easily translatable into political action, these concerns signal tensions between the 
minority indigenous religion and the more pervasive Tibetan Buddhism, a history that precedes 
and undergirds contemporary political and ecological transformations. I suggest these spiritual 
narratives are grounded in a longer history of the contested relationship between marginalized 
peoples and hegemonic state and non-state powers. In this, I offer a critique of recent post-
humanist and materialist scholarship and its lack of engagement with indigenous and subaltern 
ontologies. I highlight the relationship between natural hazards, sacred landscapes, and 
indigenous groups, to argue for a more holistic approach to the uneven impacts of climate change 
on mountainous environments and their inhabitants.  
Chapter 5: Geological Anxieties in the Anthropocene at the Unruly Borders of the Indian State:  
The increased frequency of earthquakes and landslides especially near dam construction 
sites, along with incidents of shamanic possession by angered mountain deities, has raised 
serious doubts about the economic and spiritual viability of hydropower development in the 
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Himalayan borderlands. The Nesol, a sacred Buddhist ritual text, warns devotees that desecrating 
the scared landscape of Beyul Demajong, the Tibetan name for Sikkim, can result in natural 
disasters and socio-political unrest. In official reports, Sikkim’s ‘adverse geological conditions’ 
have been described as ‘unpredictable’ and ‘volatile’ (in Kohli 2011:21). As project developers 
soon discover, these projects don’t flow uninterrupted into inert, empty spaces (Tsing 2005). 
Instead, they encounter ‘geological surprises’ (Indian Power Ministry 2008: 27), which delay 
projects or worse, result in the loss of human life, laying bare the ecological and cosmological 
limits of capitalism. In this article, I put recent materialist and post-humanist scholarship on the 
Anthropocene in conversation with indigenous and decolonial theorizing to understand how geo-
physical indeterminacy is deployed by both regional technocrats and indigenous groups, to 
critique the hegemony of ‘national interest’. I explore indigenous and technocratic narratives, to 
interrogate how heightened indeterminacy is mediating and productive of a borderland 
subjectivity grounded in the geo-physical and spiritual particularity of the region. In this my 
attempt is to demonstrate the importance of indeterminacy and a ‘critical geographic 
mobilization of place’ (Jazeel 2011) for environmental politics and marginalized subjectivities in 
the Anthropocene.   
Chapter 6: Concrete or Clay? Eco-Tourism and the Contentious Politics of Designing Lepcha 
Indigeneity 
In the last few years, Dzongu, a reserve of the indigenous Lepcha tribe of Sikkim in 
India, has gained immense popularity as an eco-tourism destination. This success is fuelled by a 
now well-known youth led movement against state sponsored hydropower projects which has 
produced a compelling narrative for the conscientious ‘eco-tourist. Even as eco-tourism emerges 
as a viable option for Dzongu’s growing ranks of educated unemployed youth, the proliferation 
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of concrete structures through state housing initiatives is seen as a threat by young entrepreneurs 
to the ‘rustic’ authenticity of the reserve. Most successful eco-tourism homestays are run by anti-
dam activists who are eager to retain traditional architectural styles and the associated skill and 
knowledge but lack political clout and therefore have little control over what plans and projects 
enter the village. This article examines how decisions related to Dzongu’s built environment are 
incendiary issues closely linked to ongoing political and cultural negotiations. Contestations over 
the design, aesthetics, and architecture of eco-tourism infrastructure are intimately tied to ideas 
of indigeneity and authenticity, inter-generational gaps, and electoral politics. Building on 
literature in indigeneity, spatial politics, critical design studies, and geographies of young people, 
this paper explores the material and spatial production and contestation of state practices to 
understand how young people from marginalized groups navigate unemployment, exclusionary 
state practices, and inter-generational expectations.  
1.8 Contributions of this dissertation  
 
This dissertation research is an intervention into debates about environmental justice in 
an era of rapid industrialization and urbanization especially in the Global South and the 
consequent ecological degradation and income inequality. This work comprises four main 
contributions to the Geography. First, its focus on the Himalayan region highlights a geographic 
and academic area of study, which despite its ecological and geo-political importance, is at the 
conceptual peripheries of knowledge production in both South Asian and South-East Asian 
Studies. Second, it furthers our understanding of environmental politics in the Anthropocene by 
demonstrating the centrality of ecological precarity to indigenous, technocratic, and political 
narratives and practices. Third, it points to overlooked forms of political action and knowledge 
through serious engagement with indigenous narratives of geological and supernatural events. 
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And finally, it reveals the centrality of youth, indigeneity, and colonial legacies of racialization 
to contemporary politics in India, one of this century’s crucibles of global environmental and 
economic change. 
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CHAPTER 2: ANIMATING THE SACRED, SENTIENT AND SPIRITUAL IN POST-
HUMANIST AND MATERIAL GEOGRAPHIES
3
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Geographers should avoid considering the earth as the scene on which the activity 
of man (sic) unfolds itself, without reflecting that this scene is itself living. 
(Carl Sauer, 1925: 321The Morphology of landscape)   
 
Surveying geographical scholarship from the past two decades one can no longer say that 
the discipline has been indifferent to the “livingness” of the earth. The discipline has witnessed a 
shift from the post-structuralist view of politics as an effect of discursive and linguistic practices, 
to the post-humanist expulsion of the human from the ontological center. Consequently, there 
has been an increasing acknowledgement of non-human actors and their agency and role in 
determining political means and ends (Castree and Nash 2004). In these explorations, the human 
subject is just another actor in a dense relational network with other animate and inanimate 
actors. Post-humanist and materialist approaches in geography have drawn on a plethora of 
theoretical and philosophical approaches, most prominently, Deleuze and Guttari (1987), 
Harraway (1990) and Latour (1993), to challenge the belief in human exceptionalism, 
destabilizing the dualisms of nature/culture, human/non-human, theory/method, subject/object 
and structure/agency (Hinchliffe 2007). 
                                                 
3
 This chapter previously appeared as an article in the Geography Compass. The original citation is as follows, 
Gergan, M. D. 2015. Animating the Sacred, Sentient and Spiritual in Post‐Humanist and Material 
Geographies. Geography Compass, 9(5), 262-275.   
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These enquiries have drawn our attention to the entangled nature of human-environment 
relations and their political and ethical consequences (Castree 2003; Whatmore 2002; Loftus 
2012). 
However despite venturing into the fantastical realms of hybrids and cyborgs, most post-
humanist and materialist work has neglected a very obvious site of enquiry into non-
human/more-than-human agency. Accounts and experiences which take seriously, the agency of 
gods, spirits or otherworldly phenomena (a different variety of non-humans) are largely absent 
from post-humanist and materialist work in the discipline. While not all who identify as religious 
or spiritual subscribe to these beliefs and there is significant variation even among those who do, 
there is overwhelming scholarly work in allied disciplines that an inquiry into these belief 
systems, provide crucial insights into both extraordinary and everyday politics (Holloway and 
Valins 2002). However incorporating these perspectives, as this review goes on to examine, 
requires questioning a set of dualisms that reveal the latent power-knowledge hierarchies in post-
humanist and materialist approaches.  
Before I proceed, a brief note on terminology. I use the term ‘religion’ to convey a wide 
spectrum of beliefs, from organized institutional faith, involving a communal experience to more 
personal expressions and practices
4. I use the term ‘sacred’, as the characteristic of a specific 
space, place, object, human or non-human, to elicit awe and reverence
5. I use the term ‘spiritual’ 
                                                 
4
 Geographers writing on religion argue that since it is historically produced and context-specific it is impossible to 
have a single all-encompassing definition of the category. It would be impossible to do justice to the numerous 
debates within the sub-field but for more details see Kong (2001) and Ivakhiv (2006).    
 
5
 Ivakhiv (2006) tells us that this definition of the ‘sacred’, most closely associated with Mircea Eliade (1969) has 
been critiqued for “harboring the very assumptions it is meant to study” (170). The sacred as a “classification of 
persons, places, and things, involving the regulation of behavior toward those objects through rules, protections, and 
prohibition” (ibid) is the more “fruitfully applied” (ibid) approach within the discipline. For the purpose of this 
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and ‘spirituality’ to denote a specific orientation towards sacred space-time, which is open to the 
manifestation of a known “divine or ultimate being” (Holloway 2003:1962) or the “intangible, 
unknowable world of the spirit” (MacKian 2011:69). I use the term ‘sentience’ or ‘sentient’ to 
specifically reference the indigenous belief in the quality of all life
6
 to think, feel and act. In 
specific relation to indigenous ontologies, Hunt (2014) rightly notes that much of the discipline’s 
engagement with indigenous peoples has been fixated on their relations with land and natural 
resources while ignoring other pertinent concerns. Needless to say, the categories this review 
concerns itself with represent merely a facet of indigenous knowledge and experience.  
While geographers have explored how emotions, desires and, affect influence people’s 
relationship with nature, non-humans and the built environment ((Thrift 2004; Pile 2005; Pile 
2010; Sultana 2011) the analytical value of sacred, sentient and spiritual categories in 
understanding political action and knowledge, has not been fully considered or in some cases, 
been purposely dismissed. An example of such a dismissal can be seen in Whatmore’s (2013) 
work on the “onto-politics of ‘natural’ hazards” where she makes the following assumption 
about natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and the focus of her paper – floods:   
Where such powers may once have been attributed to and treated as ‘acts of god’ 
or ‘forces of nature’, today they signal an ontological alliance between interests in 
the propensities, affordances and affectivities of more-than-human phenomena, 
and amplifications of the producedness and contingency of human embodiment. 
(Whatmore 2013, pg. emphasis mine)  
                                                                                                                                                             
review, I have intentionally chosen the former definition, acknowledging that I and many other authors I draw on in 
this review do harbor these assumptions.   
 
6
 ‘Life’ - references a very broad understanding, incorporating both animate and inanimate objects and world. For 
example, the indigenous Andean ‘tirakuna or earth-being’ could as easily be a fish as it could be a mountain 
(Cadena 2010).  
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Whatmore effectively dismisses belief in ‘acts of god’ or ‘forces of nature’ relegating 
them to an archaic past. There is good reason to be uncomfortable with viewing natural 
phenomena as “acts of god” since it might “obscure[s] the forces that compel people to live in 
risky environments” (Steinberg 2000: pg xxi). However, in this specific context, religious and 
spiritual beliefs can influence how people make sense and cope with ‘natural’ hazards and 
disasters (Blong 1982). Writing in the context of Andean indigenous politics, Blaser (2014) 
drawing on Stenger, argues that the absence of certain entities (gods, djinns and spirits) within 
new approaches in geography alongside the proliferation of specific types of more-than-human 
entities (objects, animals, diseases) exposes the “homogeneity of assumptions that help to sort 
out legitimate from illegitimate matters of concern” (51). The disciplinary reluctance to engage 
with claims of a religious or spiritual nature is particularly evident, in the lack of a rigorous 
theoretical engagement with indigenous social movements. Many geographers, especially those 
on the left, have been uncomfortable with indigenous claims to territory and natural resources 
and the possibility of disenfranchising non-indigenous groups in the process (Watts 1996; 
Castree 2004). These concerns are valid and must be addressed; however the discomfort around 
the ‘militant particularism’ (Harvey in Castree 2004) of indigenous projects has meant that not 
much attention has been directed to the epistemological and ontological nature of these claims.   
Panelli (2008) and more recently Sundberg (2014) and Blaser (2014) build on arguments 
within the sub-field of Indigenous geographies, which highlight the struggle to bring indigenous 
epistemes more squarely into the realm of western geographic knowledge (Johnson and Murton 
2007). While it is important to be careful of framing these inquiries in nostalgic, uncritical forms 
or worse re-enacting colonial knowledge practices, Panelli believes there is an urgent need to 
decolonize the discipline and acknowledge Indigenous and more-than-White Anglo perspectives. 
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Building on this, the aim of this review is two-fold. First it provides an overview of the concerns 
that drive the most recent work in materialist and post-humanist approaches in geography. 
Second, it presents perspectives from the sub-fields of indigenous and religious geographies and 
disciplines like anthropology, religious studies, literary fiction and post-colonial studies that 
speak directly to these concerns. The review is divided into three sections. The first section 
provides a cursory overview of recent materialist and post-humanist work in geography. 
Surveying recent reviews from prominent geography journals three categories relevant for the 
present discussion have been identified: Resource Geographies, Urban Materialities, and The 
Anthropocene. These categories are not meant to represent the range of post-humanist and 
materialist approaches within the discipline. However they do represent a sizeable body of 
literature and several influential geographers with a decided orientation towards addressing 
marginalized identities and concerns. The second section examines three approaches which 
grapple with similar concerns but offer quite a different approach: Indigenous ontologies, 
Imaginative Geographies, and Geographies of Religion and Western Spiritual epistemes. The 
conclusion draws linkages between the first and the second section to argue for a more robust 
theoretical engagement with the sacred, sentient and spiritual in materialist and post-humanist 
scholarship within geography.   
2.2 Materialist and Post-Humanist Approaches 
 
i) Resource Geographies 
The control of, commodification of, and access to natural resources and people’s daily 
and spectacular responses to these processes are central disciplinary concerns. A materialist and 
post-humanist approach to resource geographies has resulted in an attention to the biophysical 
properties of natural resources and how they ‘enable(s), constrain and/or disrupts the social 
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practices through which resource regulation is achieved’ (Bakker and Bridge 2006:21).  While 
geographers have focused on a range of natural resources, most empirical and theoretical 
attention has been directed towards water and carbon derivatives, given their multiple scales and 
spheres of influence. Within this scholarship the analysis of resource politics can be broadly 
categorized into two approaches. The first approach occurs at the scale of the state and seeks to 
decipher, how the neo-liberal project of modernity and democracy is sustained through the 
control and commodification of these natural resources (Swyengdouw 1999; Bakker 2005; 
Mitchell 2009). The second approach looks at how the material properties of natural resources 
and allied infrastructure and expertise, influence conditions for democratic politics and the 
formation of political subjectivities (Mitchell 2009; Perrault and Valdivia 2010; Sultana and 
Loftus 2013).  
This scholarship in resource geographies has been in productive tension with critiques 
from the geographical left who worry about the whiffs of environmental determinism in these 
approaches, a historical baggage that the discipline has struggled to shed. Marxist scholars worry 
about how an ontological flattening might obscure a ‘pervasive mode of human relationality to 
nature’ – i.e. capitalist social relations and its role in ordering and structuring these networks as 
well as the radical impulse in human practice (Kirsch and Mitchell 2004; Loftus 2012). This 
critique also alerts us to how ‘ontological flattening’ might foreclose attention to difference and 
inequality within/across human social groups and the disproportionate effects of capitalism on 
marginalized groups and identities. Resource geographers Bakker and Bridge (2006: 21) believe 
that ‘deploying materiality’ can be viewed as a call for a “broader anti-colonial project within 
geography that seeks to destabilize the discourses and practices through which are constituted the 
materiality of ‘others’ – whether these ‘others’ be human, animate, non-human or material 
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objects”. An attention to the practices and work of scholars detailed in this review can constitute 
an initial move in enacting this ‘anti-colonial project’.  
ii) Urban Materialities   
Within geography, political ecology has a long tradition of exploring the nature-society 
complex however sites of enquiry have predominantly been located in the Global South or non-
urban areas, what Heynen (2013) calls a function of the ‘rural Third World trap’. Cronon’s 
(1996) influential piece drew our attention to how notions of pristine uninhabited wilderness 
deeply influenced western notions of conservation and environmentalism. This understanding of 
nature as ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered also worked to locate nature outside of the city. 
Urban political ecology (UPE) draws attention to the production of nature in the city, building on 
Harvey (1996) and Smith’s (2008) Marxist engagements with questions of social justice and 
uneven development in urban spaces. UPE pays special attention to a technologically mediated 
and networked understanding of infrastructure and the built environment, bringing to life the 
metabolic flows and hybridity of socio-natural urban landscapes (Swyengdouw and Kaika 2000; 
Gandy 1999, 2002; Loftus 2012).  
UPE scholars have drawn our attention to the role of materials, technology, and the built 
environment in reinventing, facilitating or hindering processes of political participation and 
citizenship (Braun and Whatmore 2010). UPE scholars have also been attentive to people’s 
everyday and spectacular responses, to uneven power relations that sustain oppressive socio-
natural configurations in urban spaces (Loftus 2012). In his recent review, Heynen (2013) 
outlines the first and second wave of scholarship within UPE, identifying important scholars and 
recent shifts. He identifies the first wave of UPE as a cross-fertilization between Marxist, Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) and post-humanist scholarship. The second wave emerged out of two 
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critiques of the first wave: first an overemphasis on Marxist approaches, sometimes at the cost of 
others like ANT and post-humanism, and second making the city the “privileged analytical lens 
for studying contemporary processes of urban social transformation that are not necessarily 
limited to the city” (Wacsmuth in Heynen 2013). These internal debates within UPE signal there 
is still room for more theoretical maneuvering especially a deeper consideration of methodology 
and the multiplicity of political subjectivities that inhabit urban spaces (Heynen 2013). Perhaps it 
is time for UPE to revisit and extend Pile’s (2005) line of enquiry in Real Cities which takes 
seriously, “the imaginative, fantastic, emotional – the phantasmagoric – aspects of city life” such 
as “dreams, magic, vampires and ghosts” (7). Can an attention to the sacred, sentient and 
spiritual, offer UPE a meaningful engagement with the multiplicity of worlds and entities that 
inhabit cityscapes? 
iii) The Anthropocene  
A materialist attention to relationality and interconnectedness has made it impossible to 
ignore how we are deeply implicated in the global environmental crisis and in birthing an 
entirely new geological epoch, the Anthropocene (Gibson and Graham 2011). Scientific practice 
and discourse have played an important role in determining the conditions of life in the 
Anthropocene pushing geographers into the “politically charged climate of relations between 
science and society” (Whatmore 2006: 600). This ‘geological turn’ has drawn materialist and 
post-humanist geographers into deeper engagements with natural science disciplines especially 
geology and environmental science (Yousuff 2012; Castree 2014). Lorimer (2012) and Castree 
(2014) believe that inquiries into the Anthropocene bring a new specificity to geographical 
scholarship, by drawing our attention to the largest spatio-temporal scale of analysis: the planet 
itself. This claim to specificity might seem counter-intuitive at first, since it shifts our attention to 
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planetary problems, an approach that “resists immediate political traction” (Clark 2012: 685). 
However in doing so it draws our attention to how “all of these facets of existence – dynamic 
and inert, vital and mineral, generative and destructive – might under certain conditions spark 
political action, but none has a privileged affiliation with...politics in general” (Clark 2012: 687).  
Global climate change has led to an intensification of natural disasters increasing the 
vulnerability of the most marginalized groups. While geographers have analyzed the role of the 
state and neo-liberal policies in the spatialized production of disaster (Baldwin and Stanley 2013) 
post-humanist and materialist approaches examine natural phenomena like floods, earthquakes, 
and tsunamis as actors and events that can drastically reorient politics and social life (Whatmore 
2013; Clark 2011).  The Anthropocene is still an ‘adolescent concept’ (Castree 2014: 446) but 
signals a unanimous agreement within the discipline, that human actions are fundamentally 
altering the experience of all living, animate, and inanimate actors, demanding a recalibration of 
our epistemological and ontological frameworks (Gibson-Graham 2011). An attention to 
planetary processes has also led to a reflection on how viable political projects can be built 
without losing their meaning for specific places and concerns (Gibson and Graham 2011). But as 
Kirsch (2015) notes, the figure of the human is still central in these concerns for what is “more 
distinctly human, than thinking in epochal terms” (1). Alongside this we must also ask, “What 
sorts of cultural work have made this condition possible, and continue to hold the Anthropocene 
in place?” (Ibid: 2). This emergent work must then take into account, the uneven impacts of 
global environmental change on marginalized groups and their attendant response and political 
strategies.   
2.3. Animating the Sacred, the Sentient and the Spiritual  
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This section builds on the argument of Panelli (2008) and Sundberg (2014) that post-
humanist and materialist approaches within the discipline, can greatly benefit from conversations 
with disciplinary sub-fields and allied disciplines which engage with ontological pluralism in 
thoughtful, critical and creative ways. This is not to say that geographers have been completely 
closed to other disciplinary approaches however this review speaks to the general tendency to 
dismiss accounts of materiality and non-humans that take seriously sacred, sentient and spiritual 
experiences and practice. While indigenous beliefs are perhaps the most widely studied and 
recognized in this context, this review also explores empirical-political approaches within 
literary fiction and western religions. While much of the literature in the following section comes 
from the margins of power it also recognizes the plurality of western spirituality in both 
institutionalized religion and alternative practices in a move to lever open the ‘ontological 
multiplicity’ of the North (Law 2011).    
i) Indigenous ontologies  
Within geography spiritual claims deployed by indigenous groups for political ends have 
been read as discursive strategies or material ones that aim to benefit from the state (Watts 
1996). Even in materialist accounts where indigenous groups figure prominently, there is little 
mention of how these groups might view natural resources as sacred or sentient, and not simply 
as matter with agentic capabilities. Indigenous groups, especially in Latin America, have been 
able to gain political traction by deploying an overtly spiritual-materialist understanding of the 
environment. ‘The Law of Mother Earth’ enacted in the Bolivian constitution which redefines 
mineral deposits as “blessings” and grants nature equal rights to humans is the most prominent of 
these examples. Anthropology and allied disciplines have been far more cognizant of Indigenous 
epistemes. In the Andean context of indigenous resistance to mining, sentient mountains or 
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‘earth-beings’ were called forth from the realm of everyday belief into the political realm 
resulting in a dramatic reinterpretation of politics (Cadena 2010; Blaser 2014). Indigenous claims 
of sacred and sentient beings, in the context of resource conflicts and environmental movements, 
can disrupt the smooth flow of capitalism into seemingly ‘empty’ frontier spaces (Tsing 2005).  
There has been a long-standing anthropological interest in how people relate to drastic 
political economic changes in terms of new ‘magico-religious’ practices (; Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999). In her analysis of the socio-economic transitions in post-socialist Mongolia, 
High (2013) looks at how the current gold rush in Mongolia has resulted in immense wealth 
along with rumors of dangerous spirit beings. Instead of trying to make sense of people beliefs 
High examines people’s doubts in the context of socio-economic transformations which 
“entail[s] profound doubts about how humans and spirits can co-exist when human desires 
threaten to disrupt the fragile cosmological balance” (61). In this, she addresses the unpredictable 
role of a ‘living landscape’ in the production of valuable commodities for global markets. In 
another example from Mongolia, Pedersen (2011) examines the emergence of ‘half-shamans’– 
“young, unemployed men whose undirected energies erupt[ed] in unpredictable and frightening 
bouts of violence and drunkenness that seem[ed] occult in their excess”. He believes these “half-
shamans” embody the chaotic nature of the free market, neo-liberal reform and government 
corruption in the wake of post-socialist economic transformations. Both High and Pedersen 
signal towards a complexity in spiritual belief systems and how people’s response to neo-liberal 
restructuring, can go beyond more visible instances of social movements or resistance. 
Animistic ontologies which view objects as having capacities of ‘action or spirit’ can 
speak particularly well to materialist interest in ‘non-human’ agency (Reynolds 2009). Sullivan 
(2013:52) notes how the concept of “commodity fetishism” is ‘steeped in particular 
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understandings of the “fetish” as a component of “primitive” and animist thought”. He attempts 
to reclaim amodern animist ontologies from such a dismissal and forwards the epistemological 
and ontological move of “becoming-animist”. He points out that the Euro-Western tradition of a 
transcendent God, as beyond the material world and non-specialist humans, is in contradiction to 
the animist view of the sacred as immanent and accessible to everyone. Johnson and Murton 
(2007) echo this in their argument for a “re/placement of modern Native voices within 
constructions of nature” as a way to “heal[ing] the disenchantment caused through the rupture 
between culture and nature in Western science.” Thoughtful critical engagements with 
indigenous projects and belief systems can provide complex material and political insights into 
“the incomplete state of colonial erasure, the interstices in neoliberal practices and a more 
hopeful politics of place based identities, all of which have significance for geography as a 
discipline” (Coombs, Johnson and Howitt 2011: 697).  Cameron, de Leeuw and Desbiens (2014) 
offer a counter word of warning to geographers in the recent special issue on Indigeneity and 
Ontology in Cultural Geographies. They observe that critical colonial scholars are “wary of 
mobilizing any kind of ‘essential’ Indigenous nature or experience in their work” not because 
they reject indigenous ontologies but because of how these might be “represented and mobilized 
within colonial structures of knowledge production.” (19). Geographers then must proceed with 
an awareness of their personal and academic positonality, knowing that any engagement with 
indigenous ontologies is necessarily an engagement with indigenous bodies and projects.  
ii) Imaginative Geographies  
Post-colonial authors have been critical of Western traditions for their inability to be 
“attuned to the forms of communication through which a genuine pluralistic universalism might 
develop” (Barnett in Aitken and Valentine 2002). Story-telling and fantasy can be seen as forms 
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of communication that further an ‘imaginative geography’. It is widely acknowledged that 
western, scientific perceptions of what constitutes reality have been imbued with a sense of 
universality that is privileged over other ways of being (Law 2011). Said’s Orientalism critically 
analyzed the “imaginative geographies of Egypt produced by European scholars and artists in the 
nineteenth century” (Gregory 1995: 454) to demonstrate how ‘geographical imagination’ is a 
contested cognitive space, with material and political implications (Radcliffe 1996). Sundberg 
(2014) critiques post-humanist engagements in geography for ‘reproducing colonial ways of 
knowing and being by enacting universalizing claims and, consequently, further subordinating 
other ontologies’. She builds on the concept of walking with, put forth by the Zapatistas, to think 
of different ways in which geographers can engage with indigenous people as political subjects 
rather than research objects. She suggests including indigenous scholarship in our research, 
direct collaboration with indigenous groups, and direct action as a way to walk with indigenous 
people (41). Also relevant, is Blaser (2014) who draws on Annemarie Mol, to develop the term 
‘storied performativity’ -- a stance in favor of ontological pluralism, since all stories have 
“world-making effects” and “different stories imply different ontologies or worlds” (54).   
In the context of this review the literary genres of magical realism and Afrofuturism are 
especially relevant. As a literary discourse, magic realism inserts fantasy and supernatural 
elements in an otherwise ‘real’ environment. Believed to be an “authentic expression” of Latin 
America (Flores 1955) it is most prominently associated with the work of Marquez and 
Carpentier. In his seminal article, ‘Magic Realism as Post-colonial discourse’, Stephen Slemon 
(1988) argues that magical realism has been a central component of post-colonial literature 
because of its “positive and liberating response to the codes of imperial history and its legacy of 
fragmentation and discontinuity” (21). While Latin American authors provided the initial force 
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in developing the genre it has been widely used by authors from other post-colonial contexts. A 
prominent example of this is Rushdie’s Midnight Children, in which he uses fantastical elements 
to explore the major events following India’s independence and partition.  
More recently, magic realism has made its presence felt in US ethnic literature in the 
work of writers from minority groups who have deployed it to reveal “traumatic or suppressed 
histories” and “even signposts to the future” (Sandin and Perez 2012).  An example of this can be 
seen in Dominican-American writer Junot Diaz’s acclaimed novel The Brief and wondrous life of 
Oscar Wao. Diaz uses the notions of fuku and rafa, a curse and its counter-curse to explore 
Dominican life under Dictator Rafael Trujillo and the multi-faceted immigrant experience in 
America. While magical realism has been critiqued for a “commodifying kind of primitivism” 
those sympathetic to the genre argue that it questions traditional dichotomies bringing to view 
“hidden connections and connivances between material practices (late capitalism, globalization, 
social injustice), spiritual/ethical concerns (lack of eco/critical awareness and/or activism) and 
environmental degradation” and “provides spaces for alternative experiments with “reality”” 
(Sanchez, Calvo and Gonzalez 2009).    
Afrofuturism is a literary and cultural trend (Nelson 2002; Womack 2013), that draws on 
“science fiction themes, such as abduction, slavery, displacement and alienation to re-narrate the 
past, present and the future of the African diaspora” (Ramirez 2008:186). While Afrofuturism 
draws on a multiplicity of sources including magic realism and non-western cosmologies, it has a 
decidedly futuristic orientation which problematizes the disassociation of people of color from 
narratives of science and technology.  A prime mover of this genre is Octavia Butler who inserts 
black people, women and people of color as protagonists in her stories, to interrogate notions of 
science and technology as progress Afrofuturism and more recently Chicanafutrism (cf Ramirez 
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2004) open up inquiries into the “promises of science, technology and humanism for Chicanas, 
Chicano, and other people of color” and can speak very directly to major themes of concern 
within materialist and post-humanist literature while also addressing its silence on issues of race, 
indigeneity and gender (Panelli 2009). Kitchin and Kneale note that an attention to literary 
genres (cyberfiction in their case) can be a useful resource for geographers to “map[s] out 
possible future spatialities of the postmodern condition, and provides cognitive spaces which are 
being used by individuals and institutions in conceiving and making future society.” (2001:32). 
Both literary genres of magic realism and Afrofuturism, push the boundaries of the real and 
imagined to tell stories that deal with contentious issues in new and compelling ways. The act of 
story-telling (Balser 2010; Houston 2013) is also the act of imagining different conditions of 
possibility, as a counter to Capitalism’s stifling ‘There Is No Alternative’ line of thinking. 
 
iii) Geographies of Religion and Western Spiritual epistemes    
There is substantial research in the sub-field of geographies of religion that examines a 
range of concerns through the lens of religion and spirituality such as the body and subjectivity 
(Holloway 2006; Gokariksel 2009) everyday spaces of faith (Kong 1993b; 2002) and urban 
cityscapes (Kong 2008; Fenster 2004). Like Panelli and Sundberg, scholars in this sub-field have 
also been critical of Euro-Western modernity and the mechanisms through which it creates a 
false dichotomy between the religious and the secular (Asad 1993, 2003; Gokariksel 2009; 
Ivakhiv 2006; Kong 2001; Howe 2009). Authors in the sub-field demonstrate through their work 
the persistence of religious experiences and expressions and its importance in highlighting the 
experience of different constituents of population – young people, migrant communities, ethnic 
minorities (Kong 2010). In her recent review of the sub-field Kong (2010) examines the 
intersection of religious and ethical values with four key global shifts, “rapid urbanization and 
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social inequality; a deteriorating environment; an ageing population; and increasing human 
mobilities” (765). A significant portion of this scholarship is located in urban and western 
locations challenging notions of growing secularism in these sites.  
While indigenous and post-colonial perspectives offer a plethora of new perspectives, 
Law (2011) points to how there is ontological multiplicity even within the North, encouraging us 
to “craft encounter across ontological difference”. There are internal debates within the Judeo-
Christian tradition that argue that just as religion has been central in the Western context of 
capitalism, religion can also develop alternatives to capitalism (Bergman 2009). From his 
grounding in Christianity, Cloke (2002) argues that geographers must be sensitive to the ways in 
which people are linking questions of social justice, oppression, and supernatural notions of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’ in the world. Holloway and Valins (2002:5) argue that the “secular space is 
itself a hybrid of past religious traditions”.  This understanding of the secular can also illuminate 
people’s relationship to nature and the environment and how it is informed by a pluralism of 
frameworks. There is a burgeoning field of eco-theology within religious studies that explore the 
intersections of sustainability, religion and ecology primarily within the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. Bergmann (2009) echoes this in his argument that ‘ecological spiritualties’ have the 
power to provoke and heighten political agendas and associations even in the West. 
Ivakhiv (2009) in examining the ‘religious turn to ecology’ has made a case for a 
rigorous theoretical engagement “with situations where religion, science and nature encounter 
each other on the unstable grounds of a rapidly changing world”. Natural hazards and disasters 
are perhaps the strongest reminders of this unpredictability and have “reawakened the interest of 
geographers and others in disaster politics” (Pelling and Dill 2010). However Chester (2005), 
writing in the Christian religious context, argues that not much attention is paid to how “many 
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actual and potential victims of hazard continue to explain losses in theistic terms; even in 
societies where individuals are aware of alternative scientific and social explanations.” In a 
special issue on religions, natural hazards and disasters, Galliard and Texier (2010) consider four 
major religions, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism to offer insights into how 
“religious practices intermingle with social, political and economic constraints” and argue for 
religion to be seen “as a resource rather than a hindrance in the planning of disaster risk-
reduction policies” (83).  
Much of the recent scholarship in the sub-field has drawn on post-secular theory in it 
critique of secularism in both Western and non-Western context highlighting the profusion of 
religious practices and beliefs in both public and privates spaces. However Kong (2013) is wary 
of this overemphasis on post-secularism arguing instead that the focus should be on “the 
complexity of religion itself” as this can open up enquiries into other functional and symbolic 
dimension of religion which may at first appear to have no overt connection to religion. Olson, 
Hopkins, Pain and Vincett (2013) echo this sentiment in their study of young Scottish Christians 
to argue that along with a critique of secular theory, “a critical understanding of religion and 
class – as material relationships, symbolic reference and moral significance – must also be a 
priority” (1433). This breadth of scholarship demonstrates the importance of taking spiritual and 
religious perspectives in considering a range of empirical-political questions. 
2.4. Conclusion  
 
Anthropologist Deborah BirdRose (2008) suggests that our openness to unique styles of 
history leads us to relational and ethical encounters and engagements. This is a stance in favor of 
plurality and the disruptive agency of others, an agency that challenges dominant paradigms of 
thinking. Materialist and post-humanist scholarship within the discipline has opened up exciting 
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philosophical and theoretical possibilities with which to understand both human and nonhuman 
worlds. Yet, we must be wary of the tendency within such scholarship which in one instance 
acknowledges trash as lively, yet, in another, dismisses people’s insistence on a mountain’s 
sentience or the agency of other worldly spirits. Sundberg (2014) is critical of scholars who 
operate in the binaries of “political theory/primitive religion and rational/magical” (37). Drawing 
on Dipesh Chakrabarty, Sundberg (2014) argues that the epistemological consequence of such a 
theoretical gesture is that “Anglo-European scholarship is the only tradition truly alive in post-
humanist theorizing” which treats “thinkers who are long dead (e.g. as John Locke, Karl Marx, 
Max Weber) as intellectual contemporaries” while “scholars from other intellectual 
traditions…are treated as truly dead, material for either historical or ethnographic research only” 
(38) A strand of post-secular theory forwarded by McLennan (2011) is particularly relevant here. 
McLennan argues for “the ontological possibility of incorporating other-world explanatory 
variables into critical realism” and for these experiences “to be recognized as a legitimate form 
of knowledge of the world” 4 (McLennan in Olson et al. 2013: 1424). 
Chakrabarty (2000) grapples with a similar question in his own research on labor history 
in colonial Bengal, and he observes this, “Labor…. is seldom a completely secular activity in 
India; it often entails…the invocation of divine or superhuman presence.” (72). He acknowledges 
the importance of the Marxist secular narrative of labor as “indispensable” yet “inadequate” in its 
inability to “incorporate agency on the part of gods and spirits” (88).His suggestion is to develop 
a “relationship of intimacy to both languages” (89) or two systems of thought which in his case 
were the Marxist secular narrative of labor and the tool-worshipping life-worlds of jute mill 
workers. Therefore this review’s critique of post-humanist and materialist scholarship isn’t a call 
for its outright rejection. Instead it is a call to develop proficiency in another language, in order 
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to better represent the life-worlds of the humans and nonhumans, whose stories we are entrusted 
with. The work of scholars drawing on indigenous and animist ontologies is particularly relevant 
to work within resources geographies and the Anthropocene. De la Cadena, Sullivan, High, and 
Pedersen demonstrate how an attention to animist ontologies can reveal political networks, 
properties of the resource, and how people might relate to these. These authors are sensitive to 
capitalist and neo-liberal power structures especially the ways in which it silences indigenous 
voices and projects. This review has also pointed out that an attention to the Anthropocene needs 
to actively engage with the claims of indigenous and marginalized groups who have to bear the 
brunt of environmental precarity brought on by climate change. As literary trends and critiques 
of prevailing power structures, both magical realism and Afrofuturism offer provocative ways to 
imagine and write about ontological pluralism. Afrofuturism in particular makes us attentive to 
the ways in which a growing interest in scientific solutions within the humanities must be 
tempered with the awareness of the ways in which marginalized groups have been distanced as 
well as “injured or killed by and/or for science and technology” (Ramirez 2008:188). We also 
find productive intersections between UPE and geographies of religion as both seek to address 
absences and fixed understandings of cityscapes. Together they challenge the notion of the urban 
as profane, artificial, and lacking an authentic expression of either faith or nature. UPE scholars 
can benefit from an attention to how religious and spiritual beliefs inf luence the creation of 
enabling and inclusive spaces especially with regard to marginalized and minority groups. 
While the mechanisms to enact an ontological rupture within academia are beyond the 
scope of this review, taking a cue from the approaches highlighted here, a few suggestions are 
briefly outlined. Our engagement with other disciplines needs to go beyond just citations. A good 
place to start could be attending other disciplinary conferences where similar discussions are 
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taking place. Many of the insights in this review were a result of courses taken in other 
disciplines and attending conferences such as the annual meeting of the American 
Anthropological Association. Sundberg (2014) also highlights the importance of incorporating 
non-western and indigenous authors when teaching post-humanist and materialist issues. 
Resources for these can be easily found with the help of scholars on specialty listservs like the 
Indigenous Peoples Specialty Group or the Geography of Religion and Belief Systems.5 These 
listservs are also useful in keeping abreast with latest development, conferences, and debates 
within these fields. The most important consideration however is a methodological one which 
requires far more disciplinary introspection. Acknowledging sacred, sentient, and spiritual more-
than-human entities signals an ontological rupture in our research agendas. A rupture which 
makes us attentive to not only how the North establishes political and economic dominance over 
the South but also how those very same institutional mechanisms work to erase ontological 
difference, making them entirely incommensurable and inconceivable outside of their contexts 
(Law 2011; Povinelli 2001). Engaging with multiple ontologies is inextricably linked to 
encounters with difference and their meaningful academic translation (Carrithers et al. 2010). In 
the context of research being “undertaken by nonindigenous peoples in largely colonial 
institutions” (Cameron, de Leeuw and Desbiens 2014:24), this raises the difficult task of 
honoring and engaging with non-western voices and multiple ontologies without treating them 
simply as “resources for disciplinary self-renewal” (Salmond 2013: 1) but as a corrective to 
colonial tendencies within the discipline. The burden then should not fall on indigenous and non-
western subjects to speak loudly, but for us in the discipline to listen more carefully. 
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CHAPTER 3: PRECARITY AND POSSIBILITY: ON BEING YOUNG AND 
INDIGENOUS IN SIKKIM, INDIA
7
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Dzongu reserve, located in the district of North Sikkim, is home to around 5,000 
members of the indigenous Lepchas also known as the ‘Vanishing Tribe’8. For years the reserve 
had witnessed an out-migration of young people leading to concerns over the cultural and moral 
dissolution this mobility would cause. Young people’s ambivalence about returning to the 
reserve had strained inter-generational relations within the reserve. But events that unfolded in 
2007 saw these young people emerge as ‘alchemists of the revolution’ (Jeffery 2011), 
questioning, challenging and reimagining the future of Dzongu as well as their own.  
Before 2007, 29 hydropower projects had been planned in Sikkim as part of the Indian 
Power Ministry’s effort to develop the hydroelectric potential of the Himalayan states 
(Government of India 2008; Dharmadhikary 2008). Seven of these dams were planned to cut 
across Dzongu. Predictably, this resulted in tensions within the reserve splitting opinions and 
loyalties but very few could have anticipated what followed next. Dawa and Tenzing, two young 
men from the reserve both of whom had been educated in Gangtok, the state capital went on a 
hunger strike which turned into a 915 days long (2007-2010) relay hunger strike. 
                                                 
7
 This chapter previously appeared as an article in Himalaya, the Journal of Nepal and Himalayan Studies. The 
original citation is as follows Gergan, M. D. 2014. Precarity and Possibility: On being Young and Indigenous in 
Sikkim, India. Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies, 34(2), 10. 
   
8
 A.R. Foning (1987) a Lepcha author wrote the book, Lepcha, my Vanishing Tribe and ever since the epithet has 
been used in common parlance to refer to low numbers of the tribe and other ‘threatened’ aspects of the culture.  
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Their protests garnered enough national and international attention to pressure the State 
Government of Sikkim to cancel four of the seven dams
9
. Amidst celebrations, young activists 
voiced concerns about their future in a state with limited employment opportunities. Their 
involvement in these protests had jeopardized any possibility of employment in the highly 
competitive and coveted government sector (Govt. of Sikkim 2009). Larger concerns over the 
fate of the reserve were intimately tied to young people’s concerns over their future in a 
precarious political landscape. 
The Lepcha protest raises several pertinent questions around democratic politics, 
development and the agency of marginalized indigenous groups. Some of these questions have 
been explored by scholars who have argued for the increased involvement of civil society groups 
in official politics highlighting the limits of representative democracy for marginalized 
communities (Little 2010; Arora 2013). Others have pointed to the elitist and ethnocentric 
tendencies of such movements since these were educated, upper class indigenous youth, and the 
resultant polarization this causes between ethnic groups (McDuie-Ra 2011). Acknowledging the 
contribution of these scholars, I draw in the young people
10
 who were part of the movement and 
place them at the center of this conversation. I argue that the Dzongu Lepchas experience merits 
a closer examination of the relationship between youth and indigeneity. There is rich literature 
within human geography and allied disciplines exploring questions of youth agency (Aitken 
2001; Katz 2004; Durham 2008; Jeffrey 2013). Within the Indian context, young people’s 
                                                 
9
 The works of Kerry Little (2010), Vibha Arora (2007; 2008) Duncan McDuie Ra (2011) provide a rich 
ethnographic look into what sparked the movement and its political ramifications. 
 
10
 In this paper I employ the term ‘youth’ and ‘young people’ to refer to 16-30 year olds, fully aware that these are 
intellectually and politically problematic terms and that there can be no straightforward definition or experience of 
‘youth’ (Jeffrey 2013). 
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agency has been approached from the lens of caste, gender, masculinity and temporality (Jeffrey 
2001, 2008; Jeffrey et al 2004; Dyson 2008; Jeffrey and Dyson 2008; Smith 2012). However, 
thus far there has been very little discussion around indigenous youth in the context of 
environmental movements despite the prominent role played by them in such movements. While 
several authors have explored indigenous youth activism (Bora 1992; Dutta 1998; Baruah 2002) 
and environmental movements in the North-Eastern context (Arora 2007; 2008; Karlsson 2009; 
McDuie-Ra 2011), my work seeks to draw a more explicit connection between the two.  
This article builds on two important observations of the anti-dam protests in Sikkim: the 
protests were led mostly by educated youth from Dzongu and much of the support for the 
movement came from outside Dzongu and the Lepcha community in Sikkim (McDuie-Ra 2011). 
Rather than viewing this as the movement’s hamartia and one which led to its perceived failure, I 
draw our attention to the articulations of the Dzongu youth to demonstrate how contestations 
between State and indigenous groups often pry open profound contestations within these groups. 
The Lepcha anti-dam dam protests became a way to question state-led development agendas as 
well as elders and urban elite who speak on behalf of the community. In these contestations the 
meaning of indigeneity was and is being redefined by Dzongu youth, beyond and sometimes in 
conflict with former connotations. Building on literature in indigeneity and geographies of youth, 
I draw the reader’s attention to three ways in which indigeneity and young people’s experiences 
are intimately linked in the Sikkimese context. Firstly, the articulation of indigeneity was tied to 
young people’s contradictory experience of everyday hardships in a sublime11 landscape. After 
                                                 
11
 The usage of the term sublime is derived from Bill Cronon’s (1996) influential piece, “The Trouble with 
Wilderness or Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.” Cronon examines ‘the sublime’ and ‘the frontier’ as cultural 
constructs which influence contemporary environmentalism. Pristine wilderness is seen as the “ultimate landscape 
of authenticity. Combining the sacred grandeur of the sublime with the primitive simplicity of the frontier.” Cronon 
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the protests Dzongu youth promoted the idea of ‘return to Dzongu’ by presenting it as an 
exceptional landscape of both spiritual significance and economic potential. Secondly, the 
discourse of indigeneity that emerged from the Dzongu protests marked a shift from the more 
institutional discourse that is prevalent in the region that appeals to the state for recognition and 
benefits. This shift was linked to young people’s experience of their community’s dependence on 
the government and their lack of competitiveness with other ethnic groups both of which were 
understood as effects of racialized and exclusionary state practices. Lastly, the protests and what 
followed after were an attempt at constructing respectability for young Lepchas, especially men 
struggling against tropes of the ‘lazy native’ and ‘apathetic youth.’  
My research for this article draws on several years of association with the region and 
these young activists. My mother belongs to the Lepcha tribe and I conducted my M.A. research 
(2006-2008) and two pre-dissertation surveys (2011, 2012) in Dzongu, wherein I conducted 
group interviews, an oral history study on inter-generational relations, personal interviews, and 
household surveys. Most of my interactions have been with young activists from two 
organizations, Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) and Concerned Lepchas of Sikkim (CLOS). In 
most cases I have used pseudonyms except for the more prominent members of the movement. 
Interviews were conducted in Nepali and English.  
3.2 Being Indigenous in India  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
critiques this tendency to place the human and the natural at opposite poles thereby obscuring the complex ways in 
which the two are entangled. During the hunger-strike many of the activists presented Dzongu as the sublime- 
sacred and pristine in opposition to the more ‘artificial’ urban landscape of Gangtok, the capital town. Cronon would 
perhaps have been critical of such a move and further along in the paper I discuss how and why these activists 
presented Dzongu as a sublime, exceptional landscape.    
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The term ‘indigeneity’, while being rooted in “historically sedimented practices, 
landscapes and repertoires of meaning” (Murray Li 2000) is itself a fairly recent product of post-
war international bodies like the UN and ILO (Karlsson 2003; Castree 2007). It interpellates 
different indigenous groups situated in distinct histories and territories and is a way of pursuing 
local, place-based agendas through global means (Radcliffe 1999; Turner 2001; Routledge 2003; 
Castree 2004; Routledge and Cumbers 2009). Indigenous movements are rooted in struggles 
over material, symbolic and intellectual resources generally in opposition to the state but they are 
also seen as a way of securing certain benefits from the state (Karlsson 2003; Shneiderman and 
Turin 2006; Middleton 2013). While acknowledging historical conditions that necessitate 
indigenous struggles and demands, scholars argue that indigeneity is “the cultural and political 
work of articulation” (Murray Li 2000) and is ‘customized’ by the interlocutors (Greene 2009). 
The interlocutor’s position, mediated by class, gender and age, to a large extent determines the 
nature of indigeneity articulated. Indigeneity therefore is not ‘customized’ equally or similarly by 
everyone within the tribe (Canessa 2007). This is not to imply that these articulations are false 
rather it makes us sensitive to the stories of the interlocutors, the multiplicity of voices and the 
knowledge that in these articulations certain “sites and situations….are privileged while others 
are overlooked” (Murray Li 2000). 
If indigeneity is indeed the work of articulation, then it is important to recognize the role 
played by colonial administrative discourse in the Indian context. The British demarcated tribal 
areas as excluded or partially excluded areas (Pathy 2000). Post-independence partially excluded 
areas came under the Fifth schedule of the constitution which granted tribal groups several rights 
over forest and land resources. Areas which were wholly excluded came under the Sixth 
schedule and had more rights to retain customary titles and positions. Sixth schedule areas are in 
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the Himalayan region
12
 whereas Fifth scheduled areas are spread across India with a large 
concentration in Central India. Since the Fifth schedule didn’t have as strong regulations as the 
Sixth schedule, tribes here were subjected to more state-led development incursions. In opposing 
these incursions, tribal groups in Fifth Schedule areas developed stronger ties with 
environmentalists and other marginalized groups and effectively cultivated an ‘adviasi’ identity 
(Karlsson 2003). Large-scale development projects in Sixth schedule areas have a more recent 
history. The language and terms used by groups in this region are shaped much more by their 
transnational engagements rather than alliances with other Indian tribal groups (Ibid 2003). 
Differences in regulations and policies have resulted in a significantly different politics of 
resistance and recognition arising from Fifth and Sixth schedule areas. The term for indigenous 
in India is ‘adivasi’ however very few groups in the Himalayan region identify themselves as 
such and prefer the term ‘indigenous’ or ‘tribal’ since ‘adviasi’ is seen as a sanskritized term that 
doesn’t apply to them.  
Therefore in the context of the ‘indigenous debate’ it is important to recognize a plurality 
of indigenous movements as well as a plurality of discourses within indigenous movements 
(Rappaport 2005). In India, indigeneity is a controversial category which is closely related to the 
confusion around the question ‘who count as indigenous?’ Indian anthropologists such as Roy 
Burman and Bettiele (in Karlsson 2003) feel it is difficult to determine who is indigenous in 
India since the entire country was colonized and the history of tribes has been that of movement 
                                                 
12
 The Indian Himalayan Region (IHR) consists of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, hill 
districts of West Bengal and Assam and the other North Eastern States (Nandy, S.N et al 2006; Ministry of Power 
2008). The official geographic definition of the IHR includes the North Eastern states however the author is aware 
of discrepancies on the ground wherein NE states and subjects may not necessarily identify themselves as 
Himalayan. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out and pushing me to elaborate on this 
definition of the Himalayan region.  
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and migration. Others ( Xaxa 1999; Karlsson 2003) feel we must accept these groups on their 
own terms. Claims to indigeneity are understandably controversial since they provide important 
social and political leverage. Karlsson (2013) points out that in the North Eastern context, “the 
indigenous tribe category [is] a strategic conflation of two different regimes of rights or political 
assertions.” The first relates to the recognized Scheduled Tribe (ST) status for affirmative action 
and the second being the emerging global framework for indigenous peoples rights. In Sikkim 
and neighboring regions of Darjeeling and Kalimpong, Lepchas have been recognized as 
Scheduled Tribes and self-identify as indigenous since as early as 1925. In Sikkim the 
interlocutors belonged to institutional bodies with close ties to a State whose ‘pro-tribal’ policies 
have made it the envy of its neighbors (Shneiderman and Turin 2006: 56). The Dzongu protests 
marked a shift away from the institutional framework and this reformulation of indigeneity drew 
them closer to global indigenous discourses wherein the State is an antagonistic force. While 
being shaped by global indigenous politics the articulation of Lepcha indigeneity was also a 
response to localized issues specifically those facing young people from Dzongu.  
3.3 The Lazy Native meets the Apathetic Youth  
 
Young people stand on the edge of a community's boundaries constantly traversing 
between lines of ‘tradition,’ ‘modernity,’ ‘morality,’ and ‘immorality’ (Cole and Durham 2008).  
Geographers examining young lives offer a spatial and temporal analysis of how young people’s 
lives are marked simultaneously by apprehension and anxiety as well as hope and potential 
(Aitken 2001; Cole and Durham 2008; Jeffrey and Dyson 2008). Despite their involvement in 
social movements and civil society groups, young people’s lack of interest in formal politics has 
long been seen as a sign of their apathy leading to concerns around the ‘crisis of democracy’ 
(Furlong and Cartmel 2012). Young people occupy a liminal legal and political space viewed as 
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‘adult-in-waiting’ or ‘political apprentices’ rather than political agents (Skelton 2010). In the 
domestic space young people and children occupy a special place of exclusion because of their 
perceived inability to enter into intelligent dialogue with adults (Matthews, Limb, and Taylor 
1999). The agency of young people therefore needs to be understood as operating at these 
multiple scales ( Dyson 2008; Skelton and Gough 2013) . 
When discussing indigenous youth it is important to have an understanding of the 
powerful racial tropes related to indigenous groups that further contribute to their exclusion from 
political spaces. Racialized tropes brought into effect by colonial discourses cut across time and 
space and have a continued dominance in how indigenous groups are racialized in present-day 
post-colonial nations. Stoler (1995, 2002) examines how the racial discourse of colonialism 
employed patriarchal, protective and familial metaphors where racialized others were frequently 
equated with children. Both children and ‘the natives’ were othered in ways that compared them 
to lower-order, animal-like beings, lacking civility, discipline, and sexual restraint (Ibid 1995: 
151). These arguments are echoed in Nandy’s comparison of childhood and the state of being 
colonized and in Alatas’ influential piece on the ‘Myth of the Lazy Native’ (Alatas 1977; Nandy 
1983). Early anthropological accounts of the Lepcha tribe describing them as “timid, peaceful, 
and no brawler[s]” (Hooker in Kennedy 1991) with a “want of aggression [and] sex-obsession” 
(Gorer 1938) resonate with these racialized tropes. Even today these tropes are perpetuated by 
both state and non-state actors to explain away the lack of development within the reserve as an 
effect of the laziness or the lack of ambition of reserve members.   
This analysis when layered onto our understanding of indigenous youth provides a 
striking parallel in how similar tropes are variously applied to young people. Young people 
especially in non-western contexts are seen as somehow less than adult and inadequate citizens, 
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simply ‘passing time’ and a site of ‘moral panic’ (Neyzi 2001; Jeffrey 2008; Smith 2012). These 
concerns are echoed by the state, older adults in the family, and get exemplified in rural 
indigenous communities where we see strained inter-generational relations because of out-
migration. The challenges faced by groups like the Lepchas are distilled in the struggles of their 
youth —unemployment, out-migration, increased drug usage, and suicide rates to name a few 
(Eicher et al. 2000; Ningshen 2013). Concerns over the future of these young lives figure 
prominently in claims over land, resources, and material benefits. In many recent social 
movements in the region, indigenous youth are positioned as vanguards who must fashion new 
political selves which work to both challenge and affirm the anxieties of community members 
and state authorities. Young people’s bodies and futures then form the template on which these 
desires are inscribed and where territorial, ecological and moral anxieties play out (Smith 2012). 
The story of the young Lepcha activists brings these important concerns into sharp relief. 
3.4 A Political Landscape of Precarity and Possibility 
  
A narrow twenty three kilometer wide corridor known as the ‘chicken neck’ connects the 
eight North Eastern states of India to the rest of the country. While Sikkim has only recently 
(2001) been included in the North Eastern states, like the other states it has a contentious though 
far less violent history of assimilation with India. Bordering Nepal, China, and Bhutan, Sikkim 
has been described as the “single most strategically important piece of real estate in the entire 
Himalayan region” (Graver in Hiltz 2003). Beginning in the 1860s the British began settling 
Nepalis in the southern and western tracts of Sikkim to balance out the pro-Tibetan Bhutia 
community with the pro-British-India Nepalis (Ibid 2003). Sikkim was annexed to India in 1975 
prior to which it had been an independent Buddhist theocracy. A restless Nepali political 
majority pushed for a referendum in which 97.5 percent voted in favor of abolishing the 
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monarchy and becoming a part of the Indian union. The stage for annexation had been set by the 
Indian authorities in 1953 with the establishment of the Sikkim Council which divided the 
electorate into Bhutia-Lepcha and Nepali Sikkimese constituencies (Ibid 2003). This electoral 
system paved the way for the annexation and widened divisions between these communities.  
These lingering tensions still define present day political life in Sikkim. The Sikkim 
Democratic Front (SDF) has been in power for the last four terms with the same Chief Minister, 
Pawan Chamling, with practically no opposition party. However, in a dramatic turn of events in 
early February of 2013, ‘rebel’ leader P.S Tamang floated a new party, Sikkim Krantikari 
Morcha (SKM) under the Obama-esque rallying cry of Parivartan (change). SDF’s pro-
incumbency factor will be put to the test and the fate of this fledging political party will unfold as 
Sikkim goes for elections in April 2014
13
. One of the central concerns around which opposition 
has coalesced is the steady increase in educated unemployed youth in the state. The following 
quote from a disgruntled youth on SKM’s website summarizes these concerns. 
Unemployment has reached new level [sic] with over 5000 candidates filling up 
the exam forms for a vacancy of 20 or 30. Well-educated youth whose only 
mistake was coming back to their hometown to work are being employed on ad-
hoc and contract basis putting their career and future in jeopardy. I personally 
have a lot of respect for our Chief Minister but if he has become too powerful to 
ignore what’s going on beneath his nose then I am sorry sir, next year I am voting 
for change. 
After the hunger strike, several young Lepchas returned to Dzongu and set up different 
self-employment ventures, like coaching classes, organic farms and eco-tourism homestays. 
These projects were aimed at weaning young people from their dependency on the government. 
                                                 
13
 The state elections results were declared in May 2014 after this article was written. SDF won 23 seats of the total 
33 seats in the State Legislative Assembly making Pawan Chamling Chief Minister for the fifth term. SKM won 10 
seats making it the official opposition party.   
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While activists received little support from within the reserve the hunger strike marked a shift in 
political activism within the state. The indigenous Lepchas claim to be one of the most 
marginalized groups within the state, forming just 8 percent of the state’s population. The North 
district, with a majority Lepcha population, fares poorly on socio-economic and health 
indicators, while the Dzongu reserve is considered ‘underdeveloped’ in official state reports. 
Several Dzongu youth joined SKM, including Dawa Lepcha, who initiated the hunger strike and 
commands the respect and loyalty of many in Sikkim. While support for SKM may not be 
uniform, the decision to join it is the first official political move made by the Dzongu activists. 
Given this backdrop, young lives are where both state and community elders’ desire and 
aspirations for the future intersect. 
3.5 An Exceptional Landscape 
 
The Dzongu reserve has only three bridges to enter and exit it and is revered by Lepchas 
as an ancient paradise which holds the myths and folklores of the tribe. Early British 
anthropological accounts of the reserve detail a plethora of unique species of flora and fauna. 
Reserve members appear in these early accounts as bearers of indigenous knowledge ‘born 
naturalists’ knowing the name for every flower and animal in the reserve (Gorer 1938; Hooker in 
Kennedy 1991). These accounts also fed into a geographical image of the reserve as an 
untouched paradise. Winding down perilously narrow, pot-holed roads through forested slopes 
and terraced fields, even today one traveling to Dzongu can make a similar observation as Gorer 
did that “the overwhelming beauty of the landscape [is] spoilt only by the very considerable 
difficulty of traveling about, so rocky and precipitous is the land” (81). Most roads within the 
reserve are unpaved and every monsoon several interior villages get completely cut off from the 
rest of the reserve. Questions of remoteness, isolation, and poor infrastructure profoundly shape 
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young people’s everyday experience within the reserve. There is only one higher secondary 
school here and in interviews with reserve youth difficulty of access to education was often cited 
as a reason for Dzongu’s ‘backwardness.’ Nima who was now in his 30’s recalled how many 
students would have to walk several kilometers every day to get to school. 
Nima: School started at 9am and I would have to leave latest by 7am. I would 
walk every day to school. Seven kilometers both ways, that’s fourteen kilometers 
daily. By the time I reached school, I would be so tired but we did not have any 
relatives in Mangan [district capital] nor could we afford to take up a place on 
rent. 
Fig 2: Just another day in paradise: Landslides, heavy rainfall and poor road infrastructure make this an 
all too familiar sight in Dzongu. (Source: Author, 2013) 
 
 
Owing to its geographic isolation the reserve has less political clout and therefore poor 
basic infrastructure. In her account of indigenous politics and eco-tourism in the Amazonia 
drawing on Agamben’s Homo Sacer, Wheatley (2009) interrogates how specific geographical 
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locations like the ‘Amazonia’ become the exception and indigenous subjects examples of “bare 
life”—“life that is simultaneously banished beyond the normal political order of the state and 
also subsumed by the legalities of the state through its very exclusion.” Dzongu Lepchas 
experience a similar ‘banishment’ from the political realm wherein they are enrolled in various 
government schemes because of their marginalized position but are unable to effect any change 
in the political order because of this very position.  
Fig 3: A view of the landscape on the way to Lingdem, Upper Dzongu. (Source: Author, 2013) 
 
Employing Wheatley’s analysis, I argue that young activists responded to this 
‘banishment’ by presenting Dzongu as an exceptional landscape. In interviews, hardships of the 
reserve were frequently invoked both in terms of a need for improvement but also as a spiritual 
experience that kept the young activists ‘grounded’ and ‘in-touch’ with nature. Young Lepchas 
articulated a contradictory discourse which worked by essentializing the indigenous subject as 
 71 
guardian of the reserve while simultaneously critiquing state-neglect. After the protests, youth 
who had studied and lived outside began actively creating a vision of Dzongu as untouched and 
idyllic through posts on Facebook groups such as “We the Indigenous Lepchas,” “Lepcha Youth 
Association,” and “Dzongu History and Cultural Conservation Society.” An eco-tourism website 
run by one of the activists after the protests tempts the reader to visit Dzongu, “Where there are 
hidden treasures behind every tree.” Before the protests began, I interviewed Dzongu youth who 
felt that while the lack of infrastructure was a drawback, growing up in Dzongu made them more 
sensitive to Lepcha culture unlike their urban counterparts. Karma, who had returned to the 
reserve after the protests was interested in setting up an eco-tourism resort and felt he now had a 
fresh perspective.  
Karma: When you come back to Dzongu, you have that sense of belonging. Like 
when you are all the time in Dzongu you don’t feel that “own-ness” like when 
you go outside, and you see the real world outside then you come to know what 
Dzongu really means and what are the potentials in it. You [author] have seen 
Dzongu. We don’t have potential only in tourism. It’s still untouched, unexplored. 
Aitken (2001) points to how attention to the contradictions embedded in young people’s 
everyday experiences has not just descriptive but also prescriptive value, as young people may 
find playful and creative ways to subvert these oppressive structures. During the protests, 
Dzongu youth discussed the need for documenting oral histories and exploring sites of spiritual 
importance within Dzongu on Facebook groups. In the initial days of the protests with very little 
support for the movement, Dawa and Tenzing, the two young men who went on the hunger 
strike, gathered a team of young men and women who went from village to village within the 
reserve raising awareness about the movement. Dawa recalls how through these tours young 
people who had grown up outside the reserve were able to gain a spatial and spiritual awareness 
of Dzongu, 
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Dawa: There’s Dzongu they know it is Dzongu but they don’t know where, 
which point is Dzongu? The shape of Dzongu and of course how many rivers? 
What are the stories related to those rivers? Or the lakes and the mountains…but 
with this movement you know a lot of the guys know the rivers. A lot of guys 
have learned about the lakes and the stories about these lakes. For example when 
you [author] were in Gyathang you maybe have gone to this small lake? Many 
youth didn’t know about that lake but with this movement a lot of people know 
about this lake and they even make it a point sometimes to visit the lake. 
While walking from one village to another, experienced members would point to 
important landscapes and their stories as well as the sites where power houses were being 
planned thereby superimposing important spiritual landscapes onto the project sites. The 
articulation of indigeneity here is a material, place-based process closely tied to young people’s 
experience of the reserve. Dzongu is presented as the sublime whereas Gangtok, the capital city, 
is portrayed by several activists as fraught with risks of drugs, sexual promiscuity, and increasing 
unemployment. While very few young people have made the actual transition, most actively 
subscribe to the discourse of returning to Dzongu, which feeds into the vision of the reserve as an 
exceptional space worthy of being visited, lived in, cared for, and protected. 
3.6 Shifting Terrain of Indigeneity  
 
In Sikkim until recently, only Bhutia and Lepcha groups were recognized as Scheduled 
Tribes (ST). Both groups are recognized as early settlers of Sikkim and present a united front 
with organizations like the Sikkim Bhutia Lepcha Apex Committee (SIBLAC) and have joint 
Bhutia-Lepcha (BL) seat reservation in the state assembly (Shneiderman and Turin 2006). 
Though many scholars suggest the Lepchas migrated from Assam, official discourse recognizes 
them as ‘original inhabitants’ bestowing on them the ‘first insider’ status (Little 2007). In 2002, 
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the Limbu
14
 and Tamang groups, formerly under the Nepali category
15
, were also accorded ST 
status. In an indirect response to this in 2003, the Sikkim Lepcha Youth Association (SLYA) 
pushed for Lepchas to be recognized as the Most Primitive Tribe (MPT) “to protect and preserve 
this endangered human species…as these people cannot adapt in such [sic] competitive world” 
(Arora 2006). While claims to indigeneity and autochthony may not be prerequisites for the 
Scheduled Tribe status in India, histories of migration (real or imagined) and the insider/outsider 
debate still figure chiefly in official and unofficial discourse within Sikkim. The push for MPT, 
while criticized by many, for labelling Lepchas as ‘primitive’, points to the attempts at 
positioning Lepcha claims as somehow more valid and urgent than those of other groups.  
In Sikkim, Lepcha groups like the SLYA, Renjyong Mutanchi Rong Tarzum (RMRT), 
Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum (MLAS) have actively deployed the term ‘indigenous’ in their 
programs and activities. However, other than MLAS, which is based in Dzongu, the other groups 
are in Gangtok and aren’t particularly active in the reserve (Bentley 2007). These groups, headed 
by urban elite Lepchas, focused primarily on building and maintaining institutional frameworks, 
especially around language (Shneiderman and Turin 2006; Turin 2014) and political reservation 
which required close dealings with the state, making it difficult for them to openly support the 
anti-dam movement. Protests were given momentum by groups like Affected Citizens of Teesta 
(ACT) and Concerned Lepchas of Sikkim (CLOS), which, while established and advised by 
older Lepchas, was comprised mostly of Dzongu youth. It also became a ‘youth movement’ 
                                                 
14
 The Limbu’s are acknowledged as one of the earliest settlers of Sikkim however colonial administrative discourse 
progressively classified them as Nepalis. Due to limitations of space I couldn’t possibly do justice to Limbu claims 
to indigeneity which have been discussed in great depth by scholars like Arora (2006), Subba (2010). 
 
15
 Scholars view the Nepali category as a colonial construct that enveloped distinct groups with cultural, religious 
and linguistic heterogeneity who migrated from Nepal into Sikkim (Arora 2006). 
 
 74 
since several older Lepchas sympathetic to the cause were held back because of their position as 
government employees and the fear of victimization. 
During the protests, Dzongu Lepchas interacted with national and international 
researchers, activists, and media persons connecting them to global indigenous discourses. With 
severe opposition from several reserve members and state authorities, reserve youth depended 
mostly on national and international solidarity networks (Arora 2007; Little 2010). But after the 
protests when young people struggled to find employment, many returned to the reserve and 
began reflecting on their experiences. In Sikkim the government is the single largest employer 
and every year government jobs get harder to come by. Many of the young activists had at some 
point unsuccessfully tried securing government jobs, leading to a sense of failure coupled with 
indignation. Reflecting on the lack of support from official Lepcha organizations and elders 
within the reserve, young activists inferred that being a government employee made state critique 
impossible. In many interviews, a recurring theme was the refusal to be dependent on the State, 
and the focus instead was on developing sustainable self-employment alternatives. Tashi one of 
the activists had this to say,  
Tashi: They [panchayat members] make our people day by day more dependent 
on government, no? They don’t talk about self-employment kind of thing. It’s 
only theoretical to them but not practical. They talk about income-generation and 
all those kinds of things. How can you generate income in your area when you are 
not self-employed? 
Another youth, Paljor reflecting on the futility of looking for government or private jobs 
in Gangtok felt that young activists returning to the village could set an example for others,  
Paljor: It’s not like you won’t get a job in Gangtok if you look hard enough. But 
it’ll be something like a salesperson or in a shop. You stay out for a year and 
realize that in Gangtok you end up spending more than you’re earning. Also what 
happens is that young people right after they finish their studies they only want 
government jobs. Now it’s not as easy as it was before. What I’m telling the 
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younger generation is that we’re trying to set an example for them that ‘See it is 
possible to come back to the village and still make a living.’ Maybe they will see 
this and return. 
Many of the young activists had been critiqued as educated, upper class youth who had 
left the reserve and were disconnected from the realities of the reserve. While acknowledging 
these critiques, they felt their decision to return to Dzongu was a deliberate attempt at changing 
people’s perception of both Dzongu and its youth. During my fieldwork before the protests, I 
encountered two prominent discourses being mobilized by non-reserve residents. Building on 
colonial romanticized notions, outsiders saw reserve members living simple uncomplicated lives 
in close proximity to the spirits of their ancestors. But a reverse logic was simultaneously at 
work where reserve members were caricatured as black-magic-wielding simpletons. Many young 
people who studied outside recalled how they suffered the taunts of those viewed Dzongu as 
‘backward’ and perceived them as unhygienic and superstitious. Sonam, one of the activists who 
had returned to the village, made this pointed observation: 
Sonam: From the start Dzongu has…it’s been called the ‘victimized’ place. Govt. 
officials like teachers get sent here as a punishment. If there is a program 
organized in Gangtok and they announce that our next program will be in 
Dzongu, everyone says, “Ambo [Oh gosh] Dzongu! Why there?” but if you see it 
only takes two and a half hours from Gangtok but that’s the image they have. I 
feel like the earlier leaders made that image. And that’s what we’re trying to 
change now.  
Young people I spoke with demonstrated an awareness of the ways in which racialized 
tropes of the reserve and its members were sedimented in both official and unofficial discourse. 
While being aware of these negative stereotypes, they invoked another oft repeated stereotype of 
‘not being assertive’ and juxtaposed it with Bhutia and upper-caste Nepali groups who were 
portrayed as ‘shrewd’ and ‘business-minded.’ These tropes have their roots in what Bernard 
Cohn termed as the colonial sociology of knowledge whereby British authorities constructed a 
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knowledge of their subjects according to their own needs and purposes (Kennedy 1991). The 
British
16
 had a huge role to play in drawing a contrast between the Lepchas and their mountain 
neighbors, the Nepalese and the Bhutanese. While the latter two peoples were seen as aggressive, 
industrious, and warlike, the Lepchas were seen as “timid, peaceful, and no brawler[s]” (Ibid 57). 
While these tropes regarding different communities had been in circulation prior to the hunger 
strike, these were deployed by young Lepchas to create a subjectivity that would stand apart 
from the ‘dominant’ communities.  
In my M.A. interviews I asked young Lepchas to state what they felt was a unique aspect 
of Lepcha culture. Ugen, a first year college student had this to say,  
Ugen: For me the best feature of Lepcha culture is our straightforwardness, there 
is no sense of any deception in us everything that is in our hearts is there on our 
lips…giving rise to blind trust and hospitality. We must remember that we are 
those same people who gave their own lands to their so called Bhutia brothers to 
stay otherwise who gives his or her land to anyone. 
Emily Yeh’s (2007) work on tropes of Tibetan indolence and ‘being spoilt’ by the 
Chinese government and how Tibetans themselves participate actively in the circulation and 
reproduction of these tropes provides an important theoretical entry point. While these might 
appear to be straightforward reflections of state discourse, she argues that they point to important 
experiences of development and exclusion. In the Lepcha context we find an extension of this 
coded critique of the state being articulated by Dzongu youth in promoting tropes of the ‘shy and 
unambitious’ Lepchas. While the government sees it as the reason for their economic 
backwardness, young Lepchas deployed this trope to talk about how they have been taken 
                                                 
16
 While Dane Kennedy writes primarily in the West Bengal context of Darjeeling and Kalimpong, his analysis can 
be extended to Sikkim since early anthropological studies of the Lepchas of Sikkim were undoubtedly influenced by 
these tropes.   
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advantage of by other groups demonstrating how “ethnic values and sentiments can be generated 
from socio-economic insecurities and mobilized politically” (Chettri 2013). The moral and 
ecological high ground of the Lepchas is demonstrated through the performance of an 
environmental consciousness and ancient claims to the land predating those of both Bhutia and 
Nepali communities. These critiques mixed in with the general belief among Dzongu youth that 
benefits for the Lepchas were cornered by their urban counterparts suggest a break from official 
Lepcha institutions based in Gangtok thereby shifting the articulation of Lepcha indigeneity 
within Sikkim. Dzongu activists through these material and discursive practices then are 
fashioning not only an ideal vision of the reserve, but also an ideal vision of the indigenous 
subject.  
3.7 Constructing respectability 
 
Before the protests, young Lepchas leaving the reserve in search of better opportunities 
were written off by community elders as apathetic to their cultural roots. The hunger strikes 
sparked discussions among young Lepchas around a moral responsibility to return to Dzongu. 
However, many of them were studying or working outside the reserve and were critiqued for 
being disconnected with ground realities. Cardamom, the main cash crop in North Sikkim and an 
important source of income within the reserve, had seen a steady decline in productivity in the 
past decade while reserve land could not be sold to non-reserve members. With these limited 
economic opportunities, hydropower development appeared as the perfect opportunity to liquefy 
a resource that was either unproductive or no longer an essential material capital (McDuie-Ra 
2011). In interviews with community elders regarding the younger generation, they expressed 
feelings of disapproval and possibility. In interviews with village elders in the reserve many felt 
that young children were “lazy, rude, disrespectful and indifferent to Lepcha culture” but also 
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“bold, adventurous and willing to take risks.” Conversely, young Lepchas like Norden, who was 
actively involved in village affairs, felt youth were taken for granted by community elders. 
Norden: I guess in entire Sikkim there is this thing, this communication break 
down between the generations. Like the seniors don’t believe in the youths…for 
them youths are only like… there’s a meeting to be organized you have to get 
some bamboos, cut some bamboos make something [such as makeshift tents]. For 
manpower, for labor, but after that you are not thanked also like ‘you guys did 
this it’s a very nice thing.’ You’re just like a fool out there working so hard. 
Several young men like Norden who had been part of the hunger strike returned to the 
reserve after being unable to find jobs in Gangtok. While the protests were supported by both 
young men and women, there was a disproportionate amount of young men in positions of 
responsibility within the movement. The hunger strike was launched by two young men and 
prominent positions within the movement are still held by men. My own interactions with the 
movement have mainly been with its male members, a choice made for matters of convenience 
as well as one that reflects the reality of the movement. Jeffrey’s (2004, 2008, 2010) work on 
educated unemployed men is an important reference point here. He argues that for young men 
being unemployed and excluded from ‘productive’ forms of labor can come with associated 
feeling of failure, guilt, and loss of respectability. In line with broader patriarchal notions, young 
women do not face similar pressures to enter paid salaried employment (Jeffrey 2004). For 
Dzongu Lepchas, perhaps this reflects the ways in which young men in particular have been 
affected by lack of employment opportunities given the increasing competition with other groups 
in the Sikkim.  Whether their unemployment was a cause or a consequence of activism, in what 
followed during and after the protests, Dzongu youth fashioned themselves into important 
political actors worthy of their community’s respect. For some this respect was gained through 
setting up successful eco-tourism homestays. One such homestay boasts of hosting the Royal 
Prince of Norway, has won tourism awards, and has been featured in magazines such as National 
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Geographic traveler. For others like Kalzang this respect was gained through standing up for 
panchayat (village-level) elections as an independent candidate  
Kalzang: Things are really changing…now youths are really being recognized. 
Even the seniors, they act differently towards the youth…like they act a little 
maturely towards us not like before making excuses refusing to meet with us. 
Now they have to be more serious towards us. But in order to do that even we 
have to do something that’s worthwhile. That’s why we are getting more 
recognized and the public trusts the youth more than the seniors, the politicians. 
So that’s a huge difference we made. 
From being perceived as a remote, backward area, of interest only for researchers, 
Dzongu is slowly emerging as an important political constituency. After the last elections, the 
Dzongu constituency was altered to include Mangshila, the hillside across Dzongu which has a 
majority pro-SDF population. This past year, many young men and women from Dzongu, 
including Kalzang, joined the opposition party with Dawa Lepcha leading the charge. After the 
protests, Dzongu youth have been actively challenging not just racialized and exclusionary state 
practices but also community members’ perceptions about them. As Norden pointed out, from 
being seen as useful only for ‘cutting bamboos, young people are slowly being taken seriously as 
political actors who are consciously and actively shaping Dzongu’s future. 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Difference has always been acknowledged as part of the national project in India, as 
evidenced in our motto, ‘Unity in Diversity.’ Within the framework promoted by ideals of 
liberalism, projects of recognition require the subject of recognition to posture in certain ways 
that fit within the given framework of difference (Povinelli 2002; Shneiderman and Turin 2006; 
Middleton 2013; ). The indigenous subject in India has to twist and position oneself within a 
neo-colonial, neo-liberal, and religious framing of difference (Appadurai 1996b; Hansen 1999; 
Pandey 2006). Indigenous youth find themselves responding to all this and more with 
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community and state aspirations and apprehensions weighing heavily on their lives. Unlike their 
neighbors in neighboring districts of West Bengal who are struggling to secure the coveted 
Scheduled Tribe status (Middleton 2013; Chettri 2013), the Dzongu Lepchas are struggling 
against state apathy despite having this status. In the Dzongu Lepchas’ case, indigenous claims to 
exceptionalism are deployed to bolster their project of recognition where Dzongu is presented as 
an exceptional landscape which embodies and induces the contradictory experience of adversity 
and opportunity.  
While this indigenous exceptionalism is supported by transnational groups, it leaves out 
non-indigenous groups within the state who cannot make similar claims to land and natural 
resources but might experience a similar ‘banishment’ from the state. Karlsson (2013), writing in 
the Meghalaya context, points out that there the indigeneity discourse is not so much to address 
social inequality but to strengthen claims of certain already powerful tribes over land and 
resources. Discussions on Facebook groups by Lepcha youth reflect a growing anxiety around 
the dissolution of the tribe’s boundaries alongside a growing desire to keep the tribe ‘pure.’ How 
might we then make sense of this politics of difference which in challenging important 
exclusionary and racialized practices is assigning those same categories to other communities 
within the state? For any engaged academic, this presents many such worrisome yet important 
questions. An awareness of these different positionalities has to be carefully tempered with the 
ability to critique and enter into dialogue. My role as an engaged academic who positions herself 
alongside the Lepchas is not to simply critique these tendencies in an academic journal while 
keeping them hidden from the activists themselves. Instead I see myself as an outsider who 
expresses solidarity while questioning and challenging these disturbing patterns and 
contradictions.  
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In the Dzongu Lepcha case we see that there are contestations within the tribe over who 
defines indigeneity and its associated meanings. Even as there is public debate promoting Lepcha 
exceptionalism, there are also internal tensions over purity and difference. McDuie Ra (2011) 
draws our attention to the “intra-ethnic contest for legitimacy” wherein pro-dam groups within 
the reserve have been critical of Lepchas from neighboring regions like Kalimpong and 
Darjeeling for lending support to the anti-dam protests while Dzongu activists have been 
critiqued for being upper class youth disconnected from the reserves material realities. While 
acknowledging these intra-ethnic dynamics, my argument has been built around an attention to 
young people’s particular experience of state neglect and community anxieties which have put 
them at odds with the older and urban members of the tribe. Dzongu youth are redefining 
indigeneity to address concerns specific to their experiences both within and outside the reserve. 
Even as young people subvert racialized tropes surrounding the reserve and its inhabitants, they 
reify others that help them access both internal and external recognition. Tropes regarding 
Lepchas’ indolence and lack of industry have a long history in Sikkim and are at present firmly 
sedimented in official and unofficial discourse. As Yeh (2007) points out in the Tibetan context, 
while these tropes shape development policies directed at these groups and are utilized for 
political control, they also shape possibilities of maneuvering within the larger trajectory of 
reform and development. Dzongu youth’s political performance of authenticity and posturing of 
difference is closely tied to young people’s desire to be included in the plans and policies of the 
State and acknowledged as important political actors with a voice. Even though they are 
excluded by the state they cannot help but reluctantly appeal to it, pushed by their desire and 
longing for justice (Secor 2007). 
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Dzongu youth respond to and challenge the concerns of their elders and state leaders 
transforming these expectations and apprehensions into new practices and goals. Their desire to 
be seen and valued by the state and their community members as responsible citizens instead of 
apathetic youth have found fertile ground in the hunger strike and their subsequent projects. 
Through this article I have sought to illustrate the interplay between indigeneity and youth and 
the myriad ways in which indigenous youth encounter and engage with development and 
democratic politics. The entry of hydropower and other development projects in the Himalayan 
region merits a closer examination of how marginalized groups are navigating the treacherous 
terrain of industrialization and urbanization. In the Sikkimese context, indigeneity is being 
defined by young people through the lens of their particular material and embodied experiences 
and is informed by a complex relationship between personal agency and structural constraints. 
While the political practices of Dzongu youth can be read as simultaneously progressive and 
reactionary, they demonstrate that they are not unwitting subjects of state exclusion and are 
playing an important role in shaping the imaginaries and futures of their community.  
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CHAPTER 4: LIVING WITH EARTHQUAKES AND ANGRY DEITIES  
4.1 Introduction  
 
Q: What do people say about the earthquakes? 
Palzor: People say it’s because there is so much lack of peace in the village. Then 
some people say it’s because of paap [sin], maybe people have excess paap. 
Maybe the environment has gotten polluted. Then other people say it’s because of 
the devi-deorali [Nepali term for gods and goddesses]. In Lepcha we call them 
lingzee we believe they live in the mountains and hillside. And slowly we’ve 
stopped following these gods and started focusing more on Buddhism especially 
this generation we don’t believe, it could be because of that the earthquakes came.  
September 18
th
 2011, a 6.9 magnitude earthquake shook Sikkim, a small borderland state 
in the Eastern Himalayas of India. Exactly one year later in an uncanny coincidence, an 
earthquake of smaller magnitude, sparked panic among a gathering of people observing the 
anniversary of the previous year’s earthquake. Since 2011, Sikkim has witnessed earthquakes of 
varying magnitudes every year without fail. This heightened sense of precarity has drawn public 
attention to a waning anti-dam movement which began in 2007 and was led primarily by 
educated youth of the indigenous Lepcha tribe. Lepcha activists had warned state authorities of 
the dire ecological and spiritual consequences of building hydropower projects in Sikkim and the 
sacred Lepcha reserve of Dzongu. However, as Palzor
17, an unemployed youth in his early 20’s, 
suggests in the quote above, beyond the moral failure of the state, for many these earthquakes 
also point to deeper spiritual and cosmological anxieties. 
                                                 
17
 Everyone I spoke to has been given pseudonyms and all identifying details have been removed.   
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As extreme weather conditions become more commonplace in mountainous 
environments like India’s Himalayan borderlands, we find cultural anxieties like those voiced by 
Palzor, seeping through the cracks and fissures. Palzor’s concern around sin, pollution, and 
abandoning indigenous Lepcha deities in favor of Buddhist ones, reveal deep seated cultural 
anxieties around loss of authenticity and self, a common symptom of the postcolonial condition 
(Nandy 1989, 1989b; Escobar 1995). In the Sikkimese context, I suggest that people’s spiritual 
narratives regarding the earthquake, signal tensions between minority indigenous religious 
practices and the more pervasive Tibetan Buddhism. I demonstrate through ethnographic 
research, that while most lay Lepchas are aware of this tension it is the anti-dam activists who 
are tasked with enrolling these concerns in a political recognition of indigeneity that demands 
stable categories and narratives. I argue that critical scholars, committed to marginalized and 
indigenous groups often also desire this stability which deems certain categories and scenarios as 
worthy of inquiry. Drawing on fifteen months of fieldwork in Sikkim, I highlight Lepcha 
narratives of spiritual indeterminacy and loss of cultural authenticity, in an attempt to push our 
understanding of what counts as politics in the Anthropocene era, especially in examining the 
relationship between marginalized groups and vulnerable environments. Much of this 
ethnographic work was located in the Dzongu reserve, a protected reserve for the Lepcha tribe 
and the heart of the recent anti-dam movement in Sikkim.  
The concerns highlighted in this article have important theoretical and methodological 
implications for research on marginalized groups inhabiting mountainous environments that are 
the most vulnerable to climate change impacts. This article builds on my larger research project 
which examines how hydropower development and the Lepcha anti-dam movement is shaping 
the political subjectivities of indigenous youth and shifting the relationship between the 
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Himalayan margins and the Indian state (Gergan 2014). There is an urgent need to address the 
concerns of this region within geography given the recent surge in infrastructural development 
alongside an increase in the frequency and intensity of natural hazard events. Theoretically, this 
article builds on recent conversations within the discipline to ‘decolonize’ geography by 
challenging euro-western epistemes and engaging with indigenous and postcolonial knowledge 
and histories (Jazeel 2011; Sundberg 2014). Methodologically, this article builds on the growing 
interest in the geophysical as a site of inquiry within critical scholarship (Clark 2008, 2011; Last 
2015). In the Indian context, Dalit and Adivasi scholars point to the limits of postcolonial and 
subaltern scholarship, dominated by upper caste scholars, that has failed to incorporate their 
voices in interrogating the experience of colonialism and modernity (Bhagavan and Feldhaus 
2009). Scholars of the Himalayan region also argue that despite its geopolitical and ecological 
significance, the region still occupies a peripheral status in knowledge production within South 
and South-East Asian Studies (Van Schendel 2002; Gellner 2013). Recent natural disasters in 
these mountainous regions, such as the devastating earthquakes in Nepal (April 2015) and 
Afghanistan (October 2015), expose conditions of vulnerability that require a sustained and 
deeper engagement with local communities. In this article I examine how natural hazards and 
disasters open up seemingly stable narratives and categories to a whole host of cultural anxieties. 
While this article focuses on the Indian Himalayan region, it draws attention to broader 
ecological and cultural concerns that are also shaping other mountainous environments.   
4.2 Living with Indeterminacy at the Peripheries  
 
Recent scholarship on the Anthropocene evokes a sense of crisis and urgency (Roelvink 
and Gibson-Graham 2010). Apocalyptic framings of the current ecological crisis have enabled 
both academics and environmental activists to mobilize specific political projects. However, 
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indigenous and postcolonial scholars argue that the indeterminacies associated with the 
Anthropocene epoch, require a fundamental reworking of the epistemological and 
methodological frameworks of these political projects that are often still operating within the 
strictures of Euro-western intellectual traditions (Jazeel 2011; Last 2015). Within geography, 
post-humanist theory central to discussions on the Anthropocene, has been critiqued for being 
steeped in universalizing categories and classifications (Sundberg 2014). Drawing on Gayatri 
Spivak, geographers suggest her ‘planetary’ framework can bridge the posthuman and 
postcolonial divide through engagement with non-western and more-than-white Anglo 
ontologies (Jazeel 2011; Sidaway et al 2014). Distinct in its explicitly materialist and geo-
physical language, Spivak (2003) describes ‘planet-feeling’ as an experience of the uncanny, the 
unheimlich, the undoing of a sense of habitation. Both theoretically and materially, the planetary 
is something that “contains us as much as it flings us away” (Spivak 2003:73). As anthropogenic 
climate change makes extreme weather events more frequent, “planetarity demands we work 
with the indeterminacies and ambivalences of ‘our planet’ ” (Jazeel 2011: 89) wherein the 
apocalyptic serves as an opening to examine the “grounded scene of the everyday” (90). Our 
engagements with ecological precarity in postcolonial contexts, then also presents a challenge to 
our disciplinary habits.   
Geographers have drawn attention to how natural disasters and hazards expose 
differential vulnerability and conditions of everyday forms of violence and marginalization 
(Blakie et al 1994; Baldwin and Stanley 2013). Writing about drought conditions in Australia, 
Clark (2008:739) suggests that a deeper understanding of the erratic rhythms of a volatile earth 
requires an engagement with social histories of indigenous communities and argues that 
“integrating social history with geological, climatic or evolutionary history has its own potential 
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to destabilize colonial narratives”. Anthropologists have paid close attention to the significance 
of spiritual life worlds such as popular religion, shamanism, witchcraft, and spirit possession in 
examining not just hazards but how people make sense of drastic social shifts (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999). Buyandelger (2007) illustrates how the collapse of state socialism in Mongolia, 
resulted in the resurgence of shamanic practices among ethnic Buryats. As Buryats attempt to 
appease angry origin spirits, neglected and suppressed under state socialism, their “misfortunes 
become linked with memories of historical oppression…shamanic interpretations allows 
individual to situate themselves in the larger history of multiple oppression and marginalization 
within Mongolia, which in turn has been oppressed by geopolitical powers” (Buyandelger 
2007:143). An examination of people’s spiritual practices and narratives, in moments of rupture, 
both real and figurative, provides an important analytical lens to understand the relationship of 
marginalized groups to those in power.  
In this article, I draw attention to the peculiar space of India’s mountainous borderlands 
which are at the geographic and cognitive peripheries of the nation-state. The contemporary 
politics of this region has been heavily shaped by colonial spatial order and knowledge systems 
that saw ‘hill people’ as ethnically distinct from those in the plains (Chowdhury and Kipgen 
2013). Today the Himalayan region is the site of many separatist and secessionist movements 
that arise from the notion of ‘ethnically exclusive homelands’ (Baruah 2008). Ashis Nandy 
(1989:264, 265), commenting on the disorienting nature of colonialism which leaves the 
colonized with “someone else’s present as their future” presents the figure of the shaman, as a 
“modest symbol of resistance to the dominant politics of knowledge”. In the Indian context, 
Nandy’s (1989:266) shaman demands an attention to “the insurrection of the little cultures” that 
have been subsumed within the upper-caste, elitist historiography. Many “little cultures” in 
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India, existed at the margins of both the British Empire and the contemporary Indian state. The 
sense of displacement under colonialism is especially exaggerated for these groups whose local 
culture and histories have undergone multiple iterations of erasure.  
In the Himalayan context, heightened ecological precarity is activating claims that have 
ancient roots but offer important clues for the present. In the following section, I offer a brief 
historical context to Sikkim and the indigenous Lepchas who have been at the peripheries of both 
the Indian and the Sikkimese state. I then draw on interviews with Lepchas in the Dzongu 
reserve, to illustrate how people’s spiritual narratives display both spiritual indeterminacy and a 
loss of authenticity. I discuss how the politics of recognition that indigenous groups like the 
Lephca’s find themselves unwittingly enrolled in, require stable narratives. These narratives are 
activated in times of crisis and rupture but do not address spiritual and cosmological anxieties 
which are far more indeterminate.  I then close with a discussion of the necessity of broadening 
our definition of politics in the context of real and figurative indeterminacies in the 
Anthropocene era.  
4.3 Taming the Sacred Hidden Land 
 
The early history of Sikkim starts in the 8
th
 century, when it is believed that Guru 
Rinpoche (Guru Padmasambhava in some accounts) introduced Buddhism to this beyul, a sacred 
hidden land (Balicki 2008). Accounts of Guru Rinpoche’s time in Sikkim, reveal that the 
introduction of Buddhism required the taming of existing supernatural beings, which many 
interpret as a metaphor for the “taming of the mind, of society, of the environment or even of the 
country” (Balicki 2008:88). Scholars have attested to the presence of similar beyuls across the 
Himalayan region and believe that the description of Sikkim as beyul was an encouragement for 
Tibetans fleeing religious persecution, to migrate and settle here. The 13
th
 century witnessed the 
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signing of a blood brotherhood treaty between an indigenous Lepcha king and a Tibetan prince 
which is said to have laid the foundation for the Buddhist Namgyal dynasty. With the 
establishment of the Namgyal dynasty, Buddhism flourished but indigenous Lepchas, who were 
sworn protection under the treaty, were ignored and their cultural practices languished. This 
ancient story, part mythology, part factual history still frames present day political and cultural 
conversations in Sikkim.   
Several centuries later, prized for its strategic geopolitical location, the kingdom of 
Sikkim was offered protection and minimal external intervention by the British. However, in 
order to balance the pro-Tibetan monarchy, the British started settling Nepalis in the Southern 
and Western parts of Sikkim (Hiltz 2003). In 1947, after India gained independence, Sikkim 
became a protectorate of its powerful neighbor (in 1950) and was subsequently annexed to it in 
1975. Presently, the Nepali community constitute the demographic and political majority. The 
Lepchas, and Bhutias (also known as Lhopos), who trace their lineage to the 13
th
 century Tibetan 
settlers, are recognized as indigenous to Sikkim and are beneficiaries of affirmative action 
policies. The Bhutias and Lepchas formed a political alliance and within this, the Lepchas 
consider themselves the subordinate partner. The anti-dam movement saw a revitalization of 
myths, oral, and supernatural histories which were interpolated into protests narratives to 
highlight the political subordination of the Lepchas. Most Lepchas in North Sikkim, where this 
study took place, follow a syncretic blend of the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism and 
Lepcha shamanism, with recent years witnessing a steady decline in the latter’s influence 
(Bentley 2007). My fieldwork in 2014, took place during India’s national and Sikkim’s state 
elections, where many of these concerns, including those around growing ecological precarity, 
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took center stage. It is in this charged political climate that the following conversations take 
place.   
 
4.4 Spiritual and Cosmological Indeterminacy  
 
Heightened ecological precarity in mountainous environments is generating a politics of 
urgency that echoes broader global climate change anxieties. These political framings further 
specific concerns but obscure others that do not carry the same urgency despite also being 
reactive and constitutive of multiple forms of power. This section illustrates how concerns raised 
by lay Lepchas in Dzongu regarding the earthquake signal tensions between Buddhism and 
shamanic Lepcha practices. Loden, my guide and translator, had one of the clearest articulations 
of this tension. Walking back after an interview with an old bungthing [Lepcha shaman] who 
related the earthquake to the slow erosion of shamanic practices, Loden shared his own 
experience, 
Loden: When there is a death in the family lamas [Buddhist monks] come, they 
do their rituals but none of the family members understand what is being said in 
the rituals. Once I asked one of them what are you saying in your prayers? Maybe 
you can stay a while after the ritual is over and explain to the family members 
what was just said. Then some of them got angry at me. They demand a lot of 
respect and get angry if we don’t treat them like royalty.  
Loden then wondered out loud how a lama could guide his father’s spirit to paradise 
since he would be performing the rituals in Tibetan but his father only spoke Lepcha, wouldn’t 
that confuse his father’s spirit? In interviews, questions about the earthquake were often 
explained using the language of sin and pollution. Sin was understood as a spectrum of moral 
lapses and failures. Almost everyone I interviewed considered polluting and desecrating a sacred 
landscape, a sin, for which hydropower projects were responsible. But there was less certainty as 
 97 
to whether the lack of observance or mistakes made during certain ritual practices could also 
constitute sin. One of the main sites of this confusion was an irreconcilable difference between 
Buddhist and shamanic spiritual practices. Shamanism requires animal sacrifice and the ritual 
spilling of blood which Buddhism prohibits and considers a sin (Balicki 2008). In one of the 
villages in Dzongu, I was asked to film a shamanic ritual performance which required among 
other things, the offering of chickens. Later when we watched the video where one of the 
villagers bludgeoned the chickens in preparation for the offering, someone remarked in jest, 
“Gosh, look at all that blood! We must be accumulating a lot of sin. We are such bad Buddhists!” 
These uncertainties around what constitutes sin in shamanic and Buddhist cosmology, also relate 
to larger anxieties around human culpability in triggering future natural calamities.  
This spiritual indeterminacy reveals a more complex relationship with natural elements 
and the spiritual world. In Lepcha mythology, Itbu-Rum, the creator goddess creates Matlee 
Punu, the earthquake king. She then creates Mount Kanchendzonga and places him on the chest 
of Matlee Punu in order to control him
18
. Mount Kanchendzonga is revered as the protector 
mountain deity of Sikkim by Nepalis, Bhutias, and Lepchas alike. Within Dzongu, there are 
specific shamanic rituals dedicated to Kanchendzonga and neighboring mountains. Lepcha 
cosmology is similar to many other indigenous groups who enter into social contracts with spirit 
beings of the landscape. These social contracts are premised on the observance of taboos and 
ritual practices (High 2013). Within Buddhist cosmology, the Nesol, a sacred ritual text, warns 
devotees that desecrating the scared landscape of Beyul Demajong, the Tibetan name for Sikkim, 
can result in natural disasters and socio-political unrest. However earthquakes and natural 
                                                 
18
 Personal communication with Jenny Bentley, 2014.  
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disasters in Lepcha cosmology, similar in many aspects to Buddhist cosmology, have a stronger 
correlation to the failure to appease mountain deities through ritual offerings rather than the 
desecration of sacred landscapes.  
Fig 4: A bungthing offers chi (millet beer) during a ritual for the villages’safety and protection (Source: 
Author, 2014) 
 
The bungthing is the gatekeeper and mediator between the human and spirit world. Ritual 
offerings carried out by bungthings are required to appease mountains deities who prevent 
earthquakes. Those who were closer to the shamanic tradition expressed concerns that fewer 
people knew how to perform rituals of safety and protection. Would performing these rituals 
incorrectly anger the deities even more? Could the deities be trusted to protect those who 
performed shamanic rituals or were they capricious, punishing everyone equally? Others like 
Kunga, in his early 30’s, spoke of bungthings disappearing and their powers diminishing,  
Kunga: My grandfather was a very strong bunghting. In his baari [garden], if 
people went without asking or picked something, their hands would hurt for days. 
He was so powerful that if you looked him straight in the eyes, your eyes would 
also hurt. Like even if you looked at the fruit and said, “Oh this is so daami 
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[wonderful]” even then your eyes would start hurting. Nowadays we don’t have 
such powerful bungthings.  
While the earthquake served as a political opening for activists to critique state neglect, 
for others it opened up otherwise stable narratives to a host of cultural anxieties. Lay Lepcha 
narratives of spiritual indeterminacy, which deities to follow, whether to shed blood or not, how 
to correctly perform rituals, question our assumption of what is conceived and imagined as 
political and points to the multiple temporalities and registers of politics embedded in geology 
and social history (Clark 2008) 
4.5 On Authenticity and Coping with Loss 
 
Samten: Maybe the young people will leave the forests because they don’t work 
here anymore. It’s not like we can keep shouting at them…it will be bad for them 
once we die. Slowly people have stopped doing the rituals and there are fewer 
bunthings. In schools they are teaching Lepcha language but the young ones come 
and ask me instead of the teachers about the meaning of these words. These 
teachers are drawing a salary for teaching Lepcha but they know nothing (laughs). 
Spiritual explanations for the growing intensity and frequency of earthquakes in Sikkim 
also highlight the rapidly shifting relationship between people and the mountainous 
environments they live, work, and worship in. Samten, in his 80’s, conflated economic, political 
and cultural concerns when asked about the earthquake and recent shifts within Dzongu. His 
response highlights concerns that are prominent among Lepchas around loss of territory, 
language, and shamanic practices (Bentley 2007). This section illustrates how despite their 
different registers both activist and lay narratives are rooted in the recognition of the loss and 
erasure of indigenous cultural practices. These sometimes contradictory, sometimes 
complementary, narratives show how people’s relationships to territories that are in rapid 
ecological flux are mediated through fragile networks and associations that are both externally 
and internally contested.  
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The notion of Lepchas as a ‘vanishing tribe’ was popularized by colonial authorities, who 
believed that the tribe was, “in great danger of dying out, being driven away from his ancestral 
glades by the prosaic Nepali and other materialistic Himalayan tribes” (Brown 1917:4 in 
Kennedy 1991). In 1987, a Lepcha author, Arthur Foning from the neighboring Darjeeling 
district, wrote his influential book, Lepcha, My Vanishing Tribe which further popularized this 
narrative. More recently these claims have been activated by the anti-dam movement. While 
highlighting their marginalization these claims also draw attention to how spiritual traditions of 
many ethnic minorities like the Lepchas, have either been erased or subsumed within the “great 
traditions” of Hinduism and Buddhism with their “perceived purity, historical longevity, and 
textual authority” (Shniederman 2010: 309). Historically, Lepcha cultural practices shaped by 
religious syncretism and hybridity, have served as a political tool to build alliances with other 
ethnic groups like the Bhutias, who are more economically and politically influential but 
conversely in moments of political discord these underlying tensions resurface.  
For Lepcha activists, the anti-dam movement created a space for dissent in a state where 
civil society activism had almost no precedent (Huber and Joshi 2015). As large infrastructural 
projects and climate change destabilize both the ecology and civil society of India’s mountainous 
borderlands, ethnic minorities like the Lepchas must speak now or forever hold their peace but 
using language that the state recognizes. While loss and recovery of self are a theme in both 
activist and lay narratives, the former is tasked with enrolling these claims in a politics of 
recognition that demands stable categories and narratives. Lay Lepchas expressed concerns about 
the erasure of indigenous practices but were willing to live with this indeterminacy, for example 
in the continued practice of both shamanic and Buddhist practices,   
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Palden: In our house we practice both Buddhism and Lepcha rituals. If you see in 
our house, our father has been trained as a lama and he does all the Buddhist 
rituals but he’s never paid much attention to bungthing rituals. Last year he got 
sick, his one leg was almost paralyzed. He went to the hospital; he went to the 
rinpoches [Buddhist spiritual leaders]. Then we started doing our Lepcha clan 
ritual and he started getting better. We are nature worshippers, we can’t leave that. 
Palden doesn’t believe that one tradition is better than the other however he does 
emphasize that Lepchas cannot walk away from their past without any consequences. Bentley 
(forthcoming) in her research on Lepcha shamanic practices and prophecies, closely examines an 
oral account of a magical contest between a Lepcha religious practitioner and a Buddhist 
protagonist, who some believe is Guru Padmasambhava, who introduced Buddhism to Sikkim in 
the 8
th
 century. Similar accounts can also be found in other parts of the Himalayan region where 
Buddhism was integrated with the local shamanic practice. Bentley (forthcoming) argues that 
these accounts cannot be read merely as Buddhism subjugating local beliefs, as many believe 
them to be but are to be read as, “delineating fields of religious competency and ritual activities” 
(xx). Lepcha shamanic practices have their time and place as do Buddhist rituals. However the 
activist narrative is more potent since it can be translated into a critique of unjust state practices 
and the political subordination of Lepchas. The politics of recognition that many ethnic 
minorities find themselves enrolled in requires fixed goals and certainty of identity and 
categories (Middleton 2013). As scholars who profess a commitment to these groups, we must 
attend to moments of rupture that open up stable categories and narratives employed by activists 
and academics alike.  
4.6 The Limits of Politics or what counts as Politics  
 
In the highly seismic Himalayan region, an attention to people’s interpretations of natural 
hazards can open spaces to examine both personal and communal life as well as state practices. 
Earthquakes and landslides in Sikkim are being actively deployed by both Lepcha activists and 
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opposition party members to critique the ruling government’s many failures. These conversations 
are occurring in the broader context of the shifting relationship between the Indian Himalayan 
states and the Indian state. While there is a strong critique of state abandonment in the region 
there is also a desire for inclusion in the state’s modernizing project. The politics of recognition, 
which takes the form of affirmative action for ethnic minorities, is an important tool of this 
modernizing project. As, I have demonstrated in this article, lay Lepchas while concerned about 
cultural loss and the future of their tribe, do not seek immediate resolution to their spiritual and 
cosmological anxieties. However in order to stake claims to state benefits, marginalized groups 
are pit against each other, each having to prove the authenticity of their historical injuries and 
losses through stable narratives and categories.  
Rancière notes, “Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, 
around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the 
possibilities of time.” (2004:13). Climate change anxieties in the Anthropocene activate a politics 
of urgency that prioritize specific projects and goals while obscuring others that are far more 
indeterminate. As growing ecological precarity in these mountainous environments spur 
geographical research and interest, we must also be willing to let the “indeterminacies and 
ambivalences of ‘our planet’ ” (Jazeel 2011:89) challenge disciplinary understandings of what 
categories and narratives are worthy of critical inquiry. While postcolonial and indigenous 
scholarship present an important critique of euro-western theorization it must also contend with 
the fact that marginalized groups are often employing the same universalizing language and 
categories we critique. The temporality of geological and cosmological processes might resist 
immediate political traction but a commitment to indigenous and marginalized voices requires 
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sensitivity to a multiplicity of voices, questioning what counts as political, and the opening up of 
categories that our discipline has stabilized.    
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CHAPTER 5: GEOLOGICAL ANXIETIES AT THE UNRULY BORDERLANDS OF 
THE INDIAN STATE 
5.1 Introduction  
 
In a society where determinism stands guard on the frontiers of democracy, 
indeterminism cannot but be political. (Feenberg (1992:8)  
Earthquakes birthed by ancient planetary forces can shake loose all sense of certitude in a 
matter of mere seconds. September 18th, 2011 a 6.9 magnitude earthquake shook Sikkim, a 
small Eastern Himalayan state in India. The initial earthquake was followed by several 
aftershocks, forcing many people to spend the night outside their homes in parked cars and 
school playgrounds. The earthquake coupled with heavy rains, triggered catastrophic landslides 
blocking NH-31, the only highway connecting the eight Northeastern states to mainland India 
(see Fig 5) The symbolic meaning of this event was not lost on locals who have felt cut off from 
the Indian state both historically and currently. Since the 2011 earthquake, Sikkim has witnessed 
an earthquake every year without fail.
19
 The frequency of these quakes is rapidly turning public 
opinion against hydropower projects. Extending Feenberg’s (1992) argument20 to include geo-
physical indeterminism, I suggest that heightened seismicity coupled with large infrastructural 
projects, in the Himalayan borderlands provides a political opening to challenge the hegemony of 
Indian “national interest”.
                                                 
19
 Earthquakes below 5.0 on the Richter scale are considered light intensity and are felt indoors and mostly on upper 
floors of buildings. The damage in this case is minimal (U.S. Geological Survey website). Following are the dates 
and magnitudes of earthquakes in Sikkim from 2012 to 2015. 18
th
 September 2012 – 4.1; 13th October 2013 – 5.0; 
10
th
 October 2015 – 4.7 
 
20
The indeterminism Feenberg spoke of was in the context of technological development in modern societies and its 
unpredictable outcomes, but can very well be extended to include ecological factors.    
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In the past decade, Indian Himalayan states
21
 have witnessed a massive push for 
hydropower development alongside an increase in natural hazard events. Hydropower projects 
and ancillary infrastructure meant to secure these vulnerable borderland states have instead 
destabilized both the region’s ecology and civil society. Across the border, Nepal’s destructive 
7.9 magnitude earthquake of April 2015 raised similar concerns about the country’s nascent 
hydropower industry, funded in large parts by its neighbors, India and China (Thapa and 
Shrestha 2015). As large infrastructural development in the Himalayan region meets an unruly 
borderland, geology and politics find themselves inextricably linked. 
Fig 5: The turbulent Eastern frontier 
 
The Siliguri corridor’ also known as the ‘chicken neck’ is a 23 km wide corridor that connects this region to 
mainland India. In 2002, Sikkim was included in the North East council, effectively making it the eight state of 
Northeast India. The report, which is the source of this map, is titled, “India’s troubled northeast: Insurgency and 
crime”. Multiple international borders, ongoing secessionist, and ethnic unrest in many Northeastern states, have 
popularized an understanding of this region as a turbulent frontier. (Source: IISS, Strategic Comments, Vol 10, no 6 
July 2004) 
                                                 
21
 The Indian Himalayan Region (IHR) as defined by the Government of India consists of Uttarakhand, Himachal 
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, hill districts of West Bengal and Assam, and the other northeastern states of Sikkim, 
Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh.    
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Before its annexation to India in 1975, Sikkim was an independent Buddhist kingdom. 
Even today Buddhist cosmology is deeply ingrained in Sikkimese social life. The Nesol a sacred 
Buddhist ritual text warns that destroying hills, rocks, and cliffs within Sikkim can cause 
epidemics, famines, natural calamities, and socio-political unrest (Balicki 2008). In clear 
violation of this warning, hydropower projects in Sikkim require blasting tunnels through 
mountains. Official reports attribute earthquakes to Sikkim’s “adverse geological conditions” 
that are “unpredictable” and “volatile” (in Kohli 2011:21). Many locals acknowledge these 
scientific explanations but also believe that mountain deities displeased by the desecration of 
Sikkim’s sacred physiography caused these natural disasters. Hydropower developers soon 
discover these projects don’t flow uninterrupted into inert, empty spaces (Tsing 2005). Instead 
they encounter “geological surprises” (Government of India 2008:27) which delay projects or 
worse, result in the loss of human life laying bare the ecological and cosmological limits of 
capitalism.  
 The Indian Himalayan Region, a climate change hotspot, is witnessing a surge in large 
infrastructural development alongside a dramatic rise in natural hazard events. In this article I 
argue that geophysical indeterminacy coupled with controversial development projects is 
reorienting the relationship between the Indian State and its Himalayan margins. Through 
interviews with indigenous groups and state technocrats, I examine how ecological precarity is 
actively deployed by borderland communities and regional technocrats, to critique hegemonic 
state development practices. Here I define technocracy as ideas of development promoted by 
technocratic elites considered more scientific and modern wherein technological rationality 
becomes political rationality (Nandy 1988; Feenberg 1992). While indigeneity is understood as 
both territorially rooted and a product of trans-local solidarity (Karlsson 2003; Castree 2004). I 
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suggest that though designed to promote nation-building at the ‘frontier’, these projects have led 
to a growing antagonism against the Indian state among indigenous groups and state technocrats. 
Project developers from mainland India are viewed as insensitive to Sikkim’s spiritual sanctity 
and its ecology since they do not have to live with any of the repercussions. Additionally, 
regional technocrats are rarely consulted on any projects instead locals affected by these projects 
have often employed their help in suing national or private project developers. This disdain for 
mainland India, as I discuss later in the article, is rooted in historically and contemporary state 
practices that have contributed to the region’s marginalization. While based in the Indian 
Himalayan context, theoretically this article seeks to further an understanding of the racial and 
geographic unevenness of environmental vulnerability, an undeniable reality of the 
Anthropocene era. Methodologically, in its engagements with geoscientists and indigenous 
groups, this article makes a case for multidisciplinary inquiry that values a plurality of 
knowledge systems.  
I conducted ethnographic and participatory research over two predissertation research 
surveys (2011, 2012) and ten months of fieldwork (2013-2014) in Gangtok, the capital town of 
Sikkim and Dzongu, a reserve of the indigenous Lepcha tribe in North Sikkim. My M.A. 
research in 2007 was also based in Dzongu, where I examined how indigenous youth navigate 
inter-generational anxieties as they out-migrated for higher education and employment. Since 
2007, Dzongu has also been the site of a well-known anti-dam movement, where young Lepcha 
activists, after three years of protests (2007-2010), successfully cancelled four of seven 
hydropower projects planned within the reserve. My fieldwork in 2014 took place during India’s 
national and Sikkim’s state elections. In addition to interviews with indigenous activists and 
regional technocrats, I was able to witness how questions of economic and ecological precarity, 
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e.g. youth unemployment and earthquakes, were conflated and took central place in electoral 
debates and political rhetoric. In this article I draw on interviews with state geologists, disaster 
management officials, and residents of Dzongu. Through these interviews I interrogate how 
geological indeterminacy mediates and produces a regional subjectivity rooted in geo-physical 
and spiritual particularities. I draw attention to the material and cultural processes that interrupt 
the centralization of state authority and environmental governance in the Himalayan region. In 
this my attempt is to attend to how “indeterminism cannot but be political” (Feenberg 1992) and 
the theoretical and practical importance of a “critical geographic mobilization of place” (Jazeel 
2011) for post-colonial environmental politics in the Anthropocene.  
5.2 Living with Indeterminacy in the Anthropocene  
 
If climate change pundits are to be believed, we live in profoundly uncertain times on the 
brink of an eco-apocalypse. The Anthropocene, despite its contested categorization, is the surest 
reminder of the planetary and geologic scale of humanity’s material impact. But despite its 
emphasis on humanity as geologic agent, the Anthropocene has evoked humility rather than 
hubris, in a dramatic departure from the certitude of enlightenment thinking (Lövbrand et al. 
2009).   This concept has prompted profound introspection about the dialectical relationship 
between humanity and nature, where both are figured, sometimes simultaneously or alternately, 
as risk and at risk. Clark (2011) highlights, a central thread of inquiry that runs through this 
scholarship: the tension between human culpability (think Amazonian deforestation) and human 
vulnerability (think Hurricane Katrina). While not eschewing the role of humanity, Clark 
(2011:14) argues that “our planet is quite capable of taking us by surprise”. Indeterminacy then is 
a hallmark of the Anthropocene mentality and requires a “bleaker subject position” (Kirsch 
2015:2) since the future now exists as “a site of anxiety, full of unknowns, that is not amenable 
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to human intervention” (Reith 2004: 393 in Lövbrand et al 2009). The fundamental precepts 
which modernity is predicated on – order, certainty, and control – are being challenged in this 
new geologic epoch. 
Here, I use indeterminacy to signal the unpredictability and contingency inherent in 
anthropogenic climate change and industrial modernity, which generate political openings that 
are up for grabs by multiple actors. Feenberg (1992) noted that technological development was 
based on the assumption that, “our (Western-European) technology and its corresponding 
institutional structures are universal, indeed planetary, in scope” (1992:6) but this thesis breaks 
down, since technology does not have predictable outcomes and is “overdetermined by both 
technical and social factors” (8). More recently, the notion of indeterminacy has emerged 
alongside other concepts within the social sciences, such as assemblage, chaos, multiplicity, 
emergence, and others that draw on developments within the natural sciences and mathematics 
(Venn 2006). Shaw (2013:613) in his attempt to make sense of objects, worlds, and events that 
“tear apart the fabric of sense and habit in the world”, draws on Alain Badiou’s concept of 
‘inexistence’22, i.e., latent elements that exert pressure on the status-quo and their appearance 
becoming the source of radical transformation in the world. He theorizes the ‘geo-event’ as the 
“transformation of a world by inexistent objects and the resulting change caused by their 
appearance” (622). Shaw describes ‘inexistent objects’ as “clandestine, autonomous, and 
volatile” and the “primary site of contingency within the world” (622,623). The multiple crises 
that mark this epoch also mean a proliferation of inexistent objects and geo-events. For many 
                                                 
22
 Though for Badiou the inexistent are human subjects; people, marginalized and excluded by politics, whose 
appearance changes the rules of the game. Shaw draws on Graham Harman’s object oriented philosophy to push 
Badiou’s inexistent, to include “hurricanes, nuclear bombs, volcanoes, CIA drones, coals, and railways” (2013:640), 
acknowledging that scholars of Badiou would not be too pleased by this take on his work. 
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radical scholars this indeterminacy generates conditions that are ripe for radical projects, an 
argument that this article also pivots on. However as Clark (2011: 687) notes the materiality of 
the earth and such events “might under certain conditions spark political action, but none has a 
privilege affiliation with any political leaning”. An important reminder, that the earth doesn’t 
play favorites.    
We find an analogous understanding of the ‘inexistent’ in Beck’s (1992) ‘Risk Society’ 
where he theorized that technocratic expertise produces a world where ecological and 
technological hazards are knowable only when they are entrenched in the social landscape. When 
these risks surface, they illicit a response from civil society that ultimately widens the scope of 
democratic involvement in environmental and technological issues thereby producing the ‘Risk 
Society’, a social order organized around the politics of risk. While natural disasters like 
earthquakes in the Himalayan context are not a direct result of the hydropower industry
23
 the 
tunneling and blasting required for run-of-the river projects had even before the earthquake 
caused landslides and damages to concrete structures in the vicinity (Government of Sikkim 
2010). Many argue that the earthquake shook loose what had already been shaken by project 
construction. In the context of Himalayan hydropower, we find an intersection of concerns 
related to an unpredictable earth, risks inherent in industrial modernity, and conditions that force 
marginalized populations to occupy hazardous landscapes that are simultaneously full of 
potential for radical struggles. 
                                                 
23
 Although across the border in China, the Three Gorges Dam has been held culpable for dam-induced seismicity 
(Hvistendahl 2008), a claim that some tried extending to the Sikkimese context but were subsequently found to be 
improbable. 
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Although Beck (1990) noted that ‘risk industries’ are increasingly being resettled in 
Global South countries with cheap labor, Braun (2003) believes that in Beck’s thesis, the 
proliferation of risk meant they would now be experienced more generally by everyone. 
However Braun (2003:178) argues there is ample evidence that, “who lives most at risk in the 
United States [and globally] remains quite specific, overdetermined by capitalist development, 
racialization, and the social production of space, place, and nature”. While risk abounds in 
modern life in both the Global North and South, it does so in ways that can be traced back to 
histories and configurations of colonization and slavery (Haraway 2015; Moore 2015; Last 
2015). Saldanha (2013:xx) argues that in seeking radical political alternatives we must pay 
attention to how “the ecology of global capitalism (is) intrinsically racist, making white 
populations live longer and better at the expense of the toil and sufferings of others…the 
Anthropocene is in itself a racist biopolitical reality”. Similarly, Moore (2015) has argued against 
the “fictitious human unity” presumed under the Anthropocene and suggests ‘Capitalocene’ – the 
age of capital, as the more appropriate term for the present era.  
In the context of Himalayan hydropower development, Baruah (2012:41) suggests that 
the energy produced by these projects is almost entirely for use outside the region, thereby 
generating a “great unevenness in the distribution of potential gains and losses – and of 
vulnerability to risk”. Therefore it becomes important to locate risk as it unfolds in 
geographically specific settings and in racialized bodies. As I show in the following section, 
hydel projects and extractive industries promoted in the Himalayan region are built on patterns of 
regional marginalization introduced by the colonial British State and perpetuated by the Indian 
State. Jazeel (2011) drawing on Massey’s relational understanding of place, argues that place as 
a geographical unit of analysis is the most effective scale of engagement with indeterminate 
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categories and events, geophysical, or otherwise. However place is not synonymous with a 
grounded or static reality, rather it is a busy crossroads, in the context of this article, of the 
spiritual, technocratic, and geological.  In the next section, I provide context in which to 
understand large scale infrastructural development in the Himalayan states, focusing on 
hegemonic and universalizing claims that rendered these spaces as unruly margins despite their 
deep historical significance as economic and cultural crossroads.  
 
5.3 Unruly Borderlands, Unruly Natives    
 
The Himalayan Mountains, ‘young’ in geological terms are still on the move with the 
Indian tectonic plate slowly sliding under the Eurasian plate, making the region prone to seismic 
activity. These mountains also bear the brunt of the monsoon rains which cause flashfloods and 
landslides, with poor infrastructure making the region very difficult to access during this season. 
Superimposed over these subterranean fault lines and eroding hillsides are multiple international 
borders that also relentlessly push and shove against each other. These geo-political and geo-
physical particularities inform both official and popular understandings of the Himalayan 
borderland region as sensitive, remote, and peripheral to ‘mainland’ India. This understanding 
also informs how the region’s inhabitants and their cultures are viewed as untouched, archaic, 
and hence, exotic. Gellner (2013:14) notes, despite the peripheral status they are accorded, 
borderlands are in fact central to both discursive and material constructions of the nation-state. 
This is particularly evident in the Indian state’s representation of the Himalayan Mountains as its 
‘natural’ northern frontier (Krishna 1994).  
Mathur (2013) notes that the trope of the Himalayas as a ‘natural’ demarcation of India, 
first appeared in British colonial-era accounts and was carried over into the postcolonial Indian 
 115 
states assertion of the country’s ‘god-given’ boundaries. Contrary to these understandings of the 
Himalayan frontier as an impenetrable ‘natural’ barrier, the Himalayan range has a number of 
traversable passes that have historically facilitated the flows of ideas, peoples, and materials 
(Mathur 2013). Despite this rich history which harks back to Silk Route traders and Buddhist 
missionaries to East Asia (Murton 2013), the cartographic logic of the British Empire reduced 
the region along with its inhabitants to the fringes of Indian imperial geography. Zou and Kumar 
(2011: 143) note that in spite of imperial claims of absolute sovereignty, the “indeterminacy of 
boundaries” frustrated colonial concerns for order and stability in the ever-shifting “turbulent 
frontier” in the Northeast. Ultimately it was the Anglo-Burmese war of 1824-26, that caught the 
British off-guard, which provided the impetus for imperial surveys which led to the demarcation 
of both internal and external boundaries in the northeastern frontier (Zou and Kumar 2013). 
Colonial territorial techniques effectively created the vision of a ‘wild’ or unruly frontier that 
required disciplining through spatial strategies, resulting in an erasure of historical corridors, a 
profusion of boundaries where none existed, and the conversion of fluid borders into hardened 
lines of control. Both the northwestern and northeastern fringes of the British India consisted of 
kingdoms with dynamic cultures and histories of trade with neighboring regions, which suddenly 
found themselves cut off, isolated, and in a relationship of dependency to the core.  
As in other colonial contexts, maps served an important tool in “frame[ing] and 
classify[ing] the world in order to comprehend and control it” and this logic was especially at 
work in “‘wild’ or unconquered territories” (Crampton 2010: 96). Colonial territorial techniques 
did not recognize local maps that drew on oral traditions of cosmography and creation myths 
which in stark opposition to a “horizontal map of bounded territories delimited by modern state 
interests” (Anderson 1991:171), recognized deities inhabiting heavenly realms as well as an 
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underworld teeming with supernatural beings. This spatial logic and the concept of a vertical 
axis, can be found in the cosmography of many Himalayan groups (Allen 1978; Ramble 1996), 
wherein ‘up’ correlates with the North, representing benevolent supernatural beings while 
‘down’ or the South, signifies malevolent beings. Bentley (2013) notes in the Lepcha context, 
annual rituals performed by Lepcha shamans, would appease malevolent beings that tend to 
move along the spatial axis bringing cosmic disorder.  The secular mapping enterprise of the 
British not only instituted a new relationship between people and territory through systems of 
taxation and territorial chiefdoms but also led to an erasure of indigenous sacred cartography 
(Zou and Kumar 2011).   
The colonial system of oriental classification, on encountering the people residing these 
regions, saw them as relatively more egalitarian than the rigid hierarchical caste system they 
encountered elsewhere in India. The colonial sociology of knowledge that drew on European 
systems of classification and categorization (Cohn 1985; Appadurai 1993) saw the highland 
frontier and its people as ethnically distinct from the population of the plains resulting in the 
“master oppositional binary” between the hills and the plains (Baruah (2008:16). This 
oppositional binary spawned exclusionist policies that served to protect British regional 
economic interests such as tea plantations. While these policies to some degree “insulated hill 
people…from the exploitation of lowland capitalists, but … [also] curtailed tribal access to 
lowland markets.” (Zou and Kumar 2011: 160). These regional protectionist policies created a 
hill-plains dichotomy that is evident not only in the present political economy of the region but 
also in how people from the region consider themselves ethnically and culturally distinct from 
mainland ‘Indians’ (De Maaker and Joshi 2007; Smith and Gergan 2015).  
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Kennedy (1991) notes two prominent colonial categories in which highland people were 
placed, the first was the ‘martial race’ category with associated features of “courage virility, and 
pugnacity” (60) and the second was as ‘guardians of edenic sanctuaries’ who were “simple, 
guileless, noble beings, nurtured in the healthy embrace of nature, untouched by the depravity 
that pervaded the social and religious life of the Indian masses” (71). Po’dar and Subbar (1991) 
argue that many of the early Indian anthropologists were “home-grown Orientalists” who 
subscribed to the same colonial categories and for whom the “Himalayan tribes are just a new 
Orient”. They note how statements such as the following one about the Lepchas, betray the 
colonial roots of Indian anthropology: “their [Lepchas] apathy towards hard manual labor and 
lack of competitive zeal…are some of the major features responsible for their comparative 
inefficiency [in] agriculture” (Das 1978:60 in Po’dar and Subbar 1991). These powerful colonial 
tropes still inform dominant Indian representations of the region and its people as either warring 
tribes or as simple natives inhabiting exotic locales.   
The imperial logic of governing the frontier and its peoples was passed onto to the 
postcolonial Indian state and today we find four layers of borders at the frayed northern edges of 
the Indian state. First, the two hundred year old enclaves shared by India-Bangladesh which 
represent remnants of precolonial border-making, second the India-China border, a colonial relic 
of failed negotiations in the early twentieth century between British, India, Tibet, and China, 
third, the India-Bangladesh border, a result of the partitioning of British India in 1947 and fourth, 
the India-Pakistan border in Kashmir which became contested after the partition (Schendel 
2013). Schendel (2013:268) notes that these histories of “uncertain border-making” and 
“apprehensive territoriality” in the Himalayan borderlands have produced sensitive borders that 
“tend to be patrolled by armed men in state uniforms, [resulting in] volatile borderlands.” The 
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partition of India in 1947 and the resultant ‘cartographic anxiety’ (Kirshna 1994) resulted in an 
obstruction of historical networks of trade and commerce contributing to the geo-political 
isolation of the northeast and northwestern borderlands. Given the cognitive and geographically 
marginal position of the Himalayan borderlands, today, the region “readily serves as a site of 
India’s negation – seen through neat chauvinist, nationalist categories” (Zou and Kumar 2013: 
168). While not all borders are volatile, especially the one in Sikkim where tourists clamor to 
shake hands with Chinese soldiers at the Nathu-la border between India-China, the relationship 
between the Sikkimese citizens and the Indian military is marked by indifference at best and 
hostile accommodation at worst. In the next section, I provide the Sikkimese context and its 
place in the larger Indian Himalayan region, before delving into the ethnographic case study.  
5.4 Sikkimese Political Landscape 
 
In 2002, Sikkim was included as the eight state of India’s Northeast region. The 
Northeast region comprised of seven states
24
 which are also referred to as the ‘seven sisters’ and 
with the addition of Sikkim, the region is now known as ‘seven sisters and one brother’. 
Sikkim’s position within the Northeastern states is just as odd as the awkward new sobriquet 
suggests. By most accounts, Sikkim is considered to be one of India’s most peaceful states while 
in a gross generalization, the other Northeaster states are seen as a hotbed for insurgency and 
ethnic conflict. Sikkim is also held up as ‘model’ state, an exemplar in the field of sanitation, 
eco-tourism, organic agriculture, and hydropower development. Sikkim’s history as an 
independent Buddhist kingdom with a traditional feudal system and its transition from monarchy 
to democracy provides an important background to understand its ‘success story’ in the region. 
                                                 
24
 Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Assam, Tripura and Mizoram. 
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Since its annexation in 1975, Sikkim has had only two full-term Chief Ministers who have 
enjoyed absolute majority in the state legislative assembly during their successive terms. Pawan 
Kumar Chamling, the present Chief Minister under the Sikkim Democratic Front party, is now 
serving his fifth consecutive term (1994-2016). In addition to this, the state is considered a 
special category state and the 36
th
 Amendment to the Indian constitution guarantees Sikkim 
special constitutional provisions under Article 371F, which among other things, grants 
Sikkimese subjects complete exemption from income tax. These provisions instituted to ensure 
the cultural integrity of Sikkim post-annexation, have in many ways made Sikkim beholden to 
the center.  
With the recent ‘Look East’ policy of India which attempts to foster stronger economic 
and strategic ties with Southeast Asia as a counterweight to China’s influence in the region has 
led to growing concerns over the economic development and stability of the Northeast region, an 
effective corridor for the enactment of this policy (Rana 2014). Chamling’s gradual 
consolidation of power has ensured relative political stability within the state, making it lucrative 
for outside investors. Hydropower development in the state then has to be understood in the 
context of Sikkim’s position to the rest of India and Chamling’s strong political hold which 
many have referred to as a ‘benign dictatorship’ (Clement 2014). But as Huber and Joshi 
(2015:15) have argued in the context of Sikkim, “hydropower has served to catalyze a 
politicization of environmental and political decision-making, a counter-hegemonic mo(ve)ment, 
which exposed a long-standing democracy deficit”. Writing in the regional context of 
hydropower projects in the Northeast India, Chowdhury and Kipgen (2013:207) argue that while 
resistance movements against projects may not have not resulted in a “politically conscious 
‘ethno-regional identity’” but “recent development of forging identity beyond the local level 
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renders hope that in the near future a regional level identity might be conceived.” Here, my 
attention will be directed to Sikkim where ecological indeterminacy coupled with large 
infrastructural projects, while destabilizing current political configurations with the state, is 
sowing resentment against mainland India. My focus here will be on the Dzongu reserve in 
North Sikkim. With a population of 5,000, in the Upper Teesta valley, Dzongu is a protected 
reserve for the Lepcha tribe and just as the Himalayan region exists at the geographic and 
cognitive peripheries of the Indian state, Dzongu, connected to Sikkim by three bridges, exists at 
the peripheries of the Sikkimese state. In the following section, I present a fine-grained analysis 
of the spiritual, geo-physical, and technocratic renderings of these shifts, through interviews with 
indigenous groups and state technocrats, two groups that are often pitted against each other. 
5.5 Encountering Animate Landscapes  
 
“North Sikkim is facing natural disasters as its sanctity has been sold for money. 
All the Sikkimese people must come forward for a holy battle to save truth and 
religion of Sikkim. We don’t need money, we need happiness, and security that 
cannot be purchased by money” (P.S. Golay, Sikkim Krantikari Morcha, [SKM] 
Opposition Party President)   
Polemic statements about the earthquake, like the one above, though hyperbolic and 
decidedly self-righteous, (especially coming from a politician who had been embroiled in 
corruption scandals himself), capture the flavor of election season in Sikkim. Since the 
September 18
th
 earthquake in 2011, every September people in Sikkim tense up a little, making 
nervous jokes about the earthquake and if it would celebrate its “birthday” again this year. 
During my fieldwork, September came and went but just as the “earthquake birthday” jokes were 
getting stale, on October 4
th
 an earthquake of moderate intensity shook the state (Fig 6). 
Ironically, at the time of the quake, government officials were assembled in the state Secretariat, 
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in a meeting on earthquake preparedness and finding themselves quite underprepared fled the 
building.  
In the midst of journalistic exposes regarding corruption in the distribution of earthquake 
relief funds, local newspapers noted that most earthquakes in North Sikkim, including the 
September 2013 one, were located close to hydropower project sites. Conducting fieldwork in 
this heightened political climate, I expected people’s response to questions about heightened 
seismicity to be guarded, falling along party lines, since the Chamling led Sikkim Democratic 
Front (SDF) government had repeatedly assured people of the State’s preparedness and that 
earthquakes were unconnected to hydropower projects. However I was surprised to find that 
regardless of political affiliation, many people in Dzongu who I spoke with, when asked about 
the earthquakes would connect them to hydropower projects. The only exceptions to these were 
some panchayat (village governance) officials, who because of their affiliation with the ruling 
government, would speak of earthquakes as natural occurrences which one had to adapt to and 
develop resilience through government sponsored earthquake proof housing. However for many 
like 32 year old Tashi, a private contractor and a self-identified ‘social worker’, unaffiliated to 
the anti-dam movement, the connection was all too clear: 
Tashi: The epicenter was in Dzongu and most of the projects are here. Maybe it’s 
because of that [the earthquake came] this is where the devi-deuta [deities] reside 
you know, in the hillsides, mountains. The projects have drilled tunnels in all 
these really beautiful places and maybe that’s why the gods got angry. 
Though Tashi prefaced his comments with “that’s what people here believe”, he spoke at 
length about the ‘bad times’ we live in, the rise in corruption and pollution, and how people in 
Dzongu had forsaken their indigenous practices and beliefs. He also spoke of how historically 
both Dzongu and Sikkim were known to be sacred places of exceptional beauty and bounty. 
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Most people in Dzongu, with the exception of recent converts to Christianity, practice a syncretic 
blend of Buddhism and indigenous shamanic practices. I discuss elsewhere, the tensions between 
these two belief systems but in this context, it is important to note that concerns around 
‘vanishing’ indigenous practices existed decades before the anti-dam protests. During my M.A 
research, lay Lepchas within Dzongu spoke of this loss in terms of the declining use of Lepcha 
script and language, Lepchas marrying non-Lepchas, and the growing number of ‘outsiders’ in 
Dzongu, however the ecological dimensions of loss
25
 had never been as evident before 
hydropower projects and the anti-dam protests. 
Fig 6: Geology and Politics in Sikkim 
 
The newspaper Sikkim Express, known to avoid controversial subjects like hydropower projects, noted that the 
epicenter of the October 4
th
, 2013 earthquake was located close to the Stage V Dam. The news heading on the right, 
reports how the Chief Minister Pawan Chamling who was addressing a public gathering, when the earthquake 
struck, reassured everyone that the state could handle future disasters. (Source: Sikkim Express, Friday, October 4
th
) 
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 An important ecological loss that was noted during my M.A and PhD research was the decreasing cardamom 
cultivation, an important cash crop, which was attributed to a virus and loss of soil fertility. Though most people felt 
this loss had actually helped the Dzongu Lepchas, forcing them to be more industrious instead of relying on the easy 
money coming from cardamom cultivation. 
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Tsering, a college educated youth in her 20s, like Tashi, spoke of deities residing in hills 
and mountainsides, being disturbed by project construction:    
Tsering: Local people say loo-lingzay… for different deities that reside in 
dhungas [rocks] in pani-pokhri [streams and rivers] they are very angry. They 
have disturbed them. Because of that they come out to give a lesson to the people. 
They come out in different forms like this earthquake or sometimes it’s a 
landslide or flashflood or lightning and thunder. That’s what they say.  
These deities’ latent in the landscape that erupt as earthquakes and floods when disturbed,  
seem to be operating with the same logic and force as Shaw’s ‘inexistent objects’, beings and not 
objects in this case, that are “clandestine, autonomous, and volatile” (622). Though Bentley 
(personal communication, August  05,  2013) points out that in Lepcha shamanic belief it is not so 
much deities causing earthquake but them refusing to prevent these events due to the non-
observance of ritual offerings and prayers. This interpretation of Lepcha cosmology was quite 
prevalent among the people I spoke with. However in interviews, most young people would 
preface their statements with “people believe” or “our elders say”. In one of the interviews, I 
pushed my inquiry a little further:  
Q: But what about your generation….like when you’re talking right now…you 
keep saying that’s what they say…what do you believe in? 
Lakpa: Scientifically they have proven this is an area where many earthquakes 
come so there shouldn’t be such heavy construction here. So even scientifically 
and even in our local culture, it is proven. And these deities, when they take their 
physical form in bodies [spirit possession] when you see that, you really feel that 
yes this is true. We have not been able to shake this off, these beliefs. I believe 
these things. 
Earlier in the interview, 25 year old Lakpa, a college educated youth from Hye-Gyathang 
GPU in Upper Dzongu, recounted a story of the spirit-possession of twin sisters from a nearby 
village, by an angry mountain deity who claimed to have been disturbed by loud noises coming 
from the project site. Ironically, the parents of the twin sisters had sold a part of their land to dam 
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developers and supported hydropower construction in Dzongu. While not all educated youth like 
Lakpa believe in supernatural beings, for many skeptics the increased frequency of earthquakes, 
alongside incidents of spirit possession activated their belief in an animate, sacred landscape. 
The emergence of these spirit beings, in the form of natural hazards or in the bodies of people, 
seemed to “force thought” and “slow down reasoning” (Stengers 2005) in educated youth like 
Lakpa, who found himself unable to “shake off” his indigenous beliefs. Indigenous landscapes 
and bodies, inscribed by universalizing laws and state power structures, are then the inexistent 
that are the “primary site of contingency within the world” (Shaw 2013:622).  
In Lakpa’s statement, we also find instead of the eternal opposition between scientific 
and indigenous belief systems, a mutual affirmation bolstered by a dynamic, unpredictable earth.   
Theoretically, just as the ‘vitality’ of matter can shake human hubris predicated on “the image of 
dead of thoroughly instrumentalized matter” (Bennett 2007) similarly spiritual accounts of 
matter’s vitality can upend Euro-Western academic hubris. These entangled narratives of 
geology and spirituality with their different political registers, show how heightened ecological 
precarity is central to both scientific and indigenous accounts of rapid ecological and socio-
economic changes. While these earthquakes activated spiritual beliefs in some people, it also 
made them question the scientific and political grounds on which hydropower was being brought 
to the state. Hydropower projects in the Himalayan region require drilling tunnels through 
mountains and diverting the rivers waters into these tunnels. This water is then dropped onto 
turbines to generate electricity. Most people I spoke with understood the difference between 
large reservoir dams in the plains and these diversion dams but statements such as the one below, 
relay a fundamental mistrust of the Indian state and the actual intentions of project developers.   
Pema: These projects aren’t good, they’ve damaged our village and they’ve taken 
the materials, the sun-chaandi (gold and silver), you know the things that are 
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inside the mountain.  They’ve taken theses minerals. Fom the outside we only see 
one tunnel but many say that inside there is a more complex network of tunnels.  
Sikkim is not a mineral-rich state and apart from copper, lead, and zinc, no other 
commercially viable mineral deposits have been discovered so far (Government of Sikkim 
2010). While gold and silver deposits have never been located in Sikkim, rumors had quickly 
spread within Dzongu that project developers had been conducting tests to find exploitable 
minerals. This claim was not entirely unfounded as the State Mines, Minerals and Geology 
department was founded primarily for mineral exploration and identifying unstable areas and it 
was only recently that the focus had shifted to the latter of the two. Locals were aware of these 
official studies but felt that hydropower developers were greedy and would strip Sikkim bare of 
both its water and mineral resources. In 1963, the National Geographic carried a story about 
Sikkim, then a Himalayan kingdom where the author reported, “Like hillmen everywhere, the 
Sikkimese considers himself superior to men of the plains and tends to be suspicious of lowland 
India.” (Doig 1963:422). This understanding stems from the “master oppositional binary” 
(Baruah 2010) between the hills and plains but carries weight even today.  
One evening as I sat with the seventy year old father of Tenzing, one of the main anti-
dam activists, he told me the story of dam developers who were conducting tests in the area for 
the dam’s tunnel. During one of the test blasts the developers discovered a hot spring, the first 
one of its kind in the reserve. As news spread, first locals then tourists started flocking to the hot 
springs and the developers found themselves unable to proceed with their plans. Tenzing’s father 
said gravely, “now they realize the importance of this land, this land has shakti [power] and if 
you just give it away you will regret it.”  Many others like Sonam below felt they were now more 
aware of both the spiritual and material importance of this land especially it’s subterranean 
networks and channels, 
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Sonam: When NHPC [National Hydro Power Corporation] comes in they will 
have to dig tunnels, and when they dig these tunnels they will take out the 
minerals, like gold, and when they take out those minerals, in the earth that’s what 
naturally keeps the balance, and you see these sanu sroth haru [these small 
stream] will also slowly disappear because the water will run down those tunnels 
and escape.  
Therefore along with concerns about exploiting mineral resources, people expressed a 
much more pressing concern, the drying up of small streams and what it meant for farmers,  
Samdup: They’re blasting the whole place earlier we used to get thoolo pani [lots 
of water] in the field it was prashastha [more than enough]. Now many people 
have just left their land barren, it’s mostly because of the lack of water.  
Sonam and Samdup, young men in their 20’s, were aware of how these projects were 
disrupting underground water channels and spoke of ecological and economic consequences 
especially for small farmers. Samdup, spoke quite frankly about his initial mistrust of the anti-
dam activists but how after witnessing the earthquake and the recklessness of project developers, 
many people had changed their minds about the activists. However none of the people I have 
quoted in this section identified with the anti-dam movement. In fact, one of the prominent anti-
dam activists Dawa Lepcha ran for elections as a representative of the new opposition party 
SKM and lost by a huge margin to the SDF party representative who had been instrumental in 
bringing the projects to Dzongu. Within Sikkim, while the political dynamics are slowly shifting 
with the emergence of an opposition party that has a significant presence in the State Legislative 
Assembly, political allegiances and systems of patronage remain deeply entrenched. While locals 
recognize the role of a corrupt state in bringing these projects, most of the resentment is directed 
at ‘mainland’ India, i.e the Central government and private hydropower developers. While this 
didn’t help the anti-dam activists who were keen on gaining a political foothold during the state 
elections, it feeds into the historical sense of regional marginalization and mistrust of the Indian 
state. The crumbling visceral materiality of the geological ebbs and flows of the earth, angry 
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deities possessing peoples bodies, along with questionable construction practices in vulnerable 
landscapes are contributing to what Baruah (2012:41) calls a “serious legitimacy deficit” in the 
Indian state’s commitment to its borderlands and its inhabitants.  
5.6 ‘Geological Surprises’ in the Eastern Himalayas 
 
Most hydro projects have been adversely affected by geological surprises 
especially during underground tunneling in the relatively young Himalayan 
Mountains… Even with the best of geological investigations, occurrences of shear 
zones and underground lakes and streams can result into (sic) serious time and 
cost over-runs. (New Hydropower Policy, Ministry of Power (2008:27) emphasis 
mine.) 
Technocratic expertise around hydropower development in the Himalayan region is 
highly contested. Scientists and geologists have made passionate arguments both for and against 
hydropower development. Given the increased instances of disasters especially earthquakes, the 
question of dam-induced seismicity has been brought up frequently. The debates are so polarized 
with the involvement of environmental and civil society groups, international finance groups, 
and power dam developers, that it has become rather difficult to have meaningful conversations 
with concrete policy results. From early on, fears of seismic instability were raised not just by 
environmentalists but also scientists and civil engineers. However many were quick to dismiss 
these arguments: 
It has been scientifically established that the dams using modern methods of 
design and construction can safely withstand high intensity earthquakes, while 
dams not using these techniques can be damaged even with earthquakes of quite a 
low intensity. The failure of large dams due to earthquake is only a fear which is 
unnecessarily being projected manifold. (Kampta and Goel 2000:51)  
This quote from a national seminar held in 1999 on the environmental management of 
hydropower projects, suggest that fears of earthquakes damaging reservoirs, were “unnecessarily 
being projected manifold”. These debates surfaced around the late 80’s regarding the 
construction design for the Tehri Dam in the Western Himalayan state of Uttarakhand. It was 
 128 
established many years later that the Tehri Dam did not in fact contain various defensive 
measures against earthquakes, resulting in “a unanimous conclusion that significant uncertainty 
remained”, the report continues to say, “This led to the conviction that, from a scientific, non-
political, point of view, all was not well… The Tehri dam project has become a crisis of 
confidence.” (Ives 2004: 124). Even today, we find strong advocates on either side of the debate 
when it comes to hydropower projects and its role in inducing vulnerabilities in fragile 
ecosystems. Hydropower developers and the Indian state have argued that flashfloods, 
earthquakes, and landslides natural hazards are part of this region’s geophysical makeup. 
However environmentalists have proven how these hastily commissioned and constructed 
projects are rapidly chipping away at ecological resilience to these hazards (Kohli 2011; Chopra 
2015).   
In the Sikkimese context, since scientists and geologists I interviewed were government 
employees, I framed my questions around the challenges of developing large infrastructure like 
roads, bridges and buildings in a seismically active region in the context of climate change. 
However most state technocrats, spoke quite openly of the antagonistic relationship between 
hydropower developers and state departments, something that took me by surprise. Here it 
becomes important to recognize the difference between Center and state interests and the 
multiplicity of technocratic expertise. Since state technocrats are not consulted on these projects 
when locals have approached them with grievances, state technocracy has sided with locals in 
opposition to the Center. Dr. Y, from the Disaster Management Department, spoke at length 
about the negligence on the part of the dam developers: 
There was a case in Sikkim of the Dikchu dam where the project developers did 
not consider the rim treatment. Before filling up the reservoir they have to do rim 
treatment so that there is no water seepage. After the earthquake and even before 
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there were landslides in close by villages that were triggered not because of 
earthquake but because of lack of rim treatment. Because hydel power production 
is a highly lucrative business… they want to complete it in a very short time…so 
for that they are doing some mistakes that will hamper the situation…to the area.  
Despite their position as government officials and mine, as a researcher, there were no 
attempts to sidestep my questions or spin these projects in a positive light. This interactions with 
geoscientists in the field provided an important insight into the different scales of technocracy as 
it interacts with the local context. Castree (2015) argues that the Left which stands “aloof from 
contemporary science, variously critical or grateful but rarely involved” (3) must engage more 
deeply with “geoscience’s formal radicalism” (19), infusing it with its social and political 
critiques with a view to challenge the present capitalist system. Noting the contribution of recent 
geoscientific inquiries, such as those of Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen, who first suggested we 
are living in a new geologic epoch, the ‘Anthropocene’, Castree (2015:2) draws our attention to 
how geoscience’s “leading practitioners are calling for a new modus operandi in response to the 
evident failure of political-economic elites to close the yawning ‘sustainability gap’ ”. While 
Castree is calling for a much more in-depth engagement with geoscience and geoscientists than 
the one presented here, my own experience interviewing state technocrats who also happen to be 
geoscientists, challenged some of my deeply held stereotypes of government scientists. When 
asked about dam-induced seismicity in the Sikkimese hydropower context, most scientists I 
interviewed reject it but also noted that proper geo-technical studies had not been conducted by 
project developers. Dr. X, from the Department of Mines, Minerals, and Geology had this to say: 
Actually they have not carried out the geo-technical studies and investigation and 
they have not followed whatever norms are to be followed… we are trying for 
proper investigation and proper compensation for last 3-4 years. But due to the 
fact that these are public undertakings under the government, they are least 
bothered. Public undertakings think they are the boss, they don’t want to take any 
suggestions given by the state government.  
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Scientists also spoke at length of how the lure of money was obscuring deeper scientific 
considerations especially given the dearth of research related to hydrology and geology. This 
moral language of greed and corruption was often employed to talk about public undertakings 
like the National Hydro Power Corporation, who functioned with impunity since they were only 
answerable to the Central government in Delhi. Many projects in North Sikkim were handled by 
private developers through in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) with the Sikkim state so I 
inquired if private developers behaved any different from public undertaking like NHPC.  
Q: Do you think private developers are more cooperative compared to public 
ones? 
Dr. Y: No, no they are also not cooperative. In them the government thing is not 
there but with them they still want to finish their project immediately. And they 
also have other problems like getting money they have to get money from World 
Bank or some other bank. And sometimes you know their project stops because of 
lack of flow of money, these are the things facing them. 
So what happens when technology deployed by shortsighted corrupt actors meets the 
fierce capacity of nature which upends its well-laid out or in this case, not-so-well-laid-out 
plans? While there was uncertainty around why there was a growing frequency in seismic 
activity but when it came to who was responsible for aggravating ecological vulnerability, some 
more unquestionably more guilty than others. With changing climatic conditions and variations 
in ecological flows, many state technocrats also believed that hydropower projects may not even 
come through on its promises. During my fieldwork, there were fears around a glacial lake 
outburst in the higher reaches of North Sikkim which had further activated these fears. Sikkim’s 
difficult terrain and the high altitude of glacier made it difficult to conduct extensive research. 
The difficult terrain of the region as Chowdhury and Kipgen (2013) point out is also held 
responsible for the inability to provide electricity generated from hydropower development to 
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certain parts of the region, signifying that “from the very beginning the aim was to develop 
electricity for consumption outside the region” (200-201).  
Erik Eckholm (1976) writing in the context of Nepal’s environmental crisis, popularized 
the Theory of Himalayan Environmental Crisis (THEC), which blamed accelerated erosion in the 
steep-sloped areas on population growth of humans and livestock. These theories have been 
extended in the Indian Himalayan context were ecological problems in the region have often 
been blamed on short-sighted local practices like forest clearance for agriculture or overgrazing 
(Sivaramakrishnan 1995; Ives 2004). However Blaikie and Muldavin (2004:521) have argued 
how theories like THEC “drew upon notions of backwardness, technological incompetence, and 
neo-Malthusianism” and has since been challenged and rejected by many social and physical 
scientists. In the quote below, we see an inversion of this logic, which identifies state sponsored 
development in the region contributing to the ecological precarity of the region. In specific 
reference to the Sikkim physiography an official report published by the Sikkim State Disaster 
Management Authority and the Land Revenue and Disaster Management Department, notes:  
The Sikkim Himalaya has never been and will never be free from [the] ubiquity of 
weak geology, slope instability, frequent seismicity, soil erosion…human 
exploration in terms of development of tourism, intricate network of roads, hydro 
power projects etc. if not executed in an environmentally and systematic manner, 
shall in the near future lead to emergence of drastic man-made disasters in the 
mountains (2013:66) 
While state forest policies still impose bans on overgrazing and forest clearance, from 
interviews it was clear that the blame game could go both ways. State reports also identified the 
lack of hill-specific policies when it came to urbanization. While earthquakes wreak havoc quite 
evenly it has been established that it isn’t the earthquake but structurally unstable infrastructure 
that kill people (Blaikie et al 1994). This same report mentioned above also noted, “A tough 
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mesh of rampant and unplanned urbanization has trapped its people” (2013:54) and went on to 
state that more damage from landslides and earthquakes occurred in areas where hydropower 
projects were located. The development and provision of infrastructure, from the mundane to the 
spectacular, has historically been central in the deployment of state power (Akhter 2015; Scott 
2009; Mitchell). Akin to colonial cartographic logic that made legible these borderland spaces, 
large scale project also see to impose order, making both nature and subjects legible. Large scale 
infrastructure operates as a hegemonic, universalizing project that imposes a narrative of truth, 
i.e. development and modernity, embodied in architecture and the built environment.  
Dam building is not a new technocratic enterprise for the postcolonial Indian state. 
However the new hydropower policy called for a reorganization of both space, i.e. from Central 
India to the Himalayan region, and technology, from large reservoir dams to diversion dams
26
. 
The Himalayan projects necessitated a shift in technology because of the mountainous terrain 
and its fast flowing rivers. With the promise of minimal displacement these projects were 
expected to be completed much faster than their Central Indian counterparts. In addition to 
protests from indigenous and ethnic groups, project completion in Himalayan states like Sikkim 
along with the expertise of engineers, technocrats and bureaucrats have been slowed down by a 
geologically active and structurally unstable landscape.   
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In June 2013, the Western Himalayan state of Uttarakhand which has over 197 dams 
planned across the Ganger River and its tributaries, witnessed destructive flood during the peak 
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 Most Himalayan dams are diversion or run-of-river projects, which divert the rivers water through tunnels onto 
turbines to generate electricity. These dams are touted to be more environmentally safe since the return the rivers 
water instead of impounding it like large reservoir dams however as Dharmadhikary (2008:25) notes, “Many run-of-
river projects can have serious impacts by disturbing downstream river flows. Some run-of-river projects divert the 
water into tunnels, leaving downstream sections dry, and thus cause even more severe impacts downstream.” 
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Hindu pilgrimage month. An expert committee appointed by the Indian Supreme Court, declared 
that the Uttarakhand flood disaster was made worse by existing hydropower projects (Chopra 
2015). This report has led to a drastic shift in the risk perception of hydropower projects for 
insurance companies, raising serious challenges to the hydropower industry (Thakkar 2015). The 
expert committee also recommended the creation of a National Himalayan Policy and a detailed 
study of the hydrogeology of all Himalayan states where dams are coming up (Chopra 2015). 
Himalayan hydropower projects are now being viewed as risk-laden endeavors in the light of 
frequent natural hazard events.  
Fig 7: Himalayan Hydropower and ‘Sensitive’ Borderlands (Source: Grumbine, R. E., 
& Pandit, M. K. (2013) 
            
 
Hydropower projects meant to bring the mountainous peripheries into the political fray of 
the mainland has instead enabled a regionalism that is questioning centralized state authority. 
Akhter (2015) writing in the context of the Tarbela Dam controversy in Pakistan in the 1960’s 
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draws on Lefebvre’s three notions of state/space relations, i.e., physical, social, and mental 
space, that enables the production of a homogenous and controllable state space. In this article, 
my focus has been on the ‘material-natural terrain’ that is ‘mapped, modified, transformed by the 
networks and circuits and flows that are established within it’ (224-225) but Lefebvre as Akhter 
(2015) notes, also understand this process to be ‘simultaneously homogenous and fractured’ 
(2009:233). In the Himalayan context we find varied material and spiritual forces at work that 
are interrupting the production of state space. While in the case of Sikkim, as the state election 
results revealed, there would be no violent or democratic overthrow of the state however these 
critiques open a space for people to articulate what kind of central intervention is desirable and 
permissible.  
Large infrastructural projects are being imposed by the industrial North on the South 
under the guise of renewable energy in what many call a “greenwashing” of hydropower 
development (Fletcher 2010). But just as the North imposes its hegemonic knowledge and 
categories on the South, the South has its own margins and frontiers, its own personal “Orient” 
(P’odar and Subba 1997). In the context of this article, while indigenous groups and state 
officials are positioned differently in relation to the State, the visceral quality of ecological 
precarity experienced ‘in place’– crumbling hillsides, buildings with cracks running through – 
are difficult to ignore for both groups. Heightened seismicity has been crucial in drawing 
attention to the specificity of the Himalayan region exposing the underling tensions between the 
Centre and the state where state technocracy were passionately arguing in defense of the region 
and the need for mountain and hill-specific policies. The shared experience of ecological 
precarity has prompted however momentarily, “solidarity out of anxiety” (Beck 1990:61) 
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between indigenous and regional technocratic concerns. Both concerns
27
 emerge from an 
embodied engagement with a degraded environment laying the ontological foundation (Loftus 
2012) to challenge the hegemony of ‘national interest’. 
The growing concern around disaster and ecological precarity in the Himalayan 
Mountain states came to a head in the meeting of the Integrated Mountain Institute, held in 
Kohima, Nagaland, that brought together policy makers, environmentalist, and politicians from 
all ten Himalayan states. I attended these meetings and witnessed both politicians and civil 
society members alike questioning state neglect and the need for hill-specific policies. The 
“onto-politics” of ‘natural’ hazard events and their “capacity to force thought” (Stengers 2005; 
De la Cadena 2010), has led to an opening up of a variety of concerns for “political 
interrogation” (Whatmore 2013; Clark 2011). In Sikkim, geo-physical indeterminacy opened a 
space to question hegemonic state projects and cultural practices that threaten to destabilize the 
fragile political and cosmological future of the state.  
Despite differences in strategies and goals, both indigenous groups and technocrats 
employ a moral language to criticize a corrupt state that has sidelined public welfare, spiritual 
and religious sentiments. In the case of Sikkim and the Himalayan states, disasters and 
development projects are making visible these margins and their inhabitants, who are actively 
making demands on the state. Furthermore, in taking these two seemingly incongruous realities, 
i.e. indigeneity and technocracy, I have demonstrated how political action and inquiry in the 
Anthropocene needs to take into account, a multiplicity of knowledge systems and place-specific 
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 I make these arguments with the following caveats a) this doesn’t mean indigenous groups and technocrats sees 
the other as an ally b) While there has been significant opposition to the state, with the re-election of the Sikkim 
Democratic Front, and Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling for the fifth consecutive term many now fear 
speaking out openly against the state. 
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articulations. Such an inquiry can also challenge existing binaries between indigenous and 
scientific knowledge and action to examine how they interact with local and regional politics.  
As we think of our way forward, developing strategies of ecological and communal 
resilience in the Anthropocene, requires an attention to the sites where ‘geo-events’ unfold and 
those bodies that suffer most (Gibson-Graham 2011; Clark 2008). Theoretically, for many 
indigenous and postcolonial scholars this has meant challenging existing frameworks such as 
post-humanist theory and its tendency towards ontological flattening, which has its limitation. As 
Ahuja (2015:xx) notes, “neoliberal crisis thinking often makes an idealist turn toward the 
material worlds of animals, bodies, and the planet in ways that foreclose attention to difference 
and inequality within/across human social groups”. Drawing on Gayatri Spivak, geographers 
have drawn attention to her ‘planetary’ framework which is the most recent iteration of a 
decade’s old critique voiced by subaltern, indigenous, and postcolonial scholars around notions 
of untranslatable difference and radical alterity (Chakrabarty 2000; Spivak 2003). Drawing 
attention to the euro-western roots of critical social theory, these scholars argue that the 
Anthropocene presents a challenge not just to our fossil-fueled modern lifestyles but also to, “our 
sense of human universals…. [and] our capacity for historical understanding.” (Chakrabarty 
2009:201). Explicit in its geo-physical language, Spivak’s (2003) ‘planetarity’ is a call to engage 
with indeterminate categories, events, and experiences that are not “immediately comprehensible 
by the violent normalization of a universal claiming to speak for the particular” (Jazeel 2008:88).  
Drawing on the work of Guadeloupian writer Daniel Maximin (2006), Last (2015:61) 
demonstrates how a focus on geophysical forces and natural disasters, “can [even] liberate us 
from over-looking everyday disasters – the apocalypse that is performed daily, routinely, even 
happily and with permission”. An engagement with the geophysical then is crucial for the project 
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of decolonization because of the manner in which “postcolonial life continues to be shaped by 
external utilization of geography, and infrastructures around it, in detrimental ways” (Maximin in 
Last 2015: 60). Geological indeterminacy ruptures the thin veneer of order and structure modern 
lives are predicated on while revealing precarious living conditions, corrupt state practices, the 
erratic rhythms of the earth, and collective adaptation strategies. Hydropower development 
designed to promote nation-building at the ‘frontier’ has instead destabilized the fragile 
Himalayan ecology and provoked political mobilization along regional lines. The very same geo-
physical and cultural particularities that contributed to the exclusion of this region, activated by 
these geo-events are now being enrolled to speak back to the State.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCRETE OR CLAY
28
? ECO-TOURISM AND THE CONTENTIOUS 
POLITICS OF DESIGNING INDIGENEITY  
6.1 Introduction 
 
There are big changes afoot in Dzongu, the indigenous Lepcha reserve in the tiny 
Himalayan state of Sikkim, India. Large hydropower projects are being planned and protested 
against, and there is growing resentment against state apathy amongst Dzongu’s burgeoning 
population of educated unemployed youth. Located seventy kilometres, north-east of Gangtok 
the state capital, Dzongu exists at the geographic and political peripheries of the Sikkim state. 
Many consider it to be the last bastion of Lepcha culture, a culture presumed to be threatened and 
‘vanishing’ (Mainwaring 1876; Foning 1987). For several years, the state had been 
unsuccessfully trying to promote eco-tourism within the reserve to tackle its underdevelopment. 
However in the last few years, Dzongu’s eco-tourism industry has taken off but it is not due to 
state-sponsored eco-tourism. On the contrary, this success is fuelled by a now well-known 
movement against state sponsored hydropower projects in Dzongu (2007-10) that led to the 
cancelation of four dams. This anti-dam movement was supported by local and transnational 
environmental activists but within the reserve most village leaders welcomed the projects and 
were critical of the movement (Little 2010; McDuie-Ra 2011). While the struggles of Dzongu 
youth against large dams ended up alienating them from state officials and village elders, it has 
produced a compelling narrative for the conscientious ‘eco-tourist’.
                                                 
28
 The title of this chapter is ‘inspired’ by the title of Matthew Gandy’s influential book, “Concrete and Clay: 
Reworking Nature in New York City.”  
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Within Dzongu, eco-tourism is now emerging as a profitable venture, for the growing 
ranks of educated unemployed youth. Like many other reserve youth, 29 year old Jigmey from 
Hye-Gyathang Gram Panchayat Unit (village unit) lived and studied outside Dzongu since an 
early age but unable to find secure salaried employment, decided to return home.  
Fig 8: “Keepers of the Land” 
 
The caption reads, “Understanding the ancient environmentalism of Sikkim’s Lepchas”. Run by one of the anti-dam 
activists, Gyatso Lepcha (in the right hand corner), the Mayal Lyang homestay has been featured in many travel 
magazines and boasts of having hosted the Royal Prince of Norway and his family. [Source: National Geographic 
Traveller] 
Even for someone like Jigmey, who wasn’t directly involved in the protests, the lack of 
opportunities for educated youth in Sikkim and the partisan nature of local bureaucrats, has led to 
an increasingly antagonistic relationship with the state. However in his years outside, Jigmey has 
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accumulated enough cultural capital, evident from his clothes, comportment and English slang, 
to know that for eco-tourism, concrete just won’t do. 
Jigmey: You [state government] talk about eco-tourism but you start creating 
concrete structures in every corner of Dzongu. That’s not eco-tourism. Our 
present MLA [Minister of Legislative Assembly] doesn’t know anything about 
village tourism or eco-tourism or homestays. 
 
Sikkim was the first Indian state to frame an eco-tourism policy in 2011. Since then it has 
been aggressively promoting community-based tourism through state sponsored projects, even 
tweaking central-sponsored housing schemes for the poor, to include an extra room and western-
style toilets for guests (Kumar 2014). However, state-sponsored housing schemes have led to the 
proliferation of concrete structures much loathed by the ‘eco-tourist’. Jigmey and other educated 
youth are eager to retain traditional architectural styles and the associated skill and knowledge, 
aware of its purchase among travellers looking for an ‘authentic’ experience of an indigenous 
Himalayan reserve. But since young people like Jigmey lack political clout, they have little 
control over what plans and projects enter the village. His frustration at the local MLA, in the 
quote above, indicates that decisions related to Dzongu’s built environment are incendiary issues, 
closely linked to ongoing political and cultural negotiations.  
Writing in the North Indian context, Jeffery (2010:465) noted that even as investment in 
higher education is increasing, there has been a steady decline in the availability of salaried jobs 
leading to “temporal and spatial insecurities [among] marginalized young men29”. Sikkim holds 
                                                 
29
 While many women were involved in the anti-dam activism and I interviewed a number of them, not many had 
returned to the reserve after the protests. While the reasons for this are beyond the scope of this present article, from 
interviews a common theme was the lack of opportunities for educated women within Dzongu especially those who 
weren’t interested in getting married soon (Fieldnotes 2013, 2014).   
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the unfortunate distinction of having the highest national unemployment rate as well as the 
highest unemployment rate, among ages 15-29 (Ministry of Labour and Employment 2014). 
Many young people I spoke with in Dzongu connected this with another alarming statistic; 
Sikkim has one of the highest rates of suicide in the country (National Crime Records Bureau 
2013). Although in official reporting, there isn’t a strong correlation between the two statistics, 
youth unemployment and suicide rates, there is a pervading belief that the two are connected 
(Author’s Fieldnotes 2013). For Dzongu activists, their involvement in anti-dam activism has 
added to this precarity making it incredibly difficult for many to find coveted government jobs, 
despite their educational qualification (Gergan 2014).  
At this contemporary moment in Sikkim, the state’s political leaders are facing a crisis of 
confidence among its young electorate. While the concerns of Dzongu youth around eco-tourism 
and the built-environment might be unique to the site, my intention is to understand how 
marginalized young people in the face of heightened precarity, produce and contest power 
structures and political identities, embedded in the built environment and the material landscape. 
More specifically, I focus on Dzongu youth’s material and discursive engagements with the 
natural and built environment in the form of architectural aesthetics, infrastructural development 
and their political aspirations. I also draw on interviews with local bureaucrats and their 
perception of educated unemployed youth and their relationship to the state. In this my attempt is 
to examine in the context of indigenous eco-tourism, how contestations over design, aesthetics, 
and architecture of eco-tourism infrastructure are intimately tied to ideas of indigenous 
authenticity, inter-generational gaps, and democratic politics. In the larger national and 
international context, Lepcha activists’ eco-tourism initiatives are in conversation with 
transnational activism and global indigenous discourse which has earned them the sympathy of 
 146 
environmentally conscious foreign and domestic tourists. Though this is an important bargaining 
chip, indigenous Lepcha youth still have to contend with significant material and political 
obstacles.  
Between 2011 and 2014, I spent fifteen months in Sikkim, following the lives of these 
young activists as many of them made their way back to the reserve. My fieldwork in 2013-2014 
was conducted in the heightened political climate of the 2014 Sikkim assembly elections. Many 
of the Dzongu activists joined Sikkim Krantikari Morcha (SKM) and Dawa Lepcha, one of the 
activists was contesting for the position of Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) of Dzongu. 
My fieldwork included semi-structured interviews on various aspects of being young in Dzongu, 
ranging from struggles with unemployment, self-employment initiatives, involvement in village 
and state-level politics and knowledge of Lepcha culture and tradition. I conducted 13 interviews 
with panchayat members, 54 interviews with young people, 25 of whom had either supported or 
been involved in anti-dam protests. Most of the young people I cite in this article were educated 
outside the reserve and identified themselves as ‘educated unemployed youth’. Building on 
scholarship on infrastructure and the built environment with a focus on the everyday production 
and contestation of the state, I draw attention to the spatial politics of marginalized groups like 
indigenous youth. This article explores how indigenous youth navigate the treacherous terrain of 
unemployment and state apathy to craft new political subjectivities to highlight the intimate 
linkages between indigeneity and young people’s encounter with materials, spatial ideas, and 
state practices.  
6.2 Built-Environment, Rural Spaces, and Development Schemes 
 
Substantial work within geography has paid close attention to the built environment and 
infrastructure as an important template to examine a host of disciplinary strategies and state 
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practices (see Kooy and Bakker 2008; Ekers and Loftus 2008; Heynen et al 2006; Gandy 2003; 
Smith, 2001). Foucault’s panopticon is one of the most powerful illustrations of how truth and 
power come to be embodied in architectural artefacts. Gandy extends this Foucauldian lens, in 
tracing the flow of water, drawing our attention to the critical role of urban infrastructure like 
sewers and pipes, in the rationalization of modern cities and the production of modern 
subjecthood through discourses of sanitation and hygiene (Gandy 2003). While much of this 
scholarship has been located within the Global North, there is a growing body of work that 
interrogates how infrastructure is an important part of urban politics and everyday life in the 
Global South (Ranganathan 2014; McFarlane and Rutherford 2011; Anand 2011; Rademacher 
2009; McFarlane 2008; Gandy 2008). Given rapid urbanization in the Global South, this recent 
work provides an important lens in understanding the role infrastructure has played historically 
in producing the ‘modernist ideal’ of city spaces (Graham and Marvin 2001 in McFarlane 2008) 
and contemporary process of fragmentary capitalist urbanization (Gandy 2003) 
However, its significant contribution notwithstanding, this scholarship still exhibits a 
“methodological cityism” that makes the city and urban spaces a “privileged analytical lens for 
studying contemporary processes of urban social transformation that are not necessarily limited 
to the city” (Wachsmuth 2012:518; Angelo and Wachsmuth 2015). Discursively, the city and the 
countryside produce each other through an oppositional moral binary (Cronon 1996) and 
materially, cities are dependent on the countryside for raw material and cheap labour while 
providing it economic sustenance (Wallerstien 2011). While many scholars of urban space and 
politics draw on Lefebvre, his theorization did extend beyond the city’s borders to account for 
the “urbanization of the countryside” (1973:479) and how the survival of capitalism was 
increasingly dependent on the expansion of an “urban fabric” which “grows, extends its borders, 
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corrodes the residue of agrarian life” replacing it with “large-scale urban projects, new towns . . . 
roads and highways” (Lefebvre 2003a: 3, 79). This analysis is not to be mistaken for a naïve 
romanticization of the countryside especially when these developments are welcomed, even 
desired by rural populations. Instead this analysis draws attention to the processes that expand 
capitalist social relations and the territorial power of the state, producing abstract space, i.e. 
“space that is fetishized, that reduces possibilities and cloaks conflicts and differences in illusory 
coherence and transparency” (Lefebvre 1991:393) which though “not homogeneous; [it simply] 
has homogeneity as its goal” (Lefebvre 1976; 1991:304).  
Given this expansion of the “urban fabric”, examining infrastructure and the built 
environment in rural spaces is an important theoretical and methodological intervention into the 
relationship between infrastructure, spatial politics, and modernity in the Global South. In the 
Indian context, Gandhi’s vision of gram swaraj (village republics), which saw village 
communities as the moral and economic foundation of a newly independent India, soon gave 
way to a Nehruvian vision of technocratic development and modernity which necessitated a shift 
from rural to urban. Infrastructure, both spectacular and mundane, was a central feature of this 
modernity in the post-independence Nehruvian state (McFarlane 2008; Prakash 2006). As 
McFarlane (2008:31) notes an “anti-rural discourse was closely related to the Nehruvian view of 
the city as an important site for the expression and negotiation of modernity”. However a closer 
examination of official rural development programs reveals how the same logic and parameters 
of modernity that are at work in urban spaces, are being geographically produced and imagined 
through technological interventions and infrastructure in rural India. 
A recent illustration of this can be found in rural development schemes such as the 
Adarsh Gram or model village (more recently, “smart villages”) which envision ideal rural 
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spaces as those that “retain their unique cultural and ecological heritage” while being “connected 
to the internet…[along with] access to clean water, sanitation and low-carbon energy” 
(Government of India 2014).  Chakraborty and Das (2014) commenting on the lack of attention 
to questions of rural infrastructure and sustainability, speak directly to Lefebvre’s analysis, in 
this observation: “India’s rural landscape is now intersected with numerous built forms, such as 
road networks, water management systems, and land development” that have implemented 
“straight-jacketed norms for scheme implementation ignoring physical heterogeneity” (33). 
Rural poverty alleviation schemes like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA or simply NREGA
30
) geared towards employing people to work on 
infrastructure projects like roads, water infrastructure, housing etc. are rapidly altering the built 
environment and traditional architectural forms in rural India.          
In the context of rural spaces in the Global South, scholars have noted how development 
projects and schemes are mediated by existing dense networks of political patronage and 
bureaucracy (Fergsuon 1990; Gupta 1995; Corbridge 2005). While rural development 
interventions work to expand the “urban fabric”, they simultaneously extend bureaucratic state 
power into the everyday lives of people. Scholars, who study ‘everyday’, unexceptional 
encounters with the state, note how tactics of patronage and victimization are ubiquitous features 
of the mundane experience of the state in rural India (Gupta 1995; Corbridge 2005). These 
projects also enroll rural citizens in projects of neoliberal governmentality that produces self-
disciplining subjects fuelled by their “will to improve” (Li 2007). In the rural Indian context, this 
self-disciplining is evident in official discourses around sanitation and hygiene infrastructure 
                                                 
30
 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) now called the Mahatma Gandhi NREGA 
(MGNREGA) guarantees 100 days of employment for one able bodied person per household. Employment is 
generally in the form of hard manual labor on various infrastructural development schemes. 
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especially with regards to open defecation practices or efforts to make villages “alcohol-free”, 
often led by women groups in the village. The plethora of rural infrastructure projects and 
schemes, then work to produce “urban microcosms” that are simultaneously spaces of discipline 
and civilization (Richards 1985).  
Ferguson (1990) noted how ‘development’ is often presented as something that only 
happens through government action and the lack of development is understood as the result of 
governmental neglect. However he argues that this understanding fails to capture the political 
character of the state and its class basis, the uses of official positions, and state power by 
bureaucratic elite and other individuals, cliques and factions, and the advantages to them of 
bureaucratic “inefficiency” and corruption. Writing in the context of water-supply projects in 
Rajasthan, Birkenholtz (2013:15) notes how the complex network of “reservoirs, treatment 
facilities, distribution centers and supply pipelines” that were meant to ameliorate water scarcity 
ended up exacerbating those very same conditions, “necessitating yet more development 
programs”. Even though these plans and projects often fail to achieve desired development 
objectives, they end up promoting urban forms of built environment as the ideal while producing 
modes of governance within the village that perpetuates political cronyism and neoliberal 
subjecthood (Ferguson 1990; Li 2007). 
Decisions related to the rural built environment then are mediated through a tight grid of 
control, favours, and reciprocation (Gupta 1995). In the Indian context, the state exerts its control 
at the grassroots level through local bureaucrats, mostly panchayat (village governance) 
members and MLAs (Member of Legislative Assembly) who in turn facilitate the expansion of 
abstract space. These bureaucrats and village officials, determine where roads get built, who will 
be the beneficiary of a tube well, or a rural housing scheme. Ferguson (1990) also drew attention 
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to how, political parties almost never appear in the discourse of development institutions and the 
role of formal institutions such as village development councils like panchayats, in the Indian 
context, which often serve as channels for the ruling party. Corbridge (2005) makes a similar 
observation and points out that the focus on civil society and participatory development in the 
rural context has been at the detriment of analysing the role democratic and official party politics 
can play. Representative democracy in India is heavily shaped by caste, ethnic, and regional 
allegiances, while this presents several constraints for marginalized groups contending against 
upper-caste and dominant religious forces, party politics can also be enabling for those very 
reasons.    
 
6.3 Spatial Politics of Marginalized Groups  
 
Caste politics brings together important concerns around infrastructure, politics, and 
spaces of exclusion in rural India. While Gandhi imagined village-industries and village life as 
the key to India’s development, Dalit (ex-untouchables) leader, Ambedkar critiqued the 
oppressive nature of villages wherein caste hierarchies were embedded not just in social relations 
but also in the spatial arrangement of the village. In their work in Rajasthan, India, O’Reilly and 
Dhanju (2013) note how caste/class power and caste distinctions are maintained through the 
infrastructure and institutions of the drinking water system. Rao (2006 in Loynd 2009) notes how 
“the repeated experience of exclusion from public spaces was an important element of Dalit 
narratives” and something that had significant material ramifications. Most villages in India have 
important public infrastructure, like schools, hospitals, places of worship, wells, etc. towards the 
centre of the village where upper-caste families reside while lower caste groups are restricted to 
the village outskirts. Space and its organization are meant for the convenience of dominant 
groups.  
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But these practices of exclusion have also fueled struggles to reclaim public spaces and 
attempts by political actors to align spatial arrangements with political ideologies, for instance 
through the construction of museums, statues, and the renaming of roads, institutions and 
buildings (Loynd 2009). The capacity of marginal groups to refashion spaces of social control 
into sites of resistance was well recognized by the Lefebvre. For Lefebvre (1993), when 
marginalized groups appropriate space for their own aims, they disrupt the homogenizing aims of 
abstract public space. An attention to the built environment then can also be extended to 
understand how marginalized groups experience and contest social exclusion and oppression 
through the specific arrangement and planning of space. 
I contribute to this discussion on the spatial politics of marginalized groups by focusing 
on indigenous youth who struggle against racialized and exclusionary state practices as well as a 
layering of tropes of ‘the lazy native’ and ‘apathetic youth’ (Gergan 2014). Recent geographical 
literature on infrastructure and the built environment has not paid much attention to young 
people even though young people’s everyday experiences of public and private spaces have been 
a template to understand larger questions of exploitation and marginalization (Bunge and 
Bordessa 1975; Valentine 1996; Skelton 2000; Aikten 2001; Katz 2004; Skelton and Valentine 
2005; Dyson 2008). Holloway and Valentine (2000a) have argued that an attention to the 
spatialities of young people’s lives can highlight unequal power relations embedded in the 
material environment. These questions become more pertinent in the light of neo-liberal 
economic restructuring and how it has radically transformed people’s experiences of youth and 
early adulthood across the world (Jeffery and McDowell 2004).  
          In rural Indian contexts, the localized experience of neo-liberal restructuring, among other 
things has led to a surge in rural out-migration to nearby urban centers. Among marginalized 
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ethnic groups and indigenous communities, this trend has strained inter-generational relations 
leading to fears of losing cultural practices and traditions. Writing in the context of Mexico and 
India, Robson and Nayak (2010:280-281) note that, “demographic, cultural and environmental 
change through out-migration can alter the configuration of institutions, capital and values that 
characterize traditional resource-dependent communities.” As rural youth out-migrate in search 
of education and employment opportunities, on one hand they struggle to find gainful 
employment in urban centers (Jeffery 2010) while on the other hand they are slowly severed 
from cultural and political obligations and rights at home (Robson and Nayak 2010). In this 
article, eco-tourism has emerged as an important avenue for Lepcha youth to gain economic 
stability and the respect of their community members. 
Lepcha youth counter understandings of modernity inherent in government sponsored 
concrete housing and infrastructure, by presenting their brand of eco-tourism as more sustainable 
alternative, an understanding that draws on global discourses of indigeneity which in itself are a 
product of modernity (Karlsson 2003; Castree 2004). Indigeneity, in this context, is based on 
claims of ancient ties to the land and spiritual and material connections to the surrounding 
environment. While equating indigeneity with environmentalism is rife with problematic 
essentialisms, a discussion that is beyond the scope of this article, these discourses draw attention 
to site-specific concerns of marginalized groups. As Mandelman (2014: 186) argues in the 
context of Hawaiian articulations of indigeneity, “any essentialism at work in Native Hawaiian 
claims to history, landscape, and material culture cannot be separated from efforts to decolonize 
the indigenous experience”. As Valdivia (2005:300) notes, in the Ecuadorian Amazon 
reproducing images of indigenous groups as environmental protectors rather than 
developmentalists, has been a powerful strategy for gaining the support of environmental and 
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cultural rights advocates, highlighting how, “the struggles of mixing and choosing from different 
world- views and ways of knowing the world are intrinsic to formulations of indigeneity.” 
              It is also important to note that the aestheticization and commodification of ethnic 
heritage of subordinated indigenous groups will have different consequences depending on who 
deploys it. Indigenous cultural production in Latin America, an important context for 
theorization on indigeneity, while challenging the state, exists “within a transformist hegemony, 
[where] resistance takes place under conditions of inequality that limit the power of the 
subordinated subjects to redefine their status and their place in and contributions to the imagine 
national community” (Alonso 1994:398). In the Lepcha context, anti-dam activists and their 
opponents in the reserve (who are also indigenous) exist within a larger nationalist discourse of 
developing frontier regions like Sikkim and Dzongu. Both anti-dam activists and their 
opponents, maneuverer to access more political rights by drawing on and reproducing different 
narratives of modernity, the former narrative, associated with sustainability and 
environmentalism and the latter associated with “urban forms” of housing and infrastructure.  
          The problematique of eco-tourism promoted in indigenous spaces, then exemplifies how 
indigeneity is produced through material practices and the built environment and is mediated 
through existing political networks and allegiances. Alonso (1994:399) notes that research on 
social movements and resistance that focuses on oppositional culture without considering the 
political and economic power available to subordinated subjects and the possibilities for 
institutionalizing and inscribing popular alternatives, risks becoming a form of wishful thinking. 
Harvey also noted how social movements though “relatively empowered to organize in place but 
[are] disempowered when it comes to organizing over space” (1989:303). Much of the power to 
organize space in rural contexts like Dzongu is derived from capturing political power through 
 155 
representative politics. It was this knowledge that led many anti-dam activists to join the newly 
formed opposition party, Sikkim Krantikari Morcha (SKM) and field Dawa Lepcha, as an MLA 
candidate for the state elections. Indigeneity then is in conversation with multiple forms of power 
and it is important to pay attention to different indigenous interlocutors and the articulation 
between indigenous communities, nation-states, and the international order (Povinelli 2002; 
Rappaport 2005). In places like Dzongu, contestations over spectacular infrastructure like dams 
are spilling over into concerns over mundane infrastructure, drawing attention to how both are 
the product of intense negotiations between and within state and indigenous groups.  
6.4 Background: Civil society and Tourism in Sikkim 
 
As Sikkim steps into its 40
th
 year of being a part of the Indian union, lingering bitterness 
at the Indian state for annexing the independent Buddhist monarchy in 1975, is slowly giving 
way under the weight of more pressing concerns. In May 2014, Pawan Chamling of the Sikkim 
Democratic Front (SDF) party was re-elected as Chief Minister for his fifth consecutive term, 
making him one of the longest serving Chief Ministers in India. Chamling introduced 
hydropower development to Sikkim, promising to boost the economic fortunes of the state 
through infrastructural development, private investment and generation of employment 
opportunities (Lama 2001). The last of these, steady employment, was something many young 
people were eagerly looking forward to. However recent years have seen growing opposition to 
these projects in the face of hydropower corruption scandals, growing ecological precarity, and 
little to no improvement in employment generation.  
The 2014 elections saw the emergence of a new political party, a rarity in the Sikkimese 
context, the Sikkim Krantikari Morcha (Sikkim Revolutionary Front) under the leadership of P.S 
Golay, an ex-SDF party member. During the 2014 political rallies, Chamling reportedly urged 
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local officials to withhold benefits from those who supported the opposition (Fieldnotes 2014). 
In the months leading to the 2014 elections, corruption related to hydropower development, 
youth unemployment and Chamling’s tactics of patronage and victimization (Clement 2014) 
were central themes raised by the opposition. Emboldened by the presence of an opposition 
force, a nascent Sikkimese civil society became more vocal in its critique of the ruling party and 
its contradictory practices of promoting sustainable, organic agricultural practices, and eco-
tourism on one hand and large scale hydropower projects on the other.  
During interviews within Dzongu, ecotourism was brought up repeatedly by educated 
youth regardless of their political affiliation as well as bureaucrats and panchayat members, as a 
future avenue of employment within the reserve. Their hopes are not misplaced since Sikkim’s 
tertiary sector, which includes a range of infrastructure related to the tourism industry, is the 
single largest contributor to its economy (Rizal and Asokan 2013). Nationally, the state has won 
several accolades from the central government for its tourism projects. In 2014, the Lonely 
Planet Guide, declared Sikkim as the number one region for travel, noting that the state had “set 
new benchmarks for responsible travel in the county” with “checkbox tourism having made way 
for…sustainable community-based tourism” (Lonely Planet 2013). Tourism in Sikkim therefore 
is an important sphere for the control and production of space, closely regulated by the state.  
While tourism, broadly defined, is an important sector of economic growth, it has always 
held a special ideological position in Sikkim (Cooke 1980 in Arora 2009). Sikkim has been 
promoted as a former Buddhist kingdom but the predominance of Buddhist iconography and 
architecture belies the fact that the majority of the population (67%) are Nepalese Hindus, a 
factor of historical and colonial processes of migration. Arora (2009:55) notes that the visual 
representation of Sikkim in tourist brochures and postcards, present it as a Buddhist landscape 
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since a “Nepali Sikkim is not commercially attractive to the domestic and international tourist”31. 
Chief Minister, Chamling is known to have casually remarked to communities trying to promote 
tourism, that adding Buddhist prayer flags to nearby lakes would attract more tourists (Fieldnotes 
2014). Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in village based tourism in Sikkim and as 
Lonely Planet notes, “rural home stays are a big draw for foreign tourists as well as the nature-
loving Indian tourist” (Lonely Planet 2013).  Alongside these developments, we find ethnic 
groups like the Limbus and Gurungs, also promoting ‘culturally conscious’ eco-tourism in 
Sikkim. In the broader regional context, we also find many groups engaged in struggles for the 
recognition of their tribal identity, which in addition to demands for affirmative action also calls 
on the state to construct museums, statues, and religious sites that honour their unique cultural 
practices (Shneiderman and Turin 2006; Chettri 2015). 
Eco-tourism in Dzongu then is in conversation with local politics of ethnic revivalism, 
regional development policies, and a global discourse of indigeneity. Dzongu is being promoted 
as an indigenous reserve where inhabitants live in harmony with nature practicing a syncretic 
blend of Buddhism and their shamanic traditions. For the purposes of tourism, indigeneity 
trumps Buddhism or better still in Dzongu, it provides a mix of both worlds. For the anti-dam 
activists, promoting eco-tourism is a way to challenge the state’s version of sustainable 
development (which also involves eco-tourism) while providing employment for the growing 
ranks of educated unemployed youth in Dzongu. The author is aware of critiques of ecotourism 
in indigenous reserves and protected areas especially those encouraging white western tourists 
and its close parallels with colonial, orientalist desire to see natives in their untouched habitats 
                                                 
31
 Though recently there have been attempts to promote Hindu pilgrimage sites within Sikkim, most foreign tourists 
are drawn to Sikkim’s Buddhist landscape and architecture. 
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(Gilbert 2007). While these tendencies are surely at work in the Dzongu context, a discussion of 
these concerns is beyond the scope of this article and the focus instead is on how infrastructure 
and built-environment related to ecotourism provides an important lens into how indigenous 
youth navigate their political marginalization and exclusion.  
6.5 The Benevolent State and Entitled Young People 
 
Unemployed indigenous youth find themselves struggling against societal tropes of being 
‘apathetic youth’ and racialized colonial tropes of the ‘lazy native’ (Gergan 2014). This section 
deals with official state narratives of unemployed young people in Sikkim and Dzongu and how 
these are challenged by Dzongu youth. During fieldwork I attended a workshop on Youth, 
Livelihood and Sustainable Issues, organized by Sikkim’s Human Development Report (HDR) 
cell, which sought input from young people across Sikkim for the forthcoming state HDR. Many 
young people present, raised concerns around the lack of opportunities within Sikkim. The 
response of the government official moderating the meeting, turned into a patronizing speech 
about a benevolent Sikkimese state and the wayward unemployed youth:  
Government official: Is it the government’s responsibility to give jobs to all the 
people? Tell me? Now what has happened in Sikkim is that it is a ‘chopey ko 
state, maya gareko state’ [a state that protects and spoils its people]. The 
government does so much for those who are unemployed, we give trainings, and 
we give loans. When I was the BDO [Block District Officer], I’ve seen this…this 
person who got a loan of 1, 50,000 rupees for a poultry farm. I asked him, “Will 
you actually open a poultry farm”? And he said, “No, I just want to buy a 
motorbike.” 
This caricature of an unemployed youth was a recurring trope in many interviews I 
conducted with government officials both in Gangtok and Dzongu. The government official’s 
reference to Sikkim being a state that “protects” and “spoils” its people, draws on the fact that 
the state government is the single largest employer in the formal sector. Much of this has been 
enabled by special subsidy packages that Sikkim, being one of ten special category states, 
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receives from the Central government (Lama 2001). In addition to this, Sikkimese subjects also 
enjoy special provisions under article 371F of the constitution, which among other things 
includes complete exemption from income tax. At the regional level, this has granted Sikkim the 
reputation of being a state that is ‘spoiled’ by the Indian government and which in turn ‘spoils’ 
its people. The Sikkim Democratic Front with Chamling at its head, while being embroiled in 
several corruption scandals has consistently funnelled central assistance into the provision of 
public welfare schemes and projects targeted mostly at the rural poor. While these programs 
have done much to alleviate poverty within the state, even state officials agree that these benefits 
have come at a price. The author of the 2001 Human Development Report of Sikkim, Mahendra 
Lama noted that “past subsidies were used as government handouts and had spoilt the people by 
killing local initiative and traditional self-help” and that the focus should now be on, “loans for 
entrepreneurship, skills-building, and microcredit for farmers” (Dixit 2003, emphasis mine). This 
quote from Mahendra Lama, reiterates the sentiment of the government official quoted at the 
beginning of this section, who lamented how all the training and loans provided to unemployed 
youth were squandered away by a generation too accustomed to state assistance. Since the 
writing of Sikkim’s HDR in 2001, not much has changed other than the inability of the public 
sector to absorb the growing ranks of educated young people. In interviews with panchayat 
members in Dzongu, a similar theme emerged when I spoke of what opportunities were available 
to young people who were returning to the reserve: 
Panchayat member: The government has several schemes like NREGA or 
handicrafts especially for educated unemployed youth but till now I feel young 
people have not really actively been looking for work. There are so many young 
kids who have returned to the village and are just sitting at home. What I’ve seen 
is that those who have done their graduation or completed their school, they feel 
like they’ve become big people. It’s actually those who have only studied up till 
class 5th or 8th, who participate in these trainings and benefit.  So it’s not like the 
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government hasn’t done anything, there are several schemes. If these young 
people were to look around carefully there are all these opportunities.  
  In rural spaces like Dzongu, the government sponsors trainings and workshops for 
unemployed youth in a range of fields like handicrafts, poultry farming, horticulture, animal 
husbandry etc. Along with the lazy unemployed youth, we find another trope of the arrogant 
educated unemployed youth, who think they are above manual labor. This panchayat member 
was not wrong in her observation, most young people who returned to the reserve, were not very 
involved in these programs. When I inquired why this was the case, the young people I spoke 
with challenged this understanding. Thendup, one of the anti-dam activists who had recently 
switched camps and had joined the ruling party in hopes of getting a secure job, expressed his 
frustration at panchayat members who spoke of NREGA and handicrafts as viable alternatives 
for educated unemployed youth:   
Thendup: Just imagine someone who has put so much effort studied all their 
lives and then has to learn handicraft. They won’t like that. It’s like if someone is 
used to playing games on the computer will they like to play marbles? The 
training programs need to be according to the level. Those who are not educated 
should be involved in these things like NREGA or handicraft and for us there 
should be something more professional. NREGA is not something we asked for it 
is just something that has been implemented by government of India.  
The desire to be employed according to your “level” and the failure to achieve this is 
reflective of the larger global youth employment crisis, wherein many educated youth find 
themselves struggling with both unemployment and underemployment. In a 2011 report the 
International Labor Organization warned of a “scarred” generation of young people who had the 
“bad luck of…entering the labour market in the years of the Great Recession” and how in the 
long run this would result in a “distrust of the political and economic system.” (ILO 2011:6). In 
Dzongu, this distrust was apparent on both ends, with high numbers of unemployed youth 
joining the opposition party and on the other end, panchayat members, who viewed young people 
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as entitled and arrogant. Though many like Thendup, felt it was a safer bet to stick with the 
ruling party, many anti-dam activists said their reasons for returning to the reserve were to 
challenge the ruling party’s control over grassroots politics, wean themselves away from 
government subsidies, and make way for educated youth. Conversations with the educated 
unemployed reserve youth revealed an intense desire to control the projects and programs that 
were presently being executed by village leaders backed by the powerful ruling party. Mayalmit, 
one of the prominent women anti-dam activists, who had decided not to return to Dzongu after 
the protests, expressed a longing to do something for the village but felt heartened by the efforts 
of those who were running successful homestays despite the lack of government support:  
Mayalmit: The youngsters, they are really determined to do something for the 
village, Anum [brother] Tenzing is doing good work and Anum Gyatso, even 
though he is from the law background instead of practicing in the chamber, it has 
become like a compulsion for him to do something for the village. At the end they 
can tell the government with full confidence that we are not even dependent on 
you. Instead they are showing the government the alternative of development. 
Young people are trying to explain what is development. 
 As young people returned to the reserve after the anti-dam protests, they discovered that 
despite being educated and politically articulate, they were marginalized because they did not 
support the ruling party. Instead they found themselves completely dependent on the government 
in most spheres of life, having to ingratiate themselves to panchayat leaders and local politicians 
who supported hydropower projects. This exclusion from the political life of the reserve was 
especially apparent with regards to development schemes related to village or eco-tourism. 
Dzongu presents a unique set of challenges since the land cannot be sold to outsiders (the 
exception being the state and hydropower developers) therefore one can’t really earn a profit 
from land unless you’re cultivating it. Activists like Tenzing and Gyatso refused to sell their 
lands to dam developers which were in prime location and started developing those plots for both 
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agriculture and eco-tourism. Eco-tourism emerged as an important option for the young activists 
due to a combination of reasons ranging from the lack of skills for farming and underdeveloped 
market connectivity. As Lepcha youth attempt to reinsert themselves into the dense political 
networks that characterize these rural spaces, decisions related to infrastructure and built 
environment, are slowly emerging as extremely contested arenas.  
6.6 The Aesthetics of Lepcha Indigeneity   
 
The political articulation of indigeneity has been predominantly analyzed through the 
lens of place-based movements contending with looming threats to land and other natural 
resources however, much less attention is given to the multiplicity of indigenous actors vying to 
define indigeneity and its effects on representations of indigenous culture and the material 
landscape. In Dzongu, anti-dam activists and government officials had very different notions of 
indigeneity which informed their claims over material culture and debates over what counted as 
authentically Lepcha. Anti-dam activists had engaged with national and international 
environmentalist and their time outside the reserve had exposed them to debates on sustainability 
in school and college. During an interview with one of the activists, who ran a very successful 
eco-tourism homestay, I was asked if I was familiar with the work of Halfdan Siiger. Siiger, a 
Danish anthropologist had visited Dzongu almost half a century ago and was extremely taken by 
Lepcha houses in the reserve. It is worthwhile quoting him at length here: 
The Lepcha timber house, li, cannot but attract the attention of the traveler...far 
from dominating or contrasting with their natural surroundings, the massive 
wooden structures and extended thatched roofs of the Lepcha houses seem almost 
to be growing out of the ground like any other feature in the landscape….The 
ordinary Lepcha house is a sturdy one-storey wooden building on piles. The floor 
is raised about three to six feet above the ground, and in the open space between 
the ground and the floor the domestic animals shelter against bad weather and 
wild animals. When one of the occasional landslides thunders through a 
village…it all merely rolls away under the houses without destroying them. The 
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piles rest on big, flat stones…and as neither nails nor screws are used, the house 
is, so to speak, elastic; the tremors of an earthquake may cause it to sway heavily 
from side to side, but that is all. [Siiger 1967:63]  
Siiger’s romantic account of the traditional Lepcha house, that “seem to be growing out 
of the ground” has now become a part of the Dzongu activist’s jargon. Though much has 
changed since Siiger’s visit to Dzongu, for instance, today one would be hard-pressed to find a 
house with the traditional ‘no-nails’ style of architecture [See Fig 9]. But most houses still 
adhere to the basic architectural style, like the raised floor of the house with an open space below 
for storage or livestock.  
Fig 9: The traditional Lepcha house with its “no-nails” style of architecture  
 
The raised foundation of the house in a traditional Lepcha house is supported by these beams. Inside the house a 
similar architectural style can be found that uses a lock-in system rather than nails. This style of architecture is a 
rarity today. (Source: seanhellman.blogspot.in) 
One of the activists, who also runs a homestay, drew my attention to Siiger’s observation 
that Lepcha architecture had adapted to the local environment, making special accommodations 
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for landslides and earthquakes. This was especially significant, in light of the fact that Sikkim 
was extremely earthquake prone. September 11
th
, 2011 Sikkim witnessed an earthquake of 6.9 
magnitude which had its epicentre located very close to Dzongu. Speaking of the tragic 
aftermath of the earthquake, activists spoke of how traditional houses were safer than concrete 
and had not been damaged as much. With traditional houses people could easily reuse the 
different materials while rebuilding their homes but this was impossible with concrete structures 
where not much could be salvaged and reused.  
In rural India, concrete along with being a marker of modernity also represents 
prosperity. In the official census, when determining families that fall Below the Poverty Line 
(BPL), an important indicator is whether the house is kaccha meaning temporary a more direct 
translation would be raw or unripe, or pakka, meaning solid and permanent. The Indian 
government has many central housing schemes for BPL families, such as the Indira Awas Yojna 
(Indira Housing Scheme), which aims to ameliorate rural poverty through the provision of 
permanent housing which generally means construction using stone, brick, cement, and concrete. 
Many a times these housing schemes are integrated with post-disaster recovery schemes, as was 
the case in Sikkim. In Sikkim, after the 2011 earthquake, the post-disaster housing scheme, the 
Reconstruction of Earthquake Damaged Rural Houses (REDRH) came with set guidelines for 
construction using a government hired contractor.  However as Jigmey, quoted at the start of this 
article, points out these houses are more expensive than using traditional construction materials. 
Jigmey was a contractor himself but was interested in starting his own eco-tourism homestay:  
Jigmey: Ok, we have REDRH government houses that are supposed to have a 
stability of 100 years, ok? We can make that using natural ingredients and not 
using concrete. The traditional house it’s cheaper than this nine-post concrete 
house and I guess it’s more earthquake resistant also. Because the typical Lepcha 
house is, I guess it’s also earthquake proof. We have a lock in system we don’t 
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use nails. If we implement only those kind of house. So for Dzongu we are the 
ones to decide, what kind of houses we make. 
Jigmey, then went on to explain what his own homestay would look like and how he 
would only use local ‘organic’ materials from within Dzongu. Not only was this construction 
style more sustainable he pointed out but there was also the matter of what is aesthetically 
appealing for the tourists, especially Western tourists. In my own experience, many Western 
tourists, mostly white Europeans, that would come to stay in the homestays of the anti-dam 
activists, would have long conversations, encouraging them, offering advice, and feedback on 
how to promote eco-tourism. There was a general agreement that government hired contractors 
lacked the aesthetic and design sensibility that would appeal to the “eco-tourist”. This became 
especially evident in the heated debate over the Lingdem hot springs in Upper Dzongu. These 
hotsprings, owe their existence to the Himagiri dam developers who accidently discovered it 
while drilling in the area during the exploratory phase for the project in 2009 (Sikkim Times 
2009). Locals who had sold their land for the project, requested the developers to stop drilling 
the area and instead allow them to develop it for tourism. The Lingdem hot springs soon became 
a huge draw for both locals and tourists and only a small fee had to be paid to the land owner. A 
few years later however the local panchayat and tourism department decided to construct a more 
permanent structure and charge people a higher fee for accessing the hot-springs. Tsering, one of 
the anti-dam activists running a homestay, spoke specifically spoke about the design failure of 
the new construction and how it would not be profitable in the long run: 
Tsering: We don’t want another big museum, another big statue no? Like 
keeping it simple the way it is. Earlier the hotspring was such a nice place, such a 
nice ambience, like stone, protected kind of but now they have made a concrete 
house. And when you look at it it’s not feasible also. You have steam out there so 
everything gets damp and the wood gets destroyed. We thought earlier was a 
simpler one, less expensive like open air dipping. It’s a natural nice way of doing 
it. I guess it’s also long term sustainable tourism. And we don’t have to put any 
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effort but tourists are going to pay more than what they are paying for that. There 
will be a rush for that. 
Fig 10: Lingdem Hotspring in Upper Dzongu 
     
The image on the left is of the hot spring before the construction and the one on the right, is the area post-
construction (Source: Right Image: http://hotsoaksofthehimalaya.blogspot.com/ and Left Image: Sikkim Online 
Updates, Facebook page) 
 
Others like Gyatso, who runs one of the most well-known homestays in Dzongu, Mayal 
Lyang (featured in Fig. 8) mentioned how much “foreign” tourists enjoyed the natural feel of the 
old hot spring but that after the construction he doesn’t take tourists there anymore. He expressed 
his frustration about the hot springs, connecting it to broader issues related to hydropower 
development and climate change.  
Gyatso: We talk about “tourist, tourist” but to get them also you need to have 
some proper infrastructure to show. Like proper as in not man-made kind of 
things, Aboh! [Gosh] we itself are so rich in culture and stories and infrastructure 
it’s just that you need to take proper care of it and we are doing it. Like that 
hotspring, like utilizing it without destroying the ecology…because there’s 
already two projects [dams] and later on it’s going to make a huge difference. 
Like it never used to be so hot like this time this year, like after the Dikchu dam 
the ecology has changed drastically you know? 
 
Many young people framed differences in opinion with panchayat and government 
officials as their inability to relate with the older generation. Another example, that exemplifies, 
these highly politicized intergenerational tensions, was the case of the Hye-Gyathang monastery 
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in Lower Dzongu that had been damaged during the 2011 earthquake. Under the government’s 
earthquake relief scheme, funds were also released for the construction of a new monastery. The 
village panchayat along with the support of several villagers agreed to tear down the old 
monastery and construct a brand new one in its place. However anti-dam activists including one 
of the young panchayat members got together and challenged the panchayat, collaborating with 
an architecture and design studio in Gangtok, to begin the restoration and conservation of the 
monastery. 31 year old Kalzang, who contested as an independent candidate for panchayat 
elections and later joined the opposition party, sympathized with the activists which alienated 
him from the other panchayats 
Kalzang: The first issue that came to us was, destroying the monastery. The older 
generation wanted a new thing to come up so they wanted to destroy the old one. 
But Tenzing said, like it’s kind of a memory, you know you will regret it later. 
Small monasteries in villages may not attract much tourist attention but are an important 
space for the social and cultural life of the village. I had been there on several occasions with 
Tenzing [mentioned in the quote above], one of the anti-dam activists involved in its restoration 
The monastery built eighty years ago by the village people, isn’t remarkable in any way. The 
outside structure and paintings in the interior seemed typical of most monasteries and was not 
very well maintained. Many other monasteries in Sikkim are bigger, better, and more beautiful 
by far. But the activists felt the monastery was an important heritage site because it was built 
almost a century ago by village members themselves. This monastery could be promoted as 
Dzongu’s heritage and attract tourists. Activists were able to request the government to divert 
some of the earthquake relief funds for this purpose and even raised money from well-wishers. 
However since the construction of the new monastery had already been sanctioned, its 
construction was also underway in the same compound.  
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Fig 11: Concrete or Clay? 
    
On the left the old monastery in the foreground and the new monastery, peeks from behind. Right, a close up of the 
new monastery with its construction almost complete (Source: Author’s photograph, 2014) 
The Echostream consultancy, a design studio based in Gangtok has been involved in the 
preservation from its early stages. Efforts to preserve the Hye-Gyathang monastery, connected 
designers like Sonam to the anti-dam activists in Dzongu and its context. As Sonam notes, 
poignantly,  
Sonam: Professionally, it made me rethink and recontextualise design and our 
agenda for Sikkim vis-à-vis art, craft, culture, heritage, education, industries, 
tourism and village development plans. Personally, I found out that there is very 
little I know about Sikkim and its people. There is much more to Sikkim than 
Khangchendzonga, the beautiful landscape, weather and momos [dumplings] 
During the run up to the April 2014 elections I realized that many civil society folks in 
urban parts of Sikkim, like Gangtok were deeply invested in Dzongu and had developed 
relationships with many of the anti-dam activists. Dawa, the anti-dam activist who along with 
Tenzing had spear-headed the hunger strike in 2007, was running for the MLA of Dzongu 
against Sonam Gyatso, the present MLA, who was also the Power Minister. While most people 
dismissed Sikkimese politicians as corrupt, Dawa who was declared as the “poorest candidate” 
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based on his personal assets, became a talking point for what that meant for the future of Dzongu 
and Sikkim, if someone like him could win the elections.    
6.7 Electoral Imaginaries and a Landscape of Dissent  
 
As the state elections (April 2014) drew closer in Sikkim, the tension was palpable in the 
air. In August 2013, when I had just started fieldwork, the orange, red, and green flag of the 
opposition party, SKM, was hoisted only by a handful of households in Sikkim. In Dzongu, it 
was only the anti-dam activists who dared hoist the SKM flag. However with each subsequent 
trip to the reserve I noticed SKM flags cropping up at quite a steady pace across the Sikkimese 
landscape. I would often travel to Dzongu from Gangtok, with Chetan, a well-known author and 
architect who was helping with the Hye-Gyathang monastery conservation. Chetan was an ardent 
SKM supporter and traveling with him was always an exercise in memorization, “I don’t 
remember these houses having an SKM flag”, he would say looking out from his jeep, “I think 
these are new. Oh those ones are definitely new. Look at them right in the middle of a sea of 
SDF flags.” With every subsequent trip to Dzongu, with or without Chetan, I would find myself 
looking out the window, counting the new flags. During this time most interviews and interaction 
with the activists would begin and end with, “when our party comes into power”. Young people 
like Kalzang below, expressed an intense desire to control the plans and projects within Dzongu, 
by winning the elections:   
Kalzang: First we need to change the entire political scenario of Dzongu. 
Because power is the most important thing you know? If hopefully we come to 
power tomorrow, we will only implement good things and not like putting NHPC 
[National Hydro Power Corporation] forcefully. No, like getting self-
employment, doing organic farming, we will concentrate more on that. 
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Fig 12: A Landscape of Dissent 
      
Right: Posters for Dawa’s campaign in Dzongu in the foreground and the SKM party in the foreground, with the 
slogan “Say No to Drugs. Yes to SKM”. In Dzongu, many SKM posters would be torn overnight. Left: the flags of 
the ruling SDF and the opposition SKM (saffron and green) appear to be locked in battle.   
Capturing political power became one of the only ways for these young activists to 
implement their designs for the future of Dzongu. Both SDF and the SKM, were drawing large 
crowds to their campaign rallies within Dzongu and as a researcher, I had access to campaign 
meetings on both sides. During one such rally in the Hye-Gyathang GPU, both panchayat 
members and the present MLA, Sonam Gyatso, spoke openly and at length about how there 
would be repercussions for those who were coming out to support SKM. Sonam Gyatso, likened 
the youth supporting SKM, as “dangerous bulls trying to gore people”, adding, that when he 
came back to power, such young people would be disciplined (Authors fieldnotes 2014). 
However as Pempo’s comments below show, these young people had already been disciplined.  
Pempo: It’s like you go for the training [for unemployed youth] but you get so 
discouraged. At the end of the training the say you have all these documents that 
you have to move from office to office to get a loan. Before that you have to go to 
the MLA and you have to get a NOC [No Objection Certificate] from the 
 171 
panchayats. Then they will say this boy or girl is from the opposition party they 
will not get anything but they don’t do it directly. They just keep delaying. They 
won’t do your work on time and that’s how you get discouraged. The department 
people say, “you don’t support our government what can we do”. Only in very 
rare case ones get the chance. 
Even those young people, who made attempts to avail opportunities for unemployed 
youth like training programs and workshops, found that their political ideology was more 
important than their qualifications. Another youth, Tsering, expressed similar frustrations and 
commented on the futility of attending government organized trainings when you lack political 
power.  
Tsering: These cooperative societies [for unemployed youth] have been opened 
by the government of Sikkim but the government is running under one political 
party. Whichever party runs the state it’s their scheme. Once you get into a 
[cooperative] society you need to work according to the principle and ideology of 
that political party. But not everyone agrees with that. Not everyone likes that one 
party. We have many youth who don’t like the ruling party because of that we get 
no izaat (respect) even though we work so hard.   
Anyone who has had a brush with bureaucracy and red-tapism in India can attest to how 
draining the process can be. Corbridge (2005) writing of this very experience, notes that most 
ordinary, poor people never encounter the state, i.e., political representatives, in their daily lives. 
Instead they encounter the babus (colloquial term for government bureaucrats) and chamchas 
(sycophants) in government offices. These are the encounters where people “see the state” and 
engage with it through myriad practices such as bribes, using personal connections, etc. with 
varying degrees of success. Many young activists, who studied outside the reserve, had never 
had to enter a government office or ask for favors, the way poorer folks have to on a regular 
basis. In addition to this, most young activists were educated youth from relatively prosperous 
families within the reserve. It was their involvement in the anti-dam protests that had relegated 
them to the sidelines of village life. Despite not being as educated and qualified as them, 
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panchayat members and local politicians wielded all the power within the reserve. Both Pempo 
and Tsering, spoke of how while frustrating, this had been a humbling experience which helped 
them gain a better understanding of how governance and political patronage worked in Sikkim.  
On the day of the state election result, everyone was glued to their phone, radios, and 
laptops. As the counting for the Dzongu constituency began, with every new update, tense 
murmurs slowly gave to way to a disappointed silence. Sonam Gyatso defeated Dawa by a huge 
margin much to the disappointment of the anti-dam activists. For many of these young people, 
their open support for the opposition party and Dawa’s defeat meant another five years of 
political exclusion within Dzongu. A few days after the election, I saw Dawa and asked him 
what his next steps would be. Without a moment’s hesitation Dawa replied, “Panchayats. That’s 
where we have to focus our energy not being Chief Minister or something but winning panchayat 
elections…that is the most important thing now.” (Author fieldnotes 2014). While it is important 
to pay attention to social movements and their revolutionary potential, another important facet of 
grassroots politics, as Ferguson (1990) and Corbrigde (2005) both argue, are local development 
councils. Government intervention in the form of infrastructural projects or other public services 
meant to improve rural life will always be mediated through these highly politicized channels. 
While indigenous social movements can be an important site of analysis for the production and 
deployment of indigeneity, our engagement with these groups should not end with the 
movement. Instead what is required is a sustained and in-depth engagement with representative 
politics and its material impacts in these spaces.    
6.8 Conclusion 
 
In Dzongu an ‘authentic’ indigenous landscape is being shaped by young activist’s 
engagements with transnational solidarity networks, civil society groups and local designers and 
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architects, demonstrating the centrality of the material and built environment in the production of 
indigeneity. However as the divide between the older political leaders and these young activists 
sharpen, these inter-generational and political tensions manifest most explicitly in contesting 
visions of what infrastructure counts as authentic and indigenous. Material aesthetics and 
architectural design are closely tied to the representation of places and become especially 
important when considering indigenous involvement in tourism. Indigeneity is both a discursive 
and a material, place-based process that promotes a certain vision and representation of 
indigenous lives and livelihoods. Scholars also understand indigeneity as “the cultural and 
political work of articulation” (Murray Li 2000) which is ‘customized’ by the interlocutors 
(Greene 2009). This articulation and customization also has real material effects involving 
negotiations over the production and control of space and its built environment and 
infrastructure. Eco-tourism is an industry that valorizes the indigenous subject while codifying 
many customs and practices that are central to the tourist’s authentic experience. While this 
notion of fixity and an unchanging indigenous culture are highly problematic, in the Dzongu 
context alternatives like eco-tourism can offer solutions, however temporary they may be to a 
very rigid state structure that has left very few options for dissenting parties.  
The spatial politics of marginalized groups offer important insights into how power and 
meaning is negotiated through the built environment and infrastructure. A discussion of 
Escobar’s (2008) ‘figured worlds’ can further highlight the process of this negotiation. ‘Figured 
worlds’ are defines as “locally situated, culturally constructed, and socially organized worlds that 
make visible people’s purposeful and reflective agency, that is their capacity to remake the world 
they live in” (Escobar 2008:219). These are the spaces wherein activists are “literally, figuring 
worlds through a variety of practices, articulations, and cultural artifacts” (219). In Dzongu, this 
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‘figuring’ is enacted by activists, through both discursive and material practices which involve an 
explicit engagement with aesthetics, infrastructure, and democratic politics. Aitken (2013) 
writing in the context of eco-tourism in Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve (FNNR) in China, 
also draws on this notion of ‘figured worlds’ to trace the connections between eco-tourism, local 
activism, and community networks. While ecotourism in Aitken’s (2013) context was being 
promoted by the state where locals have little control over the projects, he notes how 
marginalized groups are simultaneously privileged and disadvantaged by these changes and in a 
context of limited opportunities ‘figuring’ implies having to juggle multiple priorities and 
strategies. This articulation then helps us locate indigenous groups like Lepcha youth and their 
material and political strategies as they maneuver and bargain for agency and autonomy within 
these restrictive conditions. 
At the grassroots level, party politics can bring about drastic social change especially 
when they are led by marginalized groups. Despite their tenuous relationships at home, the 
activism of Lepcha youth has rendered the tribe more visible to the state and the global 
indigenous community. Dzongu is slowly becoming a favoured tourist destination and, with the 
emergence of a SKM, an important political constituency. This emergent indigenous identity 
which valorises the indigenous subject while positing the state as an antagonistic force is 
familiar, however, in Sikkim where the state government has been lauded for its ‘pro-tribal’ 
policies (Shneiderman and Turin, 2006; Turin, 2014), this discourse of indigeneity marks a shift 
from the more prevalent institutional discourse, which appeals to the state for recognition and 
benefits. This shift is a product of the Dzongu protests and, more specifically, young indigenous 
people’s experience of exclusionary state practices and their engagements with transnational 
solidarity networks. Lepcha activists imagine a future in which educated youth will have a say in 
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development. Young people’s activism is bringing the territorial margins into the political and 
geographic imaginary of the state. These young, articulate, politically and environmentally 
conscious Lepcha activists indicate the shifting terrain of indigeneity.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: PRECARITY AND POSSIBILITY AT THE MARGINS 
 
 For many in the West, the Himalayas conjure up images of furry yaks, fluttering Buddhist 
prayer flags, and majestic snow-capped mountains. These images evoke a sense of tranquillity 
and permanence but the reality as most astute observers find out quickly, is one of cultural, 
political, and ecological upheaval. Hydropower projects, growing ethnic unrest, and natural 
hazards, are recent iterations of problems that are centuries old, rooted in colonial and post-
colonial state practices.  The contested history of incorporating these political margins into the 
Indian Union both informs and complicates contemporary development interventions in the 
region. Along with political instability, the geo-physical instability of the region can in some 
cases provide fertile ground for radical political struggles. This research argues for a more 
thorough understanding of cultural, ecological and geophysical processes and histories, to 
theoretical frameworks related to racialized and ethnic minority groups. Through its engagement 
with marginalized groups at the Himalayan margins, I have sought to illustrate how “borders and 
marginality constitute nodes of engagement within which broader patterns are negotiated and 
worked out in unequal dialogue with those living within them” (Cons and Sanyal 2013:6). The 
Himalayan region is in a state of geological and political flux that requires an attention both to 
geological time and to the pressing weight of future anxieties around economic uncertainty and 
cultural and ecological loss.  
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  For geographers, the concerns of this region and its people open up several important 
analytical categories for examination, especially given the growing interest in the Anthropocene. 
This dissertation contributes to the growing body of scholarship on this region with specific 
regard to interdisciplinary conversations around indigeneity, marginalized subjectivities, and 
environmental justice. Here I will briefly summarize the main theoretical argument of each 
dissertation chapter; In Chapter 2, I present a theoretical framework that informs many of the 
subsequent arguments in the dissertation. In this chapter I’ve argued that materialist and post-
humanist work in Geography has ignored indigenous theorizations of the sacred, sentient, and 
supernatural and that an inquiry into these belief systems provides crucial insights into both 
extraordinary and everyday politics. I extend this argument in Chapter 4 in which I draw 
attention to overlooked forms of political action and knowledge through serious engagement 
with indigenous narratives of geological and supernatural events. In this I highlight the 
relationship between natural hazards, sacred landscapes, and indigenous groups, to argue for a 
more holistic approach to uneven impacts of climate change on mountainous environments and 
their inhabitants. Chapter 2 draws on ethnographic data to demonstrate how young people’s 
bodies and futures are actively deployed in contestations over natural resources and material 
benefits between the State and indigenous groups. This chapter also illustrates how contestations 
between State and indigenous groups often pry open profound contestations within these groups, 
in this case between young people and reserve elders and urban political elite. In Chapter 5 I 
draw on interviews with indigenous groups and state technocrats to interrogate how heightened 
indeterminacy is mediating and productive of a borderland subjectivity grounded in the geo-
physical and spiritual particularity of the region. In this I draw attention to the importance of 
geo-physical and political indeterminacy and a ‘critical geographic mobilization of place’ for 
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environmental politics and marginalized subjectivities in the Anthropocene. Chapter 6 draws on 
interviews with young people, state officials and local panchayat members and highlights the 
intimate linkages between indigeneity and young people’s encounter with materials, spatial 
ideas, and state practices. In this I demonstrate how indigenous youth navigate the treacherous 
terrain of unemployment and state apathy to craft new political subjectivities.    
This dissertation research while firmly grounded in an ethnographic engagement with the 
local context of Sikkim and the broader Himalayan region is also in conversation with several 
recent national developments. I will briefly highlight a few developments that provide an 
important context to the questions and concerns raised here. While conducting fieldwork in the 
heightened political climate of the 2014 Sikkimese state elections, the outcomes of which felt 
fairly unpredictable at that time, it was easy to overlook that elsewhere in India the national 
elections were also unfolding though with much less ambiguity. The outcome at the national 
level were far more predictable, the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) led National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) ousted the incumbent Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), in a 
landslide victory winning 336 of the 543 seats of the Lower House of India’s Parliament. In 
Sikkim, discussions among activists and civil society members opposed to the SDF were marked 
with expectancy and a longing for political change after two decades of political incumbency. 
These conversations were in stark contrast with those taking place at the national level among 
environmental and social activists, which were marked instead with both resignation and 
trepidation. BJP’s Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi who went on to win the elections 
and is currently the Prime Minister of India, is a Hindu Nationalist and member of the right-wing 
organization, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). He is a controversial figure whose alleged 
involvement in the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in his home state of Gujarat under his Chief 
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Ministership earned him both national and international notoriety. For many environmentalists, 
Modi’s promise to usher in Acche Din (good days) through his pro-business policies meant a 
further deterioration in environmental, political and cultural rights of the most marginalized 
groups in India.    
Under the decade long rule of Congress led UPA (2004-2013), India had witnessed its 
fair share of destructive industries alongside a slow erosion of the environmental and cultural 
rights of indigenous groups. However within the first 100 days of the Modi administration, 
several key environmental norms and regulations such as the Forest Rights Act and Forest 
Conservation Act were significantly altered to aid industrial development (Times of India 2014). 
While many see this as no different from the underlying market logic that guided the previous 
regime (Mohan 2015) what is markedly different about Modi’s rule is the growing climate of 
intolerance against any form of civil society dissent. In April 2015, Greenpeace India’s 
registration was suspended for six months citing failure to report and underreporting foreign 
funding (Lakshmi 2015). Many prominent environmental activists believe this was a direct 
response to the organizations protests against coal mining projects in central India. Along with 
environmental concerns, at present the nation is witnessing a massive wave of student protests 
against the growing suppression of civil and political liberties in several prominent university 
campuses across India. These protests were spurred by the suicide of a Dalit student, (University 
of Hyderabad) Rohit Vemula following his indefinite suspension and the arrest of university 
student leaders (JNU, Delhi) under sedition charges for making “anti-national” statements 
(Wazir 2016). While these events at the national level don’t map on neatly to the events 
unfolding in Sikkim, an attention to the points of intersection and divergence can illuminate a 
few key issues.  
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First, the focus on hydropower and infrastructural development in the Himalayan region 
provides an important entry point given the capitalist market mechanisms that are aggressively 
pushing for the development of the Northeast and Himalayan region. These development 
projects encouraged by both national and regional development policies show no signs of 
ceasing under Modi’s administration. The ‘Look East’ policy which has identified the Northeast 
Region as an important economic corridor to South East Asia has important geopolitical 
implications for the entire region. Even as investment in the Indian hydropower industry has 
witnessed a gradual slowdown (Schneider 2014) both China and India are investing in the hydro 
futures of their neighbours, Nepal and Bhutan (Vidal 2013). Modi’s first international diplomatic 
visit was to Bhutan to inaugurate the India-backed 600 MW Kholongchhu project and over 75% 
of the energy generated by the Bhutanese hydropower industry is being supplied to India (The 
Hindu 2014). Conversely, diplomatic relations between India and Nepal (whose hydropower 
industry is being funded by China) have significantly deteriorated after India’s critical response 
to the country’s new constitution which is alleged to discriminate against Madeshi and Tharu 
groups living along the Nepal-India border (Pant 2015). The Chinese-backed Nepalese and 
India-backed Bhutanese hydropower industry while altering the ecological, political and cultural 
fates of these countries also serve as proxies for the geo-political and economic ambitions and 
anxieties of these powerful economic giants. Murton (2013:16) argues that the growing 
investment and rapid development of Himalayan highways is a “strategic and effective way for 
both China and India to create new markets as well as link existing and expanding economies 
that since the 1940’s have been largely segregated” while also noting that these developments 
“challenge[s] the historical relations between center and periphery and state and subject that have 
long characterized the Trans-Himalaya.” Even as Indian state interventions in the Himalayan 
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region enters a new phase of rapid expansion this is also leading to the conflation of 
environmental, cultural, and political movements in the region, giving rise to new forms of state 
dissent, political strategies and subjectivities.  
Second, the focus on environmental social movements, representative politics both at the 
local and regional level provide an important lens into nature of this shifting relationship 
between the center and its peripheries. Ferguson and Gupta (2002:988) have noted in the context 
of the resistance engendered by development projects that “new forms of transnational 
connection are increasingly enabling ‘local’ actors to challenge the state’s well-established 
claims to encompassment and vertical superiority in unexpected ways”. In the context of the 
Northeast Region and states like Sikkim that have a contested history of assimilation into the 
Indian Union along with local histories of cultural erasure and political marginalization, 
representative politics and social movements bring together a diverse range of concerns. The 
growing resentment against hydropower projects is taking the form of social movements across 
the Himalayan region. Though fragmented at present, these movements have the potential to turn 
into a regional alliance of civil society concerns that can effectively check state power 
(Chowdhry and Kipgen 2013).  However focusing merely on instances of resistance can also 
obscure the “explicitly-expressed hope for the state” that can provide “functional transport, 
education, health services, and justice.” (Karlsson 2013: 329). Through a focus on how social 
movements like the Lepcha anti-dam movement morph into political parties at the village and 
state level, I have attempted to show the importance of established political channels and modes 
of representation for an emancipatory politics for marginalized groups. Especially for educated 
unemployed youth who find themselves at odds with both community elders and the state, these 
political platforms provide an important space to voice state critiques.  
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Third, while environmental regulations continue to be weakened under the Modi 
administration which means we will continue seeing negligent and shoddy construction practices 
but as Huber and Joshi (2015: 22) note, the scale of these projects have made their disastrous 
consequences visible even to the untrained eye. Along with resistance on cultural and political 
grounds, hydropower projects have run into technical roadblocks that are worsened by natural 
hazards and “the exceptionally high concentrations of mud, silt, and grit carried by Himalayan 
rivers…and the ragged-edged grains of quartz and feldspar constantly overwhelm settling basins 
and chew up pipes and turbines.” (Schneider 2014: xx). While there are several functioning 
hydropower projects in the region that have been able to overcome both technical and geo-
physical challenges their future is uncertain in the context of climate change and its impact on 
the hydrology of the region. There is also growing concern over the uneven impacts of 
anthropogenic climate change, especially hazards and disasters, on mountainous environments 
and their inhabitants. I have attempted to highlight how disasters and hazards even as their 
effects are borne unevenly by marginalized communities, can also present a limit to capitalist 
expansion in the Himalayan region. However given the present political conditions it is unlikely 
we will see a decline in hydropower development in the region anytime soon. As Ferguson 
(1994: 176) demonstrates in his seminal work that despite their apparent failure development 
projects “do, however succeed in expanding the field of bureaucratic state power in people’s 
everyday life” and that this “recognition that this often unintended consequence of 
“development” is its main achievement argues for a new politics of opposition.” Therefore the 
question we must ask when it comes to Himalayan hydropower is not why they still persist 
despite their apparent failure but what this “new politics of opposition” should look like. Perhaps 
this requires a broadening of the field of politics or what we count to be political.  
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Fourth, in the wake of both political and ecological upheavals it becomes important that 
we pry open the meaning of politics and how people relate to these drastic events. In this 
dissertation, I have paid attention to people’s spiritual and religious articulation as it illuminates 
their relationship to an animate landscape but also as analytical categories that help in 
understanding the socio-political histories of religious and ethnic minorities. In the Indian 
political context, religion has played an important though mostly divisive role. Modi’s brand of 
nationalism with its narrow political interpretation of Hinduism has been understood as an 
extremist variant of the faith. Following Nandy (1998), Bachetta (2000) writing about the Babri 
mosque anti-Muslim riots, argues that this Hinduism-as-ideology must be differentiated from 
Hinduism-as-faith that does not propagate such intolerance (though Dalit and lower caste groups 
may disagree on that count). In Sikkim, Tibetan Buddhism while nowhere as extreme as Hindu 
nationalism heavily influenced both the contemporary and historical landscape of the state, often 
suppressing and subjugating local indigenous beliefs and practices.  The political ideology of 
Tibetan Buddhism must also be separated from the practice of Buddhism that has for centuries 
co-existed with local beliefs (Balicki 2008). Spiritual and religious traditions, as they morph and 
change from one generation to the next, must be placed in conversation with both historical and 
contemporary realities.  
 Fifth and lastly, young people across the Himalayan region are becoming increasingly 
politicized as they are faced with uncertain futures where despite their education they find 
themselves struggling to find employment
32
. These concerns mirror the larger national context 
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which has also witnessed a steady increased in educated unemployed youth. In the Himalayan 
states, young people become a focal point as they prepare for a future in which their homelands’ 
relation to the nation is uncertain. Ecological precarity bears directly on young people’s lives and 
labour, which are intimately tied to the natural environment (Katz, 2004; Dyson, 2008; 2014). 
Himalayan youth find themselves responding to this layering of tropes painting them as both 
‘apathetic youth’ and the ‘lazy native’. Young people’s bodies and futures are the template on 
which territorial, ecological and moral anxieties play out (Smith, 2013). Through their anti-dam 
struggle young Lepcha activists are actively developing an ecological rendering of territory and 
the future, which weaves together their ancient ties to the land with a critique of state-led 
development. Despite their tenuous relationships at home, the activism of Lepcha youth has 
rendered the tribe more visible to the state and the global indigenous community. These young, 
articulate, politically and environmentally conscious Lepcha activists indicate the shifting terrain 
of indigeneity. Young people’s activism is bringing the territorial margins into the political and 
geographic imaginary of the state. Lepcha youth activism then demonstrates how young people’s 
practices reconfigure ideas of territory and the future. The recent student protests across India are 
reflective of the struggle of young people against the state led corporate colonization of their 
mind, bodies, and futures.  
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APPENDIX 
Questions for Panchayat Members and Village elders 
1) What is your name, age, occupation?  
 
तपाई को नाम के हो र तपाई को उमेर? तपाई के काम गर्छ ? 
 
2) Have you lived or studied outside Dzongu? Do you have property or rented 
accommodation outside Dzongu?  
 
के तपाई द ्ोोंगु देखि बहीरो बसु्न या काम गनुछ भाको र्? के द ्ोोंगु देखि बहहरो तपाई को घर र् 
आफ्नो या हकराई को माकान? 
 
3) How many children? Any in the age group of 16-35 who are living and working outside 
Dzongu?  
 
तपाई को कहत नानी हरु र्? के तपाई को 16-35 उमेर को नानी र् जो चय द ्ोोंगु देखि बयरा काम 
गर्छ  अहन बाहहरो नी बस्र्ा ? 
 
4) Do you feel they will return? Do you want them to return? If not/yes then why? 
 
तपाई लाई के लाग र् तपाई को र्ोरा /र्ोरी र अरु जवान केटा केहट हरु आफ्नु school/college या 
नौकरी सकेरा द ्ोोंगु फकेर औोंर्ा? 
 
5) What things would need to change within Dzongu for young people to return? 
 
द ्ोोंगु मा कुन-कुन ची् हरु को पररवतछन हुनु परर् हजस ले गदाछ यहााँ को केटा केहट हरु फरकेरा 
औोंर्ा ? 
 
6) What do you think about government efforts with regards to a) cardamom b) cane c) 
organic farming and d) eco-tourism? 
 
तपाई लाई के लाग र् हक सरकार ले गरदई गरेको योजना हरु, जस्तो हक एलैची को िेती, बेथ को 
training, organic farming, eco-tourism इत्यादी योजना हरु, सफल भएको र्? 
 
7) Do you see a lot of young people getting involved in these govt. schemes or perhaps 
taking initiative on their own?  
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या को जवान हरु यो योजना हरु मा भाग हलए को र् जस्तो लग र् हक लागै्दना? यहद उनीहरु भाग 
हलए को रै्ना भने, के अरुों  काम गर्छ  उहन हरु ? 
 
8) If they are unemployed and not involved in these projects, what kind of activities are 
young people involved in mostly? Are there places that young people within Dzongu 
‘hang out’ within your village is there a shop or an area, like the khola or someplace 
where young people gather to talk politics or just hang out?  
 
यहद उहन हरु बेरोजगार र् अहन यो योजना हरु मा भाग लेको र्ईना भने, यहााँ क जवान हरु कस्तो 
पारा ले आफ्नु समय लाई हबतौउना गदाछ र्, ढेर जस्तो। के यहााँ एस्तो ठओों हरु र्, ज हक जवान 
केटा केहट हरु बेहला भैरा राजनीहत र अरु हवषय हरु को कुरा गरर्? 
 
9) In your GPU what is the level of political awareness and participation of young people 
like attending the gram sabha, raising questions there or showing interest in being a 
panchayat member?  
  
के तपाई को GPU मा यहााँ को जवान केटा केटी हरु ले राजनीत को कुरा मा कहत को चासो र् र 
भाग हलने गदाछ र् --- जस्तो हक ग्राम सभा मीतोंग मा भाग हलने र आफ्नो कुरा राखे्न र पोंचायत को 
चुनाव मा लड ने इच्छा रािने गदाछ र् त? 
 
10)  Has the level of participation and interest in politics changed with the upcoming state 
elections? 
 
यो आउोंदा राजनीतीक चुनाव गदाछ क जवान हरु को भाग हलने सोचाई अकै हकसम को बद हलएय 
को र् त? 
 
11)  I want to shift the questions a little bit to more of the spiritual and cultural aspect of 
living within Dzongu. Do you think this generation is sensitive to culture, like language, 
festivals, rituals? There is a certain section those who are educated who seem quite active 
but at the ground level what is the situation? 
 
मो अहलक अकै हवषय माहथ एक दुइ वात्त प्रशन तपाई लै सोदना चाहन्रु् ल. के तपाई लै लग र् हक 
द ्ोोंगु को जवान हरु रोोंग सोंसृ्कहत, जसै्त बोल्नु, चाढ-परुआ हरु मा भाग हलने गदाछ र् त? हकनहक 
अहलकेती बाइर गएरा आको र अहलकहत पदह हलिा भएको जवान हरु यो हवषय मा पुरा active र् 
तर गाोंव को जवान जो बाइर गएको रै्न  उहन हरु को एस हवषय मा चासो र् हक रै्ना? 
 
12)  Dzongu has always been a place which has attracted researchers from all the over the 
world for its culture and ecology. In the last few years esp. several things have brought 
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more attention to Dzongu - the cardamom virus, and in 2011 it was the earthquakes – 
there are official scientific explanations for why these things are happening not just 
within Dzongu but outside as well. But within Dzongu do people have their own theories 
of why cardamom died mysteriously and these earthquakes are happening with the 
epicenter very close to Dzongu.  Like spiritual or religious explanations?  
 
द ्ोोंगु को सोंसृ्कहत र पयाछवरण लै देिेरा सोंसार को हवहभन जगन बाट मान्रे् हरु धेरई हवषय हरु मा 
रेसेअचछ गनुछ लाहग औनी गदाछ च. तर द ्ोोंगु मा यो दुइ कुरा, एलैची को virus अहन 2011 को भुइचल 
मा हसखिम र भारतीय scientists हरु मा पहन धेरई इने्तरेस्ट आइको र्. Scientists हरु को आफ्नु 
theory र् हक यो भुइचल  र virus हकन आइको र् तर द ्ोोंगु मा मान्रे् हरु के भन्र् यो हवषय मा? 
जस्तो हक धाहमछक या देवी- दयूता ले गदाछ हो हक अरको कारण हरु ? 
 
Extra questions if time permits:  
What happened after the earthquake (relief efforts)?  
Opinion on relief efforts, do they feel safe and prepared for future earthquakes?  
Spiritual beliefs about the reserve  
Opinion on cardamom and non-government initiatives like JICA, organic farming, orange and 
ginger.  
Hopes for the future, optimistic or not?  
Survey Questionnaire for youth   
1. Name, age, education, occupation 
तपाई को नाम के हो र तपाई को उमेर? तपाई के काम गर्छ ? 
 
2. Have you lived or studied outside Dzongu? Do you have property or rented 
accommodation outside Dzongu?  
 
के तपाई ्ोोंगु देखि बहीरो बसु्न या काम गनुछ भाको र्? के ्ोोंगु देखि बहहरो तपाई को घर र् आफ्नो 
या हकराई को माकान? 
3. How many siblings do you have? Are any in the age group of 16-35 who are living and 
working outside Dzongu?  
 
तपाई को कहत भाई - बईनी हरु र्? इन्ही हरु बीच मा 16-35 वषछ सम को चैइ ्ोोंगु देखि बायर 
काम गने अन्ही बसे्न कहत र्?    
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4. Do you feel they will return? Do you want them to return? If not/yes then why? 
 
तपाई लै के लग र् तपाई को भाई- बइनी या साहथ हरु जो बायर जानु भाको र्, आफ्नु सू्कल 
college या काम सकेर ्ोोंगु फकेरा औोंर्? 
 
5. What things would need to change within Dzongu for young people to return? 
्ोोंगु मा कुन-कुन ची् हरु को पररवतछन हुनु परर् हजस ले गदाछ यहााँ को केटा केहट हरु फरकेरा 
औोंर्ा ? 
6. What do you think about government efforts with regards to a) cardamom b) cane c) 
organic farming and d) eco-tourism? 
तपाई लाई के लाग र् हक सरकार ले गरदई गरेको योजना हरु, जस्तो हक एलैची को िेती, बेथ को 
training, organic farming, eco-tourism इत्यादी योजना हरु, सफल भएको र्? 
7. Do you see a lot of young people getting involved in these govt. schemes or perhaps 
taking initiative on their own?  
 
या को जवान हरु यो योजना हरु मा भाग हलए को र् जस्तो लग र् हक लागै्दना? यहद उनीहरु भाग 
हलए को रै्ना भने, के अरुों  काम गर्छ  उहन हरु ? 
 
      8. If they are unemployed and not involved in these projects, what kind of activities are               
          young people involved in mostly? Are there places that young people within Dzongu  
         ‘hang out’ within your village is there a shop or an area, like the khola or someplace where   
          young people gather to talk politics or just hang out?  
 
यहद उहन हरु बेरोजगार र् अहन यो योजना हरु मा भाग लेको र्ईना भने, यहााँ क जवान हरु कस्तो 
पारा ले आफ्नु समय लाई हबतौउना गदाछ र्, ढेर जस्तो। के यहााँ एस्तो ठओों हरु र्, ज हक जवान केटा 
केहट हरु बेहला भैरा राजनीहत र अरु हवषय हरु को कुरा गरर्? 
 
9. In your GPU what is the level of political awareness and participation of young people like  
   attending the gram sabha, raising questions there or showing interest in being a panchayat  
   member?  
  
के तपाई को GPU मा यहााँ को जवान केटा केटी हरु ले राजनीत को कुरा मा कहत को चासो र् र 
भाग हलने गदाछ र् --- जस्तो हक ग्राम सभा मीतोंग मा भाग हलने र आफ्नो कुरा राखे्न र पोंचायत को 
चुनाव मा लड ने इच्छा रािने गदाछ र् त? 
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     10. Has the level of participation and interest in politics changed with the upcoming state  
     elections? 
 
यो आउोंदा राजनीतीक चुनाव गदाछ क जवान हरु को भाग हलने सोचाई अकै हकसम को बद हलएय 
को र् त? 
 
11. I want to shift the questions a little bit to more of the spiritual and cultural aspect of living 
within Dzongu. Do you think this generation is sensitive to culture, like language, festivals, 
rituals? There is a certain section those who are educated who seem quite active but at the 
ground level what is the situation? 
 
मो अहलक अकै हवषय माहथ एक दुइ वात्त प्रशन तपाई लै सोदना चाहन्रु् ल. के तपाई लै लग र् हक 
्ोोंगु को जवान हरु रोोंग सोंसृ्कहत, जसै्त बोल्नु, चाढ-परुआ हरु मा भाग हलने गदाछ र् त? हकनहक 
अहलकेती बाइर गएरा आको र अहलकहत पदह हलिा भएको जवान हरु यो हवषय मा पुरा active र् 
तर गाोंव को जवान जो बाइर गएको रै्न  उहन हरु को एस हवषय मा चासो र् हक रै्ना? 
 
12. Dzongu has always been a place which has attracted researchers from all the over the 
world for its culture and ecology. In the last few years esp. several things have brought more 
attention to Dzongu - the cardamom virus, and in 2011 it was the earthquakes – there are 
official scientific explanations for why these things are happening not just within Dzongu but 
outside as well. But within Dzongu do people have their own theories of why cardamom died 
mysteriously and these earthquakes are happening with the epicenter very close to Dzongu.  
Like spiritual or religious explanations?  
 
्ोोंगु को सोंसृ्कहत र पयाछवरण लै देिेरा सोंसार को हवहभन जगन बाट मान्रे् हरु धेरई हवषय हरु मा 
research गनुछ लाहग आउनु गदाछ र्. तर ्ोोंगु मा यो दुइ कुरा, एलैची को virus अहन 2011 को 
भुइचल मा हसखिम र भारतीय scientists हरु मा पहन धेरई interest आइको र्. Scientists हरु 
को आफ्नु theory र् हक यो भुइचल र virus हकन आ को र् तर ्ोोंगु मा मान्रे् हरु के भन्र् यो 
हवषय मा? जस्तो हक धाहमछक या देवी- दयूता ले गदाछ हो हक अरको कारण हरु ? 
 
Questions for Government officials at Mines, Minerals and Geology Department, Disaster 
Management, Department of Science and Technology  
1. Which areas of Sikkim are the most seismically unstable and landslide prone? 
2. What are some of the main minerals being mined in Sikkim? Which areas is the most mineral 
rich in Sikkim?  
3. What are the major projects being undertaken by your department? And are there any 
collaborative projects being undertaken with other departments 
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4. Is there a lot of conversation between different government departments, say for example 
between your department and the Urban Development and Housing Department?  
5. What are the biggest challenges geologically speaking in developing infrastructure and large 
projects in Sikkim?  
6. After the 2011 earthquake, what was the biggest challenge for rescue operations? Is there a 
any way in which damages to roads and other infrastructure could have been minimized? 
7. Does your department conduct risk assessment studies? If yes, can you give me some details 
of where and when these studies were conducted? 
8. How can dams and other development projects be planned and executed in a more 
environmentally friendly manner in Sikkim? 
9. Would you consider yourself a scientist first or a government official first? Do you ever find 
the two things in conflict? 
  
